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Abstract 
Keywords: Small firm (SME), tendering, critical realism, routines, 
capability, generative mechanisms, case study, absorptive capacity 
Objectives: The current state of theory building in the field of small firm 
tendering capability requires better explanation of the detailed routines 
that underlie capability. This thesis enhances small firm productivity 
literature by proposing a new conceptual framework to explore small firm 
capability to competitively tender for public sector contracts  
Prior Work: My prior work has tested literature themes in human capital 
and dynamic capability theory to move beyond the resource scarcity 
explanation of small firm difficulty in competing for public sector contracts. 
This suggested a conceptual framework to link competitiveness with 
capability building, drawing on cutting-edge organisational theory. It 
prepared me to begin an empirical mobilisation of dynamic capability 
theory, as it relates to small firms 
Approach: A detailed analysis of an exceptionally successful small firm 
identifies specific resources and routines that form the micro-foundations 
for contingently contextual capability. Primary case findings are augmented 
by a comparative case analysis. Research is operationalised through a 
critical realist mode of perception, where tendering is examined as a social 
institution with overlapping layers of structural power that constrain and 
enable the exercise of agential efforts inside a firm. Theoretical case 
sampling through interviews and wider observational and documentary 
analysis demonstrates the utility of the framework  
Results: Tendering capability is conceptualised using institutional, 
capability and absorptive capacity theory. Fifteen firm routines are identified 
and organised into a capability framework that comprises of operational and 
dynamic domains. Competitive capability emerges from routines that 
command resources effectively, not just resource ownership. Tendering 
activity is amenable to routinisation that are situated in regular patterns of 
knowledge, skills and action, but also in dynamic capabilities  
Implications: The study of successful firm routines suggests a new 
research direction for studying aspects of small firm productivity, of which 
tendering is an example. The capability framework and findings will help 
practitioners and policy makers to focus beyond descriptions of practice 
towards a better understanding of causal relationships  
Value: The study addresses a capability knowledge gap in small firms’ 
empirical literature. It demonstrates how the exercise of agency is built and 
shaped through the notion of context. It benefits researchers, business 
support providers, public procurers and small firms. It creates knowledge 
about learning pathways that lead to more small firms placing themselves 
in the opportunity flow of public sector tendering, by using a capability 
framework. 
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Definitions of terms used in this thesis  
 
 
Abduction The identification and testing of links between 
empirical observations and underlying causal 
mechanisms  
Absorptive 
capacity 
A capacity to learn through knowledge 
acquisition and integrating that knowledge 
inside the firm  
Agency Reflexive behaviour within a structural context 
Austerity Refers to official measures or actions taken by 
the government, during a period of adverse 
economic conditions, to reduce its budget 
deficit using a combination of spending cuts or 
tax rises. In procurement terms, public 
institutions and departments are asked to 
deliver services from a reduced income stream 
Brexit A term given to the 2016 UK vote to leave the 
European Union 
Capability  A set of differentiated skills, complementary 
assets, and routines that provide the basis for 
a firm's competitive capacities and sustainable 
advantage in a particular business 
Causation The process of causing something to happen 
or exist, often used to express the relationship 
between an event and its cause 
Context The specific and temporal environment within 
which activity takes place 
Critical realism A meta-theory for social sciences to view 
reality as stratified in nature, with the notion of 
a social structure that people (agents) interact 
with, but that exists independently of 
observable phenomena 
Dynamic capability  A routine that builds and reconfigures internal 
skills and routines to rapidly adapt to changing 
environments  
Embedded  Human action is situated within a wider set of 
social processes 
Emergence  What comes about as change or 
transformation from structure-agency 
interactions  
Entity A theoretical building block used to explain 
relational arrangements of a unit of a social 
structure to guide behaviour and exert power 
with social effects 
Entrepreneurial 
capital 
The skills and abilities to organise socially-
embedded resources used in the creation and 
exchange of goods and services  
10 
 
European Union A political union, often called the EU, with law-
making powers 
Financial capital Resources to provide goods or services, 
measured in terms of their monetary value 
Generative 
mechanism  
Social and cultural forces that are hidden, and 
operate independently or in concert to cause 
change and bring about an effect 
Human capital 
 
The bundle of accumulated knowledge and 
skills that exist, often used at firm-level  
Institution A typed of social structure that exists where 
social actors or individuals are grouped 
together by a common and boundaried 
purpose 
Isomorphism A term to describe types of pressure that 
emanate from an environment  
Laminated 
structure 
Overlapping layers (entities) of a compositional 
social structure 
Mechanism A causal structure that explains a phenomenon 
Micro-foundational  A research technique to gather information at 
the level of everyday practices  
Morphogenetic 
cycle 
A temporal cycle of events that explains the 
concept of emergence. A morphogenetic cycle 
has three analytical phases that occur at 
different points in time 
Organisational 
legitimacy 
A general assumption made that the actions of 
a firm are appropriate within a socially-
constructed set of norms  
Prime contractor  Firms that directly hold a contract with a public 
purchasing unit 
Public sector The part of the economy that is owned by the 
State, i.e. the UK government  
Reflexivity Circular relationships between cause and 
effect  
Resource A tangible or intangible asset that can be a 
source of competitive advantage  
Retroduction An analytic technique critical realists use to 
explain events by identifying generative 
mechanisms that are capable of producing 
them  
Routine  A codified skill or process built from resources  
Small firm  
Social capital 
The ability to facilitate external knowledge 
acquisition and support knowledge exploitation 
Social value 
A way of thinking about how resources are 
allocated and used to improve the economic, 
social and environmental well-being of an area 
Stratification The division of the world into emergent, 
explanatory levels  
11 
 
Structure/structural 
conditions 
The operating environment which pre-exists 
individual and firm interaction with it  
Supplier diversity  A market mechanism for goal-setting and 
monitoring equality in procurement and buying 
services  
Tender  A legally-binding set of documents that set out 
the specification and terms used to purchase a 
product or service   
Tendering A persistent form of competitive public sector 
purchasing action that influences the market 
and conditions under which small firms 
operate.  
Transfer under 
protected 
employment 
A legal term to describe a process to transfer 
individual employment rights from one 
organisation to another when a specific 
contract or service is awarded to another 
organisation 
Value for money A stated goal for procurement to achieve the 
optimal use of resources to achieve intended 
outcomes sought, sometimes referred to as 
‘spending well, spending less and spending 
efficiently’  
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
1.1 My doctoral journey 
 
In 2009, whilst in full-time employment at Manchester Metropolitan 
University as a Senior Enterprise Fellow, I enrolled part-time onto a doctoral 
degree to research small firm public tendering capability. My research 
interest arose from over ten years’ practitioner experience of completing 
public tenders in blue chip and small firm environments. Between 2004 and 
2009, I was a self-employed consultant who provided bid-writing advice and 
review services to SME management teams. Subsequently, whilst in 
university employment, I was awarded government funding to assist an 
architectural practice with public sector tendering. In Manchester 
Metropolitan University’s Business School, I developed new business for 
the University’s Centre for Enterprise through tender completions. 
My practitioner knowledge on tendering capability requirements has 
accumulated through multiple contexts. Yet in 2009, I came to a realisation 
that I did not really understand all the ingredients that allowed some firms 
to become successful at tendering whilst others did not, often with 
comparable resource efforts. Product, reputation, market pricing and an 
ability to follow tendering rules are obvious competitive differentiators. I was 
unable to offer a satisfactory explanation as to whether capability rested 
primarily on experience accumulation, ‘learning by doing’ (Zollo and Winter, 
2002), or if what happens in a firm’s external environment affects how firm 
leaders choose to respond and the resources they employ to do so. As I 
thought harder, I began to see that firms have a complex and dynamic 
interface with the public procurement market. I was curious, and this led me 
to enquire into the small body of empirical knowledge in existing research 
on what is specifically known about small firm tendering.  
I achieved a Masters in Research (MRes) milestone award towards my 
doctorate in 2012 for a dissertation entitled ‘Tackling procurement from the 
smaller end: SME capability enactment through non-tangible resources’ 
(Turner, 2012).  Between 2011 and 2015, it was necessary to suspend my 
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doctoral studies twice for health and personal reasons. After a seven-year 
period of academic study and reflection, I have conducted sufficient 
research to gain a theoretically informed and contextually-led perspective 
of small firm tendering capability to submit my doctoral thesis.  
 
I am studying small firm tendering capability at a time when contemporary 
procurement policy still seeks to promote SME engagement in public 
procurement, evidenced by an industrial strategy green paper that 
dedicates an entire chapter to mobilising small firm engagement with 
tendering for public sector contracts (UK Government Green Paper, 2017). 
Simultaneously, enactment of the UK ‘Brexit’ decision (the 2016 UK vote to 
leave the European Union), could significantly change the landscape for 
firms if European Union (EU) procurement legislation is repealed or 
reformed, but the effects of Brexit on my research topic will not emerge for 
some time. Knowledge about tendering as an environment and competitive 
tendering practice is vital for the UK to decide its future regulation strategy. 
I feel privileged to make my own contribution into this important ongoing 
debate.  
1.2 Introduction to the thesis aim  
 
This thesis offers a novel conceptual model of tendering capability, defined 
in extant literature as “the ability of a firm to marshal its organisational 
resources in order to identify contract opportunities and subsequently 
position itself to exploit them” (Flynn and Davis, 2016, p.9). This definition 
is accepted, but it has limitations too.  It is unclear from the definition if small 
firm action of tendering for public work is in itself a single and distinctive 
capability or a subset of other existing firm capabilities. The thesis develops 
a set of core ideas around what comprises tendering capability in small 
firms to win public sector tenders. It analyses tendering activities by 
specifically connecting firm practices to the concept of capability in an SME 
context. The conceptual framework proposed recognises the macro and 
micro societal factors in play that make firms socially dependent and 
engaged in an interactive influence of external conditions and with firm 
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behaviour. Yet by using the small firm as the unit of analysis, the notion of 
capability presented also recognises how leaders of small can exercise 
agency to create their own tendering capabilities. The proposed research 
framework therefore explores how capability is built from firm practices and 
shaped by context.  
 
Application of a capability-based approach to small firm tendering has 
several advantages. First, it offers a model of interpretation that rejects one-
dimensional definitions and it bypasses some of the narrow or simplistic 
definitions of resource poverty in small firms versus large firms. Second, it 
can accommodate the notion of context between firms and tendering 
situations. Third, it has a sound theoretical basis and it is practically 
relevant, as illustrated by the influence of the capability approach on other 
issues small firms face. For example, empirical studies of collective forms 
of capability in small firms have been applied to multiple operational 
dimensions such as compassion (Lilius et al, 2011), innovation (Branzei 
and Vertinsky, 2006; Hervas‐Oliver et al, 2016; Saunila, 2016), 
internationalisation (Raymond et al, 2014) and environmental performance 
(Lee and Klassen, 2008), and yet not to tendering. The flexibility of adopting 
a capabilities-based approach to understand tendering practices is able to 
capture what firms do without imposing a rigid conceptual structure. 
 
The objective of the study is to analyse tendering practices created inside 
a single small business that is very successful at winning public sector 
contracts. A comparative case study method enables further examination 
of the role and influence of contextual conditions in a primary case. There 
are two reasons why research into tendering capability is required. Firstly, 
tendering capability is not defined adequately in the literature, and it lacks 
a consensus of understanding and approach from the small firm 
perspective. Flynn and Davis’s (2016) definition in section 1.2 does not take 
account of the influence of contextual conditions that surround every 
tendering episode and it does not suggest the role of learning as a construct 
of capability. The distinctive nature of my contribution is to use a micro-
foundational process perspective to study successful small firm tendering 
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actions through a comparative case study approach. A micro-foundational 
approach requires a method such as a case study that can gather 
information at the level of everyday firm tendering activities (Felin et al, 
2015). In this study, the main subject of study is at firm level, with data 
accessed from the firm owner and managers who are the decision-makers 
and deploy resource stocks into tendering. Its novelty lies in learning from 
effective tendering practices and using case findings to conceptualise 
capability in a theoretical framework that includes a dynamic learning 
perspective, with utility for broader audiences beyond academia. 
Knowledge developed on forms of capability and the routines and 
resources that support those capabilities offers a set of thinking tools that 
firms can use to increase their sensitivity to their environmental context.  
 
Secondly, 5.5 million small firms drive the UK economy that account for 
99.3% of all private sector businesses (House of Commons Library, 2016). 
Their ability to win and deliver public sector contracts has both economic 
and social implications. The combined annual turnover of SMEs is £1.8 
trillion, 47% of all private sector turnover in the UK (FSB, 2016). As a sector, 
the role small firms play in economic development and growth is 
recognised, referred to as the vital 95% of the UK economy (Young, 2013). 
Access to winning public contracts offers firms income, reputational gain, 
reliable service payment and opportunities for job creation. The UK 
government spends £268 billion per year on goods and services (UK 
Government Green Paper, 2017), which amounts to 14% of overall UK 
gross domestic product (GDP). Small local firms are believed to generate 
over 58 per cent more economic benefit for their locality over two rounds of 
re-spending than large local firms do (FSB, 2013). SME participation and 
success rates in the public sector marketplace do not match their economic 
weight (GHK, 2010). The UK government reports that over 25% of its 
spending reached SMEs in 2014-15, and that it aims to increase this to 33% 
by 2020 (National Audit Office, 2016). However, these figures refer to SMEs 
delivering public sector contracts both directly (by winning tenders 
themselves) and indirectly (through entering into sub-contracted 
arrangements from a large firm). The focus of interest in this study is upon 
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a small firm’s capability to win tenders directly, and reliable data does not 
exist to report on direct contract awards to SMEs.  Promises of more 
opportunities for SMEs and government responsibility to create the ‘right 
conditions’ are encouraging, but do not offer any clues about how small 
firms can develop capability to participate further.   
 
Socially, SMEs increase the volume and nature of supplier diversity (Baden 
et al, 2011). Supplier diversity is a market mechanism concerned with 
equality in procurement and buying services. It exists to ensure that any 
supplier or potential supplier has a free and fair opportunity to compete for 
business, based on individual merits. For tendering to work as a social 
institution, it must be inclusive of small firms as suppliers to counterbalance 
market monopoly by a few organisations that can impose limits on procurer 
choices. The local nature of SMEs offers public purchasers an opportunity 
to act upon their wider responsibilities to the local economy and to society 
(Preuss and Walker, 2011). For economic and social reasons, public 
responsibility towards SME suppliers has been visible for over fifteen years 
and it is an important element of economic policies (Pickernell et al, 2011). 
In 2013, an SME Friendliness tool (Cabinet Office, 2013) encouraged 
government departments to self-assess their procurement practices. 
Results of this show that there is a consensus that support for SMEs needs 
to be at the heart of Government procurement to support business growth 
(House of Commons, 2013, Public Contract regulations, 2015) even as 
economies of scale are sought in government procurement in the current 
era of austerity.  A government green paper (2017) about building an 
industrial strategy dedicates a chapter to improving public procurement, 
with new promises. Government support for economic growth promises to 
remove several burdens and to provide a listening platform to hear SME 
experiences and concerns. What it does not do is address how firms can 
become more capable to compete for publicly tendered contracts.  
 
My research aim is to address the capability knowledge gap on small firm 
tendering, and its construction is based upon findings from a review of 
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empirical literature in chapter two. Three research questions shape the 
focus and methods of this inquiry: 
 What causal powers exist within the tendering environment to 
constrain and enable small firm tendering performance? 
 What are the practices, expressed as routines, that generate capability 
to successfully tender in the case firm?  
 To what extent, and how, do firms learn to improve through repeated 
tendering experiences?  
 
The research topic and its aim sit within a critical realist approach (Bhaskar, 
1989,  2008; Sayer, 1992: Archer, 1995) as a mode of perception. A critical 
realist epistemology looks at facts at the level of that which is experienced 
and purports that they exist through interpretation. Social structures include 
factors that remain external to actors, but are open to agency interpretation 
as a form of reality. Critical realists are concerned with general questions 
about the nature of social structure and the behaviour and intention of 
human agency within a structure. Public sector tendering is analysed in this 
thesis at institutional level, with a focus on the consequences empirically 
observed for small firm agency as an element within the structure of the 
social institution. 
 
The aim of chapter one is to locate this study in an empirical gap amongst 
a growing body of literature on small firm practices and tendering 
performance. I introduce and explain the nature and practices of 
competitive tendering in the UK, and use a chronological perspective to 
narrate the development of competitive tendering in the UK over the last 
twenty years, since its introduction in 1991. I state the methods used to 
conduct fieldwork research, with a brief introduction to case firms under 
investigation, before outlining the structure of the thesis. 
1.3 The nature of competitive tendering in the UK  
 
Tendering is a competitive and specialist form of business exchange. Under 
regulation, it is necessary to trade with public bodies for contracts above a 
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minimum financial threshold. Tendering describes a set of processes where 
specifications for public work are encased in a regulatory set of documents, 
under which potential suppliers can respond through completion of 
specialised information requests. As such, tendering is a social institution 
in a functionally specialist area (Scott, 2001). Public purchasers, such as 
local authorities, employ their power in tendering processes to promote self-
interest and stability of operations (Loader, 2013). They shape tendering as 
a social system that legitimise fairness of supplier selection. Tendering has 
formal structures and informal rules to structure conduct activity (Steinmo 
et al, 1992) and individuals hold personal beliefs about the system. 
Tendering is a voluntary social act, based upon a system of norms 
(Parsons, 1934) and embodies a distinct set of values (Selznick, 1948).  
 
Small firms opt into a tendering supply base when a tender is advertised or 
by registering their services in advance, on national, regional and local 
government portals.  Tendering processes operate across all sectors where 
public money is used for purchase, and for different contract financial 
values. A supply base may comprise private and public sector 
organisations of any size and legal structure. According to sector, tendering 
firms may face more or less competition, and the complexity of completing 
a tender submission many also vary according to procurer and contract 
nature or size. Nevertheless, SMEs can participate in single or episodic 
tendering events, with each occurrence carrying a specific and temporal 
context open for examination. 
Firm leader experiences of tendering may change as they become shaped 
by internal or external conditions. Conditions in an institutional setting can 
act to enable firms or else they can place sanctions on them. Either way, 
tendering as a social institution provides guidelines for actors to interpret 
the rules. It is a form of social reality with multiple actors occupying dynamic 
positions. Firm tendering capability is not an accident, a static process or 
even a single capability; it is a creative and purposeful endeavour built upon 
an interplay between business routines, building up knowledge of tendering 
inside a firm and the contextual environments where activity takes place. 
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As such, current tendering practice will always be shaped by conditions that 
pre-exist action, and the notion of ‘context’ is central to the field of 
investigation.  
1.4 Introduction to the state of knowledge on small firm 
tendering capability  
 
SMEs have become central to the discussion on public procurement 
(Pickernell et al, 2011; Flynn and Davis, 2016), yet there has been a paucity 
of research in how tendering capability is acquired in small firms. Interest 
in the concept of public procurement began to receive attention in the 1990s 
when it was aligned to the accelerated growth of small business policy as 
part of the economic engine. Small firms and public procurement together 
have not received adequate attention, but a small body of literature exists, 
and is investigated in Chapter Two. Table 1.1 below summarises the 
general nature of academic literature to date. It also highlights knowledge 
gaps that still exist. It shows that existing studies of tendering capability 
rarely focus on small firm practices. Indeed, “prior studies have not given 
much attention to the process by which … capabilities develop, emerge or 
evolve especially in small firms that have limited resources, knowledge 
bases and expertise in building and integrating diverse capabilities” (Zahra 
et al, 2006, p.920). 
Table 1.1 Summary of existing knowledge and knowledge gaps about small firm tendering  
What is already known  Knowledge gaps (What is not yet explained or 
known before this study, and is addressed by 
this study  
Small firm perceptions of public 
sector  tendering (Loader, 2005) 
and the reliability of those 
perceptions (Kitching et al, 2015) 
The nature of reality expressed is unclear and 
one-dimensional. The structural conditions 
under which small firms operate and the 
importance of context is overlooked and 
requires investigation 
SME engagement with tendering 
is linked to the human and 
administrative resources firms 
have at their disposal for 
tendering (Karjalainen and 
Kemppainen, 2008; Flynn et al, 
2013) 
How are firm resources mobilised into routines 
and capabilities? A process perspective of how 
firms acquire capability to tender is needed.  It 
is not yet understood theoretically how small 
firms develop capability to tender 
There are multiple barriers faced 
by SMEs when tendering (Loader, 
2013) 
In what contexts do these barriers exist? Are 
they applicable to all tendering contexts in 
small firms, and can they be overcome? The 
notion of context is missing from the debate  
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What is already known  Knowledge gaps (What is not yet explained or 
known before this study, and is addressed by 
this study  
Tendering capabilities are defined 
as relational and procedural 
(Flynn and Davis, 2016) and as  
functions of entrepreneurial 
orientation (Reijonen et al, 2016) 
and market orientation  (Tammi et 
al, 2014) 
Clues exist, but there is still no 
comprehensive, micro-foundational 
explanation of small firm capability that has 
been expressed through a study of successful 
firm routines and resource combinations  
Resource poverty affects small 
firms more than large firms 
(Bannock and Peacock, 1989; 
Karjaleinen & Kemppainen, 2008; 
Loader, 2013)  
What resource investments do firms need? 
How do small firms make sense of the 
tendering process across idiosyncratic public 
tender specification requirements? 
 
Current literature does not explain what a tendering capability is nor how 
we can come to understand it. Research into UK government procurement 
highlights the resource poverty of small firms in relation to larger firms 
(Bannock and Peacock, 1989; Karjaleinen & Kemppainen, 2008; Loader, 
2013), but few studies consider the nature of firm capability to tender or 
regard it as a process in an open system, where firm performance attempts 
to interact with external and dynamic environmental influences. Moreover, 
extant literature has not yet considered capability as a process or how 
tendering capability knowledge acquisition occurs within small firms. SME 
barriers to participation exist, and such barriers have been developed into 
a typology of barriers (Loader, 2013). Few inductive studies have been 
carried out to date, making it inconclusive on the micro-foundations of 
capability. Research to date has observed limitations to SME capability 
through business characteristics such as size (Pickernell et al, 2011), 
resource poverty (Bannock and Peacock, 1989; Karjaleinen & 
Kemppainen, 2008; Watson, 2010; Loader, 2013) and by procurer 
behaviours or constraints (Loader 2007; Freshminds, 2008), not through a 
detailed consideration of operating context. Yet some small firms do 
succeed in winning public work. What is not known are the contextual and 
organisational factors that surround capability, and how these are acquired 
and built within small firms to place them in the opportunity flow of public 
sector tendering. If procurement is an operational capability that can be 
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learnt by firms, how does it involve the mobilisation of resources in different 
combinations and types, drawn from both within an organisation and from 
outside it? The exact customer capabilities involved in competitive 
tendering have not yet been fully explicated through empirical observation.  
 
1.5 Research approach  
 
This study aims at deepening the knowledge in the problem area by offering 
both theoretical and empirical insights. The theoretical foundation for 
tendering capability has been created from the literature. The reality is 
subjective and multiple, and firm  participants in the study help us to 
understand the world from their point of view as  individuals directly involved 
in tendering activities, but this is only accepted as a partial perspective on 
reality. A critical realist interpretation of practice uses a retroductive 
approach to data analysis to reach an explanation of structures and 
practices, not just perceptions, as it is concerned with causes and 
conditions. This investigation into small firm tendering utilises a case study 
approach, which has gained acceptance as a qualitative method within 
small business research (Perren and Ram, 2004) to investigate a 
contemporary phenomenon in depth within its real-life context (Farquahar, 
2012). It is an enquiry vehicle used to understand successful tendering 
behaviour and to build empirical knowledge about small firms’ capability in 
competing for public sector contracts. A case study approach can allow for 
a more dynamic understanding of how firms configure resources (Byrne 
and Ragin, 2009). The case study enables understanding of the dynamics 
present within a single setting (Eisenhardt, 1989) and allows for exploration 
of an under-theorised area of study.  Additionally, it offers the researcher 
flexible and opportunistic data collection strategies (Eisenhardt and 
Graebner, 2007). 
 
What a case study can produce, for the purposes of evaluating capability, 
is contingent on the characteristics of the setting (Kœnig, 2009). The 
purpose of this comparative case study is to build theory (Eisenhardt,1989; 
Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007), to understand complexity (Stake, 1995),  
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analyse context and processes that illuminate theoretical issues (Hartley, 
2004), and to provide insight into a specific issue or to revise a 
generalisation (Stake, 1995).  
 
Small firms as a social unit have the capacity to take action to serve self-
interest, and some case firms may display more agency than others. Such 
agency may be able to shape firm capability by neutralising negative 
institutional effects or by seizing contextual conditions to enhance 
business. Case research is described by critical realist practitioners as 
being very useful to explain complex social phenomena and to locate deep 
processes and structures that cause particular events to happen and the 
conditions for this to occur (Easton, 2010). A comparative case study has 
enabled identification of mechanisms, social causes, which underlie how 
capability can be observed. Case method can also capture the significance 
of historical and contextual settings (Pettigrew, 1987) that are important to 
analyse as data. 
 
1.5.1 Case firms under study  
 
This study uses a primary case of one small business, given the 
pseudonym Fit for Life (FFL) that was purposively selected as an example 
of strategic best practice at successful public sector tendering. Fit for Life 
has demonstrated rapid growth in acquiring public sector contracts and 
evidenced through its public sector income turnover, growth in employee 
numbers and outstanding commitment to resource investment into and 
leadership of firm strategy to deliver publicly funded services as a 50-60% 
proportion of its overall contract portfolio. The study explores, at micro-
foundational level, everyday routines and behaviours conducted for 
tendering. Fit for Life is an outdoor leisure training business that is well 
known in the industry. Primary case data findings are presented in chapter 
six, and then compared in chapter seven to a secondary successful firm, 
Software4U, an educational software provider in a niche market, to three 
other firm datasets from a pilot study and to an expert informant interview. 
The purpose of comparison is to identify if similar routines and resource 
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combinations are displayed or have the potential for display in other firms 
to consider the necessity or efficiency of FFL’s capabilities in other 
contexts. Software4U was also purposively selected for its repeated 
success at tendering, although on a smaller financial scale. Pilot firms, 
referred to as The Big Carer, The Local Care Company and Domiciliary Ltd, 
belong to the social housing sector, and they are all linked to one specific 
tendering case rather than a demonstration of successful practice. Pilot 
firms have been included to broaden examples of contextual positioning 
and practices employed, again through the presence, absence or 
difference to those routines discovered in Fit for Life. The expert informant 
contributed current commentary on her subjective experiences of small firm 
observed practices.  
 
1.5.2 Defining the small firm  
 
Attempts have been made to define a small firm, firstly by its size and 
secondly by its social structure. In relation to size, there is not one single 
standard definition of what constitutes a small business and it is subject to 
multiple interpretations and uses. In the UK, Her Majesty’s Custom and 
Excise (HMRC, 2017) defines an SME (for the purpose of Research and 
Development Tax Relief) as a business with not more than 500 employees 
with an annual turnover not exceeding £100 million. The rest of the UK 
government uses other definitions.  Statistics collected by the Department 
for Business (BIS, 2017) defines SMEs as companies with fewer than 250 
employees. Companies House defines a small business for accounting 
purposes as employing fewer than 50 people and a turnover under £6.5 
million and a medium business as fewer than 250 employees and a 
turnover under £25.9 million. European law (European Commission, 2005) 
defines small and medium enterprises (SMEs) by employee numbers, by 
turnover and by balance sheet.  Within the band of small to medium 
enterprises, micro- firms employ nine or fewer staff with a turnover equal to 
or under two million euros, small firms employ between 10 – 49 staff with a 
turnover of 20 million euros or less and medium size businesses employ 
50-249 staff and report a turnover of 50 million euros or less. As EU law 
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governs UK procurement law, the EU definition is applied to this study. This 
research classes small firms as having under 20 employees. Fit for Life is 
classed as a medium sized firm, with 62 staff. 
 
From a social structure perspective, small firms exist in different lifecycles, 
from start-ups to long-established firms. They are formed as different legal 
entities: limited companies, partnerships, sole traders or forms of social 
ownership as a social enterprise. The ambitions of a small firm owner varies 
from a lifestyle business to a gazelle business with high intentions of rapid 
growth. Small firms are not a homogenous entity, although there is a broad 
set of characteristics that can be applied to the definition, starting with size 
itself (Beaver, 2002). Small firms have the ‘liability of smallness’ ( Aldrich 
and Auster, 1986) that suggests limited resources for market power and 
often limitations in management capability. Small size can create cost 
disadvantages in the marketplace through raised transaction costs when 
regulations imposed are disproportionate to SMEs when compared to large 
organisations (Bannock and Peacock, 1989). In turn, this may limit the 
ability to take advantage of economic opportunities in their path. However, 
smallness can also enable agility (OGC, 2003).  
 
1.6 The UK public procurement market practice of competitive 
tendering  
 
Any conceptualisation of small firm capability to tender relies upon an 
understanding of the nature of public sector procurement. ‘Public 
procurement’ describes how public authorities spend public money to carry 
out their functions that may include their own service delivery that is 
contracted out through a tendering process. It is defined as “the acquisition 
by means of a public contract of works, supplies or services by one or more 
contracting authorities from economic operators chosen by those 
contracting authorities” (Public Contracts Regulations, 2015, p.9). Public 
tendering covers three phases of activity by a public body: procurement 
planning, placing a contract to acquire goods or services and administering 
the contract to ensure effective performance. Firms in a supply chain must 
respond to each phase of a tender they are involved in. Firstly, there is the 
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job of identifying and selecting tenders that are advertised, of which they 
may or may not have prior knowledge. Next, firms respond to a tender 
advert for the acquisition of goods and services through a formal document 
completion process, called competitive tendering or ‘tendering’. Finally, 
firms become informed of the winner of competitive tenders, and are at 
liberty to seek feedback on their scoring and scored position from across 
the competitive supply base. In the UK, public procurement practices take 
place at central government level, operated by the Government 
Procurement Service, or at regional and community level within local 
government authorities and other organisations such as universities, 
hospitals, housing associations and emergency services. For small firms 
seeking a prime contractor relationship with a publicly funded agency, 
opportunities occur more frequently at regional or local level.  
 
The market practice of ‘competitive tendering’ is a common form of 
purchasing within procurement, introduced in 1984 as part of a restructure 
of public sector commissioning. Placing a contract to buy goods or services 
is common practice in the UK, where the government body or agency 
entrusts the actual delivery of public services to private enterprise, guided 
by a set of regulatory principles and measures. Within an open competitive 
tendering process, firms voluntarily complete using a set of technical and 
codified documents that are matched against a set of specified buying 
criteria and ranked by their scores against market competitors to support a 
buying decision. This form of regulated selection limits discretion by 
procurement officers and is designed to provide transparent rules for firms 
to follow.  There are four different types of competitive tendering procedure 
used by UK contracting authorities: open, restricted, competitive dialogue 
and negotiated. Open tendering tends to be the general default procedure. 
Table 1.2 below sets out the key characteristics of each method. An 
explanation of procedures offers insight into the technical language firms 
need to understand which opportunities are accessible to them in the public 
market.  
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Table 1.2 Tendering procedure types  
Procedure  Description 
 
Open Any business may submit a tender. The minimum time limit 
for submission of tenders is 35 days from the publication date 
of the contract notice. If a prior information notice was 
published, this time limit can be reduced to 15 days. 
Restricted Any business may ask to participate in a restricted procedure, 
but only those who are pre-selected will be invited to submit 
a tender. The time limit to request participation is 37 
days from the publication of the contract notice. The public 
authority then selects at least 5 candidates with the required 
capabilities, who then have 40 days to submit a tender from 
the date when the invitation was sent. This time limit can be 
reduced to 36 days, if a prior information notice has been 
published. 
Competitive 
dialogue 
Often used for complex contracts such as large infrastructure 
projects where the public authority cannot define the technical 
specifications at the start. After the publication of the contract 
notice, interested businesses have 37 days to request 
participation. The public authority must invite at least 3 
candidates to a dialogue in which the final technical, legal and 
economic aspects are defined. After this dialogue, candidates 
submit their final tenders. 
Negotiated The public authority invites at least 3 businesses with whom it 
will negotiate the terms of the contract. Most contracting 
authorities can use this procedure only in a limited number of 
cases, for example, for supplies intended exclusively for 
research or testing purposes. The contracting authorities in 
sectors such as water, energy, transport or postal services 
may use it as a standard procedure. The time limit to receive 
requests to participate is 37 days from the publication of the 
contract notice.  
 
Table Source: EU Rules and Procedures (2015) 
 
Public sector tendering has a set of common factors that apply. Contract or 
‘solicitation’ documentation is set out in a standard descriptor of supplier 
economic and financial standing, technical and professional ability, the 
requirement specification, commercial conditions, scoring criteria and 
administrative procedures. SMEs can participate in public contracts in one 
of two ways: they can directly contract with a public authority or participate 
as a sub-contractor in a supply chain held by a prime contractor. Tenders 
are published routinely on publicly accessible portals, and financial 
threshold levels determine all contract opportunities that need to be 
advertised. Information on award decisions is in the public domain, if firm 
leaders know where to look. 
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For contracts exceeding a published contract value, the UK government is 
obligated to follow EU rules, which aim to ensure transparency or 
accountability and non-discrimination in achieving value for money. 
Regulated procurement with rules routinises the opportunity alert process 
to improve transparency and competitiveness in the procurement of public 
services (Glover, 2008). EU legislation is applied to the UK to offer open 
access to opportunities from firms outside the UK, although this is not an 
objective or a legal position in other countries outside Europe. In addition, 
the UK has to apply ‘non-discriminatory rules’ from European legislation 
which means that small firms compete for public contracts on a level playing 
field with large organisations. The EU principles for contract letting are 
described as non-discrimination, equal treatment, transparency, mutual 
recognition and proportionality (OJEU, 2009). This is not the case 
elsewhere. A survey of OECD member countries shows that a third have 
adopted specific legislative provisions or policies to encourage SME 
participation of SMEs in public procurement (OECD Procurement Data, 
2013). The United States of America, South Korea and Japan, for example, 
offer more favourable systems for small businesses by using set-aside 
procurement funds to offer SMEs closed access to lower value contracts 
(Kidalov and Snider, 2011). Without such set-asides, SME suppliers are 
placed on a level playing field with larger firms to compete in the same way 
for public sector contracts (ODPM, 2005).  
 
1.7 A chronological perspective on the development of 
tendering practices  
 
A review of the chronology of the use of competitive tendering in the UK 
affords insight into its dynamic history to date. Table 1.3 below sets out a 
timeline of key legislative and policy developments that relate to how public 
procurement has been conducted in the UK since its introduction in 1984. 
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Table 1.3: Timeline of EU and UK public procurement legislative and policy 
developments  
Year  Type and nature of key developments to procurement law and 
policy  
1984 Major restructuring of UK public procurement; tendering introduced as 
a purchasing practice 
1997 Compulsory Competitive Tendering (CCT) was introduced as a 
requirement for public sector organizations to allow private sector firms 
to bid for the delivery of services, such as catering or security and 
improve value for money. 
1999 The Office of Government Commerce is established as the new body to 
promote further improvements in government procurement. 
Government report (National Audit Office) published on central 
government procurement;  
2004-
5 
The Gershon Efficiency Review considered public sector efficiency and 
made efficiency and expenditure recommendations 
2004  EU directives were applied to governance of UK public procurement 
legislation  
2005 An EU ‘SME friendly concordat’ was published to encourage 
governmental consideration of enabling small firms to compete for 
public sector work 
2007 A new Government strategy, Transforming Government Procurement, 
highlighted the central importance of procurement in delivering high-
quality public services and best value for money (VFM); that is, to 
award the contract, both monetary and non-monetary components of 
an offer are to be considered. 
2009 The Glover Review considered new ways of improving participation in 
public procurement by small firms. Key changes it claims to have 
achieved were greater transparency of tender adverts and simplicity in 
tendering instructions 
Jan 
2011 
Review of EU procurement rules and evaluation of impact and       
effectiveness of EU procurement legislation 
July 
2011 
UK Government Procurement Service established for central 
government procurement  
Dec 
2011 
Proposals published for revised public procurement directives – first 
widespread review since 2004 
2012 Public Services (Social Value) Act introduced in UK 
Publication of report: Local Procurement: Making the Most of Small 
Business 
2013 Lord Young’s report, ‘Growing Your Business’: several key reforms to 
create a simple and consistent approach to procurement across all 
public sector agencies. Support for SMEs and voluntary organisations 
in gaining better and more direct access to contract opportunities. 
Implemented in part 4 of the Public Contracts Regulations 2015 
2014 The 2014 EU Procurement Directives came into force at EU level. EU 
member states had two years to implement them in national legislation. 
This followed a successful lobbying campaign by the UK government 
and EU partners to negotiate a simpler, more flexible regime of 
procurement rules 
Confederation of British Industry’s (CBI) endorsement of the 
procurement reform agenda in the ‘Getting a Better Purchase: Public 
Sector Procurement Report’ 
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Year  Type and nature of key developments to procurement law and 
policy  
2015 Procurement Policy Note 03/15: Key reforms make public procurement 
more accessible to SMEs. Abolition of a pre-qualification stage for 
procurements below EU financial thresholds, and a requirement to 
have regard to guidance on qualitative selection issued by Cabinet 
Office for above EU threshold procurements  
A requirement for contracting authorities to insert provisions in all public 
contracts to ensure prompt payment through the supply chain  
The requirement to advertise public sector opportunities in one place 
(Contracts Finder), and to publish award notices for contracts from 
framework agreements  
2015 The Public Contracts Regulations 2015. In practical terms, this ensured 
procurement documents are all available electronically from the date 
any contract notice, and compliance to Lord Young requirements to 
publish details of contracts and contract awards to Contracts Finder  
2016 Brexit vote - decision taken for the UK to leave the EU 
2017  Green paper, ’Building a New Industrial Strategy’. New goal set to 
achieve one third of all government spend with SMEs (directly and in 
supply chains) by 2020. 
 
In the 1980s, a new operating environment emerged to win public sector 
work that also began a positive political and economic climate for small 
firms. The decade saw the first major review of UK public procurement in 
1984 led by the Cabinet Office as part of a new agenda to ensure 
government spending is efficient and effective. In turn, the Treasury Central 
Unit on Procurement was formed, more senior procurement staff were 
appointed in departments, and other bodies such as The Office of 
Government Commerce (OGC) were established. The market practice of 
tendering as one form of purchasing within procurement was first 
introduced in 1984 as part of restructuring activity for public sector 
commissioning. Within the new competitive tendering process, firms could 
submit a set of documents that demonstrated value and capability. In effect, 
they would be joining a competitor peer group to compete to deliver a public 
service or product when matched against a set of specified buying criteria.  
 
The 1990s were characterised by major policy and infrastructure 
developments that directly affected UK public procurement. The Treasury 
Central Unit on Procurement had been formed, and from 1995 to 1999, 
there were three major government reports published on central 
government procurement (Treasury 1995; Treasury/Cabinet Ofﬁce 1998; 
Gershon, 1999) that gave public procurement a prominent platform. The 
effects of regulation were observed to cause tendering to be an expensive 
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process for small firms (Curran and Blackburn, 2001) which became an 
area for exploration in subsequent empirical studies. By now, the concept 
of procurement was receiving attention in its own right. In 2001, seven 
benefits small firms bring to public procurement were articulated: 
competition, lower cost, innovation, responsiveness, flexibility, quality of 
service, and specialist knowledge (OGC and SBS, 2005). This report also 
stated that small firms may face barriers to tenders and so need support.  
Such support appeared nationally through the promotion of on-line tender 
access portals, tender completion guidance toolkits and increased localised 
efforts to engage small businesses in supplier briefing opportunities.  
 
In 2003, the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister developed the National 
Procurement Strategy for Local Government (ODPM, 2003) that carried a 
target to create the Small Business Friendly Concordat, a voluntary code 
of practice that set out what SMEs can expect when tendering for local 
government contracts (ODPM, 2005). Secondly, in 2004-5, the Gershon 
Efficiency Review considered public sector efficiency and made efficiency 
and expenditure recommendations. These became key themes that 
influenced how public procurement was conducted in Britain. Thirdly, policy 
directives started to use procurement as a wider vehicle for economic 
regeneration (Glover, 2008) and so resource and capability requirements 
became extended through external influences, for example, to create local 
jobs. The Glover report (2008) built on previous policy statements (Morand, 
2003; Small Business Service 2005) to call for amelioration of market 
functioning. As a process, tendering is primarily driven to achieve, or 
demonstrate, short-term achievement of ‘value for money’ (Morand, 2003; 
Treasury, 2007; Loader, 2007). The introduction of the EU Code of Best 
Practices for SME access to procurement (2008) stated that increased 
involvement of SMEs in public procurement would result in higher 
competition for public contracts, leading to better value for money for 
contracting authorities. 
 
The Single Market (2010) introduced a recommendation to make public 
procurement work for innovation, green growth and social inclusion by 
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imposing specific mandatory requirements. The intention and effects of 
such moves upon small firm capability are examined in recent studies as 
tender documents begin to demand supplier evidence of compliance 
towards meeting new capabilities, such as environmental management  
(Lee and Klassen, 2008) and, later on,  in corporate social responsibility 
(Baden et al, 2011). By 2011, it had become standard for governments to 
enact policies that are designed to facilitate an increased small firm 
engagement in public procurement (Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development, 2013). In 2011, public intention towards SME 
engagement was again highlighted when the Cabinet Office declared that 
small firms should cease to be shut out of procurement processes by its 
own description of excessive bureaucracy and petty regulation.  
 
In 2012, the government introduced the Public Services (Social Value) Act. 
This meant that for the first time, all public bodies in England and Wales 
must now consider how the services they commission and procure might 
improve the economic, social and environmental wellbeing of an area. 
Social value is a way of thinking about how resources are allocated and 
used. It looks beyond contract price towards the collective benefit to a 
community. This Act sits alongside other procurement laws to complement 
existing procurement legislation that is characterised by value for money.  
 
In 2013, the role small firms play in economic development and growth was 
re-enforced in a procurement context. The concept of capability in relation 
to small firms to improve their skills and performance is cited as one of the 
three most important conditions for economic growth from this sector 
(Young, 2013) where much more needs to be done to encourage ﬁrms to 
invest in their capability. In a 2013 survey (FSB) the top three reasons for 
not engaging in tendering were a lack of awareness (31%), too time 
consuming (20%) and unable to compete (13%). Nearly half of those firms 
surveyed who had tendered had not won any public contracts. In 2015, the 
UK government introduced further reforms to make public procurement 
more accessible to SMEs, such as abolishing a pre-qualification tendering 
stage. In 2017, a Green paper on Building a New Industrial Strategy 
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published a new goal to achieve one third of all government spend with 
SMEs (directly and in supply chains) by 2020. It does not offer clues about 
how to improve small firm capability to compete successfully achieve this 
target. 
 
Over a thirty-five year period, competitive tendering has been portrayed as 
an efficiency mechanism, a socio-economic instrument and as a small 
business support policy. It is clear that tendering capabilities are under-
conceptualised and reliant on descriptive accounts that do not seek 
causalities that may exist independently of observable events. Social 
structures can and do condition the possibilities for firm actors to make 
sense of social situations and to act deliberately and competitively within 
them. This thesis sets out to explore those structural conditions and the 
exercise of agency that shapes successful tendering practices in small 
firms. 
 
1.8 Dissertation structure 
 
This dissertation has eight chapters, including this first introductory chapter.  
 
Chapter two is a review of primary empirical literature about knowledge of 
SME tendering practices and SME operating environment and conditions.  
 
Chapter three theoretically explores the concept of capability to underpin 
the research framework. Institutional theory, capability theory and 
absorptive capacity theory are utilised to make sense of small firm 
procurement capability and to produce a research framework within a 
realist ontology. 
 
Chapter four is a context chapter. It presents public sector tendering as a 
social institution with multiple and overlapping (laminated) levels of entities 
that can exert power. It explores the structural conditions of tendering by 
dealing with structure, agency and the emergence of social effects through 
interaction. 
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Chapter five sets out the field research design and methodology, 
beginning with epistemological and ontological considerations that critical 
realism suggests. The research design includes details of a pilot project 
that helped to refine the selection of research methods. Data gathering and 
data analysis through fieldwork are embodied within a justification of a case 
study approach. 
 
Chapter six identifies key findings from one primary case, Fit for Life. Using 
a micro-foundational approach, fifteen routines found are identified. Six 
operational capabilities and two dynamic capabilities constitute knowledge 
of the primary case firm’s capability to compete for public sector contracts 
via tendering. 
 
Chapter seven offers a set of secondary case findings that are 
systematically compared with Fit for Life. It restates what happens in each 
Fit for Life routine and identifies if that routine is present or absent in other 
firms. In terms of knowledge, this chapter examines comparative conditions 
or practice to further analyse routine enactment under different contextual 
conditions. 
 
Chapter eight is the discussion and conclusion chapter. It discusses the 
implication of case findings. It also offers a higher level of contribution 
through an interpretation of tendering as a laminated social structure, where 
structure and agency interact in contextually contingent ways. The chapter 
reflects on thesis limitations and points to possible directions for future 
study, before summarising how each research question has been 
addressed in the thesis. 
 
 
 
 
39 
 
1.9 Contributions to knowledge and practice  
 
This study makes the following contributions to knowledge: 
A new interpretation of a tendering capability framework through a 
micro-foundational approach  
 
Empirical findings build a macro-micro bridge between the causal effects of 
tendering environment as a national social institution and the micro-level 
study of firm actions through which tendering capability materialises 
through lower level factors observable at episodic level. Understanding of 
micro-foundations remains limited; this thesis contributes to the scholarly 
movement by considering what happens inside a firm at the level of 
practice, expressed through resource investments into skills, knowledge 
and forms of practice, typically routines.  
 
A comprehensive analysis of firm routines to assemble operational 
and dynamic capabilities  
 
Successful routines small firms use for tendering are a largely unexplored 
issue. The study categorises fifteen routines that are clustered into a 
capability framework. This improves understanding of what resource 
investments and combinations occur in SMEs, mediated through context, 
that enable small firms to consider strategies for managing tendering as a 
way of meeting the challenges within competitive and dynamic  public 
sector environments. A typology of the nature and form of tendering 
capabilities is presented as an over-arching framework of operational and 
dynamic capabilities to build and change routines. 
 
Use of a critical realist ontology to conceptualise small firm tendering 
environment capability  
 
The study extends knowledge of situated reality and its consequences for 
the nature and composition of tendering routines that underpin capability. 
Tendering is a social system that is open, with mechanisms that overlap 
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that pre-dispose events to occur in the way that they do. As such it is not 
possible to close the system to study it. The production of an empirical 
study that articulates at micro-foundation level specific ways in which small 
firms can exercise agency in the face of structural constraints. This is a step 
towards unifying scholars behind a more informed common 
conceptualisation of what constitutes capability to tender in small firms. 
 
An examination of the structural features of tendering as a social 
system  
 
Structural awareness and description of tendering is a major contribution to 
the literature. The study furthers empirical and theoretical perspectives on 
the micro-foundations of capabilities by drawing on a laminated, contextual 
understanding of successful strategic and operational practices that 
empirically exist and combine to create tendering capability in small firms. 
An empirical evaluation of the role of absorptive capacity in small firm 
tendering fulfils a gap in knowledge about how firms learn to tender. 
 
Creation of a practical set of requirements to help small firms 
consider the types of resources and routines for tendering  
 
Small firms are often perceived as having too few resources to tender. This 
thesis challenges that perception by pointing to how tendering can be built 
as a specialist capability through an interlocking set of fifteen routines and 
a capability framework. 
 
What is known empirically about small firm tendering capability is explored 
in the next chapter through a literature review. 
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Chapter Two: A review of literature on small firm 
tendering  
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Competitive tendering is a well-established procedure for firms to win public 
sector contracts. Yet, despite a great deal of practical tendering experience 
by small firms, empirical studies that explore tendering components and 
firm resources upon which this activity depends are scarce. To date, there 
has not been a comprehensive literature review on small firm tendering, 
although recent articles have laid a useful, partial foundation for exploration 
of tendering practices (Tammi et al, 2014; Flynn and Davis, 2016). The 
literature is fragmented and limited in its utility, either to help small firms 
build or change their tendering practices or to enable public stakeholders 
to recognise the nature of the problem. The dominant discourse explains 
small firm lack of engagement through resource poverty, creating market 
disadvantage through the liability of smallness (Freshminds, 2008; 
Karjaleinen and Kemppainen, 2008; FSB, 2013; Loader, 2013). Little 
description exists from the small firm perspective about their everyday 
practices, or of the internal or external conditions that exist at the nexus of 
SME and public procurer interface in a tendering episode. Current 
approaches limit observation of agency by creative small firm leaders. 
Evidence shows that a knowledge gap still exists in extant literature: 
“SME involvement in public procurement constitutes a 
burgeoning line of inquiry in organisation studies…there is a 
need for further empirical research in this area” (Flynn and 
Davis, 2016, p.16). 
 
Knowledge about resource demand for tendering organisations within the 
public sector market regulatory framework has been steadily growing in 
terms of scope and quantity (Bannock and Peacock, 1989) when the study 
of issues in the UK that relate to small firms and public sector procurement 
began. Since that time, SME engagement with public procurement has 
already been examined from various perspectives: resource poverty 
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(Loader, 2005 and 2007); the risk averse culture in procurement 
departments to embrace supplier diversity (Smallbone et al, 2009), 
traditional approaches to procurement that continue to disadvantage SMEs 
(Loader, 2009; Ram et al, 2009); the environmental and ‘social’ criteria to 
be satisfied by SMEs when tendering (Baden et al, 2011); from a policy 
perspective (Glover, 2008); and, in terms of the relationship between 
government intent and effect (Erridge, 2007). Studies that are more recent 
provide a useful but incomplete picture of resources that assist 
understanding of how small firms can approach tendering. These include 
entrepreneurial orientation (Woldesenbet, 2011; Reijonen et al, 2014); 
market orientation (Tammi et al, 2014); and, relational and procedural 
processes (Flynn and Davis, 2016).  
 
This chapter provides a review and synthesis of the extant literature. The 
investigation and critique of literature selection was primarily driven by 
deconstructing the study research aim: to explore small firm capability to 
tender competitively for public sector contracts. The chapter examines the 
extent to which studies explore firm resources and processes upon which 
capabilities depend to enable small firms to compete for public sector 
contracts. As a critical realist mode of inquiry, the review explores what role 
literature attributes to firm agency and self-management of capability, and 
how studies address the importance of context and the interplay between 
firms and their external environment.  For this reason, a wider discussion 
on regulation and its causal significance to firm action is included. This 
approach has revealed a research gap in the micro-foundational study of 
what small firms do to prepare for and enter a tendering competition.  
Chapter two comprises nine sections. Following the introduction, section 
two explains the literature review process. Section three summarises the 
nature of key studies critiqued. Section four evaluates four studies that build 
understanding of SME tendering practices. Section five considers wider 
studies that elucidate resource absorption associated with public sector 
tendering. Section six turns attention towards studies on the structural 
conditions for tendering. Section seven introduces empirical mobilisations 
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of the effect of regulation. Section nine discusses empirical findings and the 
last section locates a research gap and three research questions that guide 
the remainder of the thesis.  
2.2 Conducting the literature review  
 
An empirical literature review was first conducted in 2012/13 over a twelve-
month period. Between 2013 and 2016, the researcher inductively 
searched for new articles, and between 2014 and 2016, some of the most 
interesting studies on firm tendering behaviour were published. The 
literature chapter was structured initially in a chronological order of studies 
to reflect the interplay between the empirical knowledge base and the 
changing regulatory environment within which small firms operate. 
However, in writing up the thesis, the original format has been replaced with 
an integrated critique of thematically organised studies. In 2017, the 
researcher invested time in upgrading and re-examining all literature 
sources. The result is a more critical, coherent and synthesised piece of 
writing that offers a better interpretation of how far tendering has been 
conceptualised. It is informed by Cooper’s taxonomy of focus for literature 
reviews (1988) through critiquing the research methods, outcomes, 
theoretical interpretations and applications of extant studies. To construct 
a critical review framework, three questions framed the literature review: 
 What is the nature of studies on small firm tendering, and whose 
perspectives are heard?  
 What is known about tendering practices?  
 What firm resources does public sector tendering absorb, and what 
are they used for? 
 
2.2.1 Literature search methods and criteria 
 
Over twenty key words and search terms were used in EBSCO and Google 
Scholar databases relating to public procurement and small firms with 
strings such as “SMALL FIRM* OR SME + TENDERING” and “SMALL 
FIRM” OR SME + PROCUREMENT” or “SMALL FIRM OR SME” + 
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RESOURCES + PROCUREMENT” OR “SME + REGULATION”. The 
highest search return was from SME/Small Firm + Procurement with 180 
scholarly articles published. Twenty-seven articles were studied and the 
remainder were out of scope because they presented low knowledge 
contributions such as literature on how SMEs procure services for 
themselves (Bill and Luke, 2004) rather than selling their services. 
Additional search activity included a review of small business conference 
papers, “googling” references in unpublished articles and identification of 
“grey material” as additional data sources. Studies are included in the 
literature review if they report results on at least one of the following: 
 A theoretical interpretation of small firm experience of or access to 
tendering  
 An a-theoretical interpretation of small firm experience of or access 
to tendering, including public and private tendered opportunities   
 Identification of small firm resources or routines used to tender  
 Third party perceptions about small firm tendering capability 
 Specific knowledge forms, e.g. corporate social responsibility 
(CSR), that are linked to tendering  
 The nature and impact of the tendering environment  
 Provide a theoretical perspective on the causal powers of the 
regulatory environment for small firms.  
 
The literature is at an exciting place in its development. Until recently, a 
limited knowledge base had accumulated over a thirty-five year period 
across international research communities. Notably, much of the core 
literature that directly informs understanding of capability is recent and less 
than twenty years old. It is in the last three years that the most relevant 
studies on firm capability have been published.  A significant proportion of 
earlier literature is biased towards reporting SME opinions of tendering as 
a market structure and to third party perceptions, namely public procurers, 
about how SMEs behave. Whilst this is helpful, it does not explore the 
practices that occur inside a firm to develop capability and sustain 
competitive performance. More recent studies have begun to investigate 
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broad practices that can make a small firm become successful at tendering.  
 
2.3 The nature of studies on small firm tendering  
 
Table 2.1 below summarises the key papers critiqued in this literature 
review. Small firm tendering practices have been empirically investigated 
repeatedly through quantitative, hypothesised methods, with attempts to 
identify significant market-level factors that enable small firms to identify or 
bid for publicly tendered contracts. Eight survey-based studies have 
investigated small firm perceptions. The studies are concerned with: i) firm 
resources required to tender (Karjaleinen & Kemppainen, 2008); ii) SME 
barriers to involvement in tendering episodes (Freshminds, 2008); iii), the 
environmental and social criteria SMEs need to satisfy when tendering 
(Baden et al, 2011); iv) links between procurement and firm growth 
(Pickernell et al, 2011); v) the implications of firm size on tendering (Flynn 
et al, 2013; McKevitt and Davis, 2013); vi) the effects of entrepreneurial 
orientation (Reijonen et al, 2014); vii) market orientation (Tammi et al, 
2014); viii) the relational and procedural capabilities that can explain SME 
performance in public contract competitions (Flynn and Davis, 2016); and, 
ix) to show that the public market has competing priorities that can 
advantage and disadvantage SMEs (Erridge et al, 2007). Each study is 
critiqued for its insight into small firm tendering practices. Whereas 
quantitative studies tell a story of predictive factors linked to tendering, 
qualitative studies focus more on rich descriptions of firm practice. To date, 
there has not been a qualitative study that investigates successful firm 
tendering practices, or indeed studied small firm practices at micro-
foundational level.  Existing qualitative studies have investigated: i) 
perceptions held of SMEs as competitive bidders (Loader, 2005, 2007); ii) 
increased SME access to public procurement contracts (Smallbone et al, 
2009); and iii) entrepreneurship and dynamic capability as interconnected 
dimensions that underpin supply chain capability (Woldesenbat et al, 
2011).  
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Table 2.1 A summary of literature sources examined (1989 - 2017) 
Author(s) and 
year  
Study Purpose Research 
Method 
Key Findings  
Bannock and 
Peacock 
1989 
To examine the “form 
of burden” as a 
characteristic placed 
upon small firms 
through taxation and 
regulation. 
Desk 
review of  
survey data 
(source 
unknown)  
Five approaches are 
identified to improve 
SME supplier success 
Erridge et al, 
1999 
To examine 
competitive tendering 
and areas for 
improvement as an 
SME market model  
Transaction 
cost 
analysis 
Identified experience 
accumulation as a 
micro-foundation of 
capability 
Loader, 2005  To evaluate 
perceptions of SMEs 
as competitive 
bidders by public 
bodies  
Case study 
of seven 
public 
procurers  
Large firm competitive 
advantage results from 
size and experience. 
Flexibility and 
responsiveness rated as 
top SME qualities  
Erridge, 2007 
 
To show that the 
public market has 
competing policy 
priorities; regulatory, 
commercial and 
socio-economic goals 
underlie UK 
procurement policy 
Procurer 
and winning 
firm 
questionnai
re  
The tendering 
environment is seen as 
a dynamic marketplace 
and characterised by 
competing regulatory, 
commercial and socio-
economic goals  
Freshminds,  
2008 
To enable SMEs to  
identify  barriers to 
their involvement in 
tendering episodes  
On-line 
questionnai
re to FSB 
members  
Structural and 
procedural restraints; 
supplier requirements 
exclude SMEs, 
increasing contract 
sizes reduce 
opportunities for SMEs; 
SMEs lack capacity to 
take advantage of 
opportunities. 
Baden et al,  
2011 
To investigate the   
environmental and 
‘social’ criteria SMEs 
need to satisfy when 
tendering. 
 
Exploratory 
interviews 
with SMEs 
prior to 
electronic 
survey 
Problems experienced 
by SMEs in fulfilling 
‘social’ and/or 
environmental criteria  
are caused by 
excessive bureaucracy 
that increases 
production costs  
Tammi et al, 
2014 
 
To apply the concept 
of market orientation 
customer orientation, 
& inter-functional 
coordination)   to 
examine strategic 
and behavioural 
aspects associated 
with SMEs’ 
participation in public 
sector procurement 
Questionnai
re to 
Finnish 
SMEs  
First empirical analysis 
of the relationship 
between a firm’s 
strategic orientation and 
its activity in public 
procurements. Market 
orientation (MO) has a 
positive effect on SME 
activity levels to search 
for information and 
participate in bidding 
contests 
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Author(s) and 
year  
Study Purpose Research 
Method 
Key Findings  
Karjaleinen & 
Kemppainen, 
2008 
To examine why it 
may be difficult for 
SMEs to become 
suppliers in public 
procurement 
Electronic 
survey with 
Finnish 
SMEs 
SME perceived lack of 
resources especially in 
legal expertise and 
administration is 
associated with low 
SME involvement 
 
Author(s) and 
year  
Study Purpose Research 
Method 
Key Findings  
Pickernell et 
al, 2011 
To analyse the 
general 
characteristics of 
SMEs most likely to 
supply 
the public sector 
Questionnai
re to UK 
FSB 
members  
No significant link 
between procurement 
and firm growth. A 
potential policy conflict 
in the use of 
procurement demand to 
promote innovative 
SMEs between 
employment and 
innovation effects 
Smallbone et 
al, 2009 
To use a study of the 
Olympic 
Development 
Authority (ODA) to 
discover if it could 
increase SME access 
to public procurement 
contracts 
Face to 
face 
interviews 
with ODA 
staff and 
SME 
bidders 
SME effectiveness to 
engage in tendering is 
constrained by public 
sector regulatory 
compliance behaviour. 
Cited use of successful 
prior public contract 
awards by winning firms 
concurs with previous 
studies that indicate this 
is where the steepest 
learning curve applies 
for small firms, and it 
remains in the ‘black 
box’ of the small firm 
experience for 
researchers  
Woldesenbat 
et al, 2011  
To examine 
capabilities that allow 
small firms to operate 
as suppliers to large 
organisations  
Semi-
structured 
interviews 
Differentiates capability 
into two phases: market 
entry and market 
evolution and growth 
Flynn et al, 
2013 
To investigate the 
impact of size of 
SMEs on public 
sector tendering  
On-line 
survey with 
Irish SMEs 
Tendering resources, 
behaviour and success 
are affected by firm size 
Loader, 2013  Literature 
review  
A typology of 23 barriers 
SMEs face to access 
public tenders 
 
McKevitt and 
Davis, 2013 
To explore how 
micro-enterprises 
interact with public 
procurement systems 
Online 
survey with 
Irish micro-
enterprises  
A typology of four 
interaction patterns is 
developed from the data. 
Small suppliers should 
view procurement as a 
process, not a one-off 
exercise  
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Author(s) and 
year  
Study Purpose Research 
Method 
Key Findings  
Reijonen et al, 
2014 
To assess the effects 
of proactivity & 
innovativeness 
influence on SMEs in 
information search on 
tender opportunities 
and subsequent 
bidding 
Online 
questionnai
re with 
Finnish 
SMEs  
Proactive marketplace 
behaviour through 
different levels of 
entrepreneurial 
orientation (EO) in firms 
has a more substantial 
influence on SME 
activity in public 
procurement. 
Kitching et al,  
2015  
To theoretically 
position regulation as 
a dynamic rather than 
as a static and 
negative regulatory 
force. 
 Presents SME 
perspective of regulation 
as fallible  
Kitching, 2016 To examine the 
influence of 
regulation on 
entrepreneurial action 
 Expands understanding 
of how regulation 
contributes to 
entrepreneurial action 
from indirect effects 
arising for small firms via 
their relations with the 
stakeholders 
 
Flynn and 
Davis, 2016  
To examine the role 
that relational and 
procedural 
capabilities play in 
explaining SME 
performance in public 
contract competitions 
Electronic 
survey - UK 
SMEs  
SMEs capable of 
interacting with public 
buyers and proficient in 
the formal aspects of 
tendering and contract 
management enjoy 
superior outcomes.  
 
 
2.4 Firm tendering practices  
 
Four studies tell us something about what firms do when they tender 
(Woldesenbat et al, 2011; Reijonen et al, 2014; Tammi et al, 2014; Flynn 
and Davis, 2016).  The first study investigates small firm use of 
entrepreneurial processes and dynamic capabilities. Woldesenbat et al 
(2011) draw on the concepts of entrepreneurship and dynamic capability 
as interconnected dimensions that underpin supply chain capability. It 
explores what factors small firms require to secure contracts with public and 
private large organisations. Whilst it does not examine situated firm 
experiences of competing in a competitive tender, its value lies in how it 
theoretically proposes a process perspective of capabilities to sell. The 
study starts with the question, ‘What capabilities enable small firms to 
become suppliers to large organizations in the public and private sectors?’ 
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The study is set in 2008-9 in the UK, with participant firms drawn from two 
key regions. It investigates the experiences of case study firms who 
secured contracts. It is a rare example of a study of where capability is 
conceptualised as a central theme. The study extends empirical research 
from tendering resources being present or absent to consider adaptive 
practices by using dynamic capability theory. It explains what helps small 
firms grow and evolve in supply chain relationships with large 
organisations. A qualitative approach interviewed 18 owner managers of 
small firms from the ICT, business service and food manufacturing sectors. 
A semi-structured interview process identified dimensions of 
entrepreneurial and dynamic capabilities of small firms that underpin the 
supply chain relationship they hold with large organisations. 
Entrepreneurial capability is defined as a dynamic concept that interacts 
with the environment, where the display of three entrepreneurial 
characteristics, innovation, pro-activeness and risk taking (Wiklund and 
Shepherd, 2003) are shaped by market conditions. The definition of 
dynamic capability that the study uses is the ability to “reconfigure a firm’s 
resources and routines in the manner envisioned and deemed appropriate 
by its principal decision-maker(s)” (Zahra et al, 2006. p. 918). The 
researchers’ objectives were to assess the processes, routines and 
resources that have enabled them to enact a supply chain relationship and 
to elicit views about their direct experiences of doing so. No separate 
attention was given to contracts secured through public procurement, yet 
findings about supply chain relations enhance and enforce general 
understanding of power asymmetry issues that constrain small firm action.  
 
Interview questions drew upon entrepreneurial and dynamic capability 
theory to explore issues relating to strategic choice, product market, 
competition and perceived capabilities, all from the small firm perspective. 
Four core capability themes arose from the interview analysis. These are:  
i) entrepreneurial capability to identify and act  upon  opportunities; ii) 
networking and bridging capability to influence resource configuration and 
relationship building through effective communication; iii) resource 
integrating capability to build minimum stock resource levels and to re-
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assess resource acquisition, and development; and iv:) strategic service 
delivery capabilities, referring  to unique processes and routines to deliver 
and to differentiate firm position in the marketplace. Themes ii-iv form a new 
dynamic capability to assist market growth and development once the 
entrepreneurial capability has enabled entry into a new product market. 
Table 2.2 presents capability attributes directly extracted from the study as 
firm routines and resources. 
Table 2.2 Four capability attributes small firms need to sell to large organisations  
Entrepreneurial capability  Networking and bridging capability  
• Open to new ideas and search 
• Increasing online presence 
• Adopting best practice, lean 
  manufacturing, just-in-time 
• Passion and motivation 
• Investing 
• Knowledge of product market 
• Research and development 
• Identifying business opportunities 
• Identifying gaps in market/unmet 
customer demand 
 Penetrate new product markets 
through established contacts and 
networks 
 Transform an identified opportunity 
into real business transactions. 
 Show willingness and ability to make 
links, share experience and knowledge 
and foster trust and loyalty. 
Resource development and 
integration capability  
Strategic service delivery capability  
Process, routines and resources  
 Hiring and retaining talent 
 Intelligible use of information 
 Accreditation/certification 
 Knowledge about the market 
 Knowledge of ICT 
 Outsourcing 
 Maintaining diverse workforce 
 New organisational structure 
 Teamwork 
 Developing image and brand 
 Managing process creatively 
 Strategic forward buying 
 Research and development 
Routines, processes and strategic 
resources  
 Delivering value and delivering on time 
 Customer-orientation: right products to 
the right customers 
 Exceeding customers’ expectations 
 Providing bespoke and distinctive 
services 
 Offering quality services and products 
 Working with strategic partners 
 Diversification of clients/business 
 Regular review of business models 
Source: Adapted from Woldesenbat et al, 2011, pages 501-507) 
Woldesenbat et al (2011) note how supply chain relations with large 
organisations were “highly skewed and constrained” (p.504) and this is re-
enforced through interview data that show how the majority of firms 
interviewed struggled to establish a “collaborative, knowledge sharing, 
reciprocal relationship” (p.509). Their study findings refer to on-going 
exasperation with the complexity of procedures necessary to win contracts.    
 
Several revelatory learning points arose from Woldesenbet et al’s study 
(2011) that resonate with the thesis topic. Firstly, some, but not all, 
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respondents as encouraging motivation towards being innovative, 
responsive, risk management-orientated and modernising see the supply 
chain of a large organisation. However, it is not known how behaviour 
changes and how firms learn to adopt and adapt practice. Secondly, 
confirmation that the greater a firm’s bridging and networking capability, the 
better it is positioned to penetrate and position itself with large organisations 
as it enables wider leverage of resources. Networking uses Putnam’s 
definition of bonding and bridging (2000), with bonding describing 
horizontal ties between actors and bridging recognising the ability to 
engage in open networks outside of the firm. Collectively, networking and 
bridging represent a competence that underpins tender preparation and 
requires further exploration in this study. Thirdly, forms of professional 
accreditation and certification by an independent third party are viewed as 
important resources in small firms. For example, a company called Payco 
claimed it had an enhanced reputational and brand capital through holding 
an accreditation awarded by a bank. Fourthly, and most importantly, the 
research introduces the concept of entrepreneurship to articulate the role 
that search and sense-making capability plays in market penetration and 
growth. Its overall conclusion is that small firms have great potential to 
compete as suppliers of large organisations, provided that they have 
developed the entrepreneurial and dynamic capabilities required to make a 
sustained offering. This is a concept that aligns to the field of study in this 
thesis.  
 
The value drawn from this paper is a novel application of investigating SME 
experiences, using dynamic capability theory to do so. It introduces the 
notion of entrepreneurship theory as relevant to the opportunity-seeking 
aspect. It also differentiates capability into two phases: i) market entry and 
ii) market evolution and growth. To this extent, it theoretically addresses 
how the process of creating and applying capabilities varies according to 
different types of small firm maturity and sector. The argument presented 
demonstrates the need to avoid seeing small firms homogenously. Creative 
search, linked to innovation (Wicklund and Shepherd, 2003), is cited as an 
important managerial or organisational process that requires strategic 
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action.  We learn that small firms pursue changes to market conditions 
themselves. An ontological observation made later (Kitching et al, 2015) is 
that a critical realist understanding of regulation is useful to interpret 
capability development. Critical realism focuses on the role of agency that 
behaves contingently according to external conditions. 
 
Several limitations exist in relation to the usefulness of Woldesenbet et al’s 
study (2011) to address the thesis research questions. The study omits 
discussion about the contingent value of a priori experience, for how long 
each firm remained unsuccessful beforehand, and what details are known 
about specific resources or routines they enacted to win.  It is unknown 
what resources were owned or risked by each case company for building 
market entry in the first place. Public procurement is not examined as a set 
of processes that small firms interact with at micro-level. We do not know 
the foundations or resource base of each successful company and the role 
that a priori market knowledge played. Two knowledge-based capabilities 
are introduced; ‘market knowledge’ and ‘technology’ in relation to 
discovering and exploiting opportunities but these do not fully explain 
capability development or emergence, where in the company that 
knowledge base resides, or address tendering as a market mechanism. 
Operational capabilities are under-investigated to focus on dynamic 
capabilities. Finally, by not distinguishing more fully between public and 
private sector large organisations, no clear judgement can be made about 
capability demand in each tendering environment.  
 
A second study (Reijonen et al, 2014) conducted a quantitative inquiry to 
examine one aspect of a firm’s strategic orientation, entrepreneurial 
orientation, to measure SME participation in public procurement. The 
journal article does not refer to ‘capability’, and it relies upon self-reported 
small firm survey data to identify factors that restrain or facilitate 
participation in public procurement. Entrepreneurial orientation (EO) is 
defined in this study in the same way as a firm’s ability to innovate, take 
risks, and proactively pursue market opportunities (Wiklund and Shepherd, 
2005; Rauch et al, 2009).  An online questionnaire was sent to firms in 
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North Karelia, Finland, in September 2012. One hundred and ninety-one 
participants responded to questions about how they sought out open 
tendering opportunities and the activities they engaged in to submit bids. 
Firms were asked, “Does your firm look for public sector tender requests?” 
and “How many times have you submitted a bid to public sector tender 
requests?” Hypotheses were set for the empirical analysis; two for each 
dimension and its possible relationship with tendering. Firm size, age and 
industry were used as control variables. Prior success at tendering was not 
a criterion for selection. Firms in scope for the survey were identified as 
those that employed up to 249 people and were for-profit. Fewer than 
15.7% of the firms reported that a public-sector organisation was their main 
customer.  
 
Findings from Reijonen et al (2014) add to the study of tendering practice 
as it demonstrates how successful SME participation in public procurement 
can be encouraged and increased.  In terms of public procurement, 
innovative behaviour was important to becoming involved in an unfamiliar 
process. Pro-activeness was tested to see if it enhanced firm ability to 
obtain relevant market information. Risk taking was a dimension of EO 
tested for its presence or absence in firm behaviour.  EO as a form of 
strategic orientation may be a critical influence as it represents elements of 
a firm’s culture that guide its interactions with markets, customers, and 
competitors (Woldesenbet et al, 2011). Reijonen et al (2014) believe that 
strategic orientations can define how active or passive a firm is regarding 
markets. They identified that readiness to tender is shaped by firm 
resources available to meet tender requirements and an ability to assess 
the chances of winning prior to bidding. This requires market insight, 
customer knowledge, resources, and awareness of market competition. 
Strategic orientations are described as guiding firm information gathering 
and utilisation that is required to pursue public procurement opportunities.  
 
Results suggest that two dimensions of EO, pro-activeness and 
innovativeness, can predict increased likelihood of pursuing tendering 
opportunities and are important behaviours for new customer acquisition 
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and finding new market opportunities. In particular, innovativeness was 
positive in enhancing small firm ability to find novel ways to put their existing 
resources to work to meet the requirements in tender requests. Firms that 
are pro-active and innovative are more active at tendering. They have an 
increased chance of exploiting public market opportunities, as they are 
more aware. Higher EO levels within firms are more likely to be selected 
for inclusion in a bidding process, and their proactivity perseveres after 
rejection. Innovativeness in firms creates novel and effective resource 
utilisation. No evidence could be found to support risk taking as having a 
positive effect on firm behaviour, which is the third dimension of EO in the 
literature. Older and larger firms were found to be more likely to seek open 
tendering opportunities and participate in tenders than younger and newer 
firms. This finding does not contribute to a conceptual understanding of 
what happens inside a firm to respond to tenders. The study showed that 
higher levels of EO are associated to experience accumulation over time.  
 
Results align with (Flynn et al, 2015) in reporting firm size as a positive 
influence on SME tendering resources, activity, and success rate in 
tendering. However, in Reijonen et al (2014) public procurement is 
described as a stable regulatory environment. The study did not open up 
the importance of context as a condition for EO to be more or less effective 
or contribute to a richer description of what firms actually do beyond 
applying EO as a behavioural frame for action. It did not study successful 
tendering behaviours; evidence of participation cannot be construed as 
evidence of capability. Self-reported data tells us more about what firms 
think rather than what objectively happens in practice. Data were not 
triangulated and so are open to fallibility. The study did not include a broad 
discussion on firm behaviours, and it ignored the effects of external 
conditions upon participating firms. 
 
A third study by Tammi et al (2014) surveyed the effects of market 
orientation (MO) on SMEs’ activity in public sector procurement 
participation. This study examined how SME participation in public 
procurement was influenced by its strategic orientation towards gathering 
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market information using the construct of MO defined as “activities to 
acquire, share and respond to market information” (Reijonen et al, 2014, 
p.322). It has three dimensions: customer orientation, competitor 
orientation and firm’s inter-functional coordination to gather and use market 
information (Narver and Slater, 1990). The construct of market orientation 
(MO) was examined for its capability effects on Finnish small firm activity 
orientation to participate in public procurement markets (Tammi et al, 
2014). In 2012, 191 participants responded to an online questionnaire, 
which tested a series of hypotheses regarding the relationship between MO 
and winning public contracts.  It was proposed that, with enhanced MO, 
SMEs are better able to assess whether their strengths, as well as the 
resource combinations available to them, fit the needs of the public sector 
buyer in general and the requirements of the tender request at hand, in 
particular. Findings show a significant relationship exists between MO, and 
this affects how actively SMEs look for and submit bids for public sector 
tender opportunities. Information is a prominent part of customer orientation 
that enables a firm to assess whether it is able to meet the needs of the 
customer, which, in turn, affects their willingness to submit bids in the public 
sector tender requests. With regard to competitor orientation, a significant 
relationship exists between inter-functional coordination, a firm’s 
coordinated efforts and utilization of resources to create superior value for 
customers (Narver & Slater, 1990), and how actively SMEs both look for 
and bid for public sector tender calls.  
 
In addition to measuring SMEs’ activity in public sector procurement and 
SMEs’ market orientation, data was gathered on several background 
factors. From these, firm size, age, and main industry were used as control 
variables in the analysis. Results of the study show that market orientation, 
has a clear positive connection with SMEs’ activity in finding information 
about business opportunities in public procurement and, more importantly, 
submitting bids in requests for tenders. We did not learn whether 
encouraging the adoption of MO by small firms increased their chances to 
obtain public sector customers as success in gaining contracts was not 
used as a dependent variable. The study offers utility in conceptualising a 
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capability to tender seeking as well as to submission and demonstrating its 
association with practice. However, as with Reijonen et al (2014), a 
quantitative study does not deal with descriptions of best practice at 
tendering. This remains a knowledge gap.  
 
The fourth and most recent survey on small firm tendering (Flynn and 
Davis, 2016) took place in Ireland. It looked for predictors of SME success 
by examining the role that relational and procedural capabilities play in 
explaining SME activity and performance in public contract competitions. 
Relational capabilities are defined as three-dimensional: i) an ability to 
influence buyer needs prior to tender; ii) communicate a value proposition 
to inform a tender specification; and, iii) promote goods and services to 
public buyers prior to tender. Procedural capabilities describe five 
dimensions of ability, to: i) understand contract qualification criteria; ii) 
satisfy contract qualification criteria; iii) effectively respond to contract 
qualification criteria; iv) receive feedback and search contract award 
notices; and v) successfully manage contracts. The study describes 
tendering capability as:  
“A firm’s ability to marshal its organisational resources in 
order to identify contract opportunities and subsequently 
position itself to exploit them. It is the ability to leverage 
organisational resources – human, technological, financial, 
administrative, network and reputational.” (Flynn and Davis, 
2016, p.4). 
 
The statement above recognises deliberate agential efforts but it ignores 
the notion of context within which firms operate.  It refers to organisational 
resources that may or may not solely reside within the firm. Tendering 
capability is usefully conceptualised as resource leverage, yet this definition 
does not offer clues about resource accrual, investment or combining 
mechanisms. Flynn and Davis’s (2016) analysis of primary survey data 
from 3,010 SMEs established what firm leaders believe to be true in 
multiple and diverse settings after a pilot exercise with a small number of 
firms. Firm level characteristics (firm size, age and sector) are found to be 
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more important than tendering-specific capabilities in explaining the 
number and value of contracts for which SMEs compete.  Questions asked 
of SMEs are too general in nature to invite responses that can infer active 
agency, for example, to ‘understand’, to ‘receive’, to ‘satisfy’. They indicate 
that SMEs that are proficient at interacting with public buyers in the formal 
aspects of tendering and contract management enjoy superior outcomes. 
Firms with ‘procedural know-how’ are hypothesised to able to increase their 
participation rates and those capable of influencing  buyer needs, 
communicating a value proposition and promoting their goods and services 
to public buyers prior to tender may introduce selectivity to firm tendering 
strategies.  The study points to a clear need for firms to invest in two forms 
of tendering-specific capabilities but does not say how to acquire them, 
upon which resources and resource combinations that they reside. The 
notion of learning is also absent. 
 
Supplier interaction with the procurement process is conceptually useful for 
investigating procurement as a context-interactive process and what small 
suppliers actually ‘do.’  An on-line questionnaire-based study with an 
achieved sample of 2,027 firms that are all active tender competitors 
(McKevitt and Davis, 2013) explores how micro-enterprises in Ireland 
interact with public procurement systems. Firstly, the study points to the 
fact that prior research on small firm barriers is limited by the absence of a 
process view of public procurement. Evidence is found that engagement 
prior to tendering is a necessary condition for small suppliers to achieve 
above-average bid outcomes. A general weakness of ‘informal and 
intuitive’ marketing practice in small firms is highlighted in a public 
procurement context and the researchers point toward a lack of research 
into ‘business to government’ marketing. The study shows that small firms 
weight the three phases of the procurement process (pre-tender, tender 
and post contract award) differently. The data supports and extends the 
argument that small firms are not a homogeneous group, and illustrate that 
small firms use different strategies to compete for public contracts. 
Researchers encourage small firms to see procurement as a process rather 
than as an isolated tendering exercise.  
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So far, discussion of tendering practices across these four studies has 
attached importance to six attributes that can contribute towards successful 
tendering practices. They are; i) taking entrepreneurial action; ii) having a 
market focus; iii) building relationships  to influence buyer needs and 
promote the firm in the public marketplace; iv) knowing how to build and 
integrate resources; v)  strategic service delivery; and, vi) an ability to follow 
tender procedures. They are all useful ideas to take forward, but the survey-
based nature of each study does not show us how a firm can orchestrate 
its assets (in the form of resources and routines) to accomplish any of these 
attributes and build capability to tender. That is the focus of this thesis. The 
next section critiques further studies that focus on the nature of firm 
resources employed to tender, but without linking resources to capabilities. 
 
2.5 Firm resources absorbed by public sector tendering and 
their application  
 
Descriptions of SME resources to tender for public sector contracts are 
presented in the literature primarily as issues of resource deficits and 
challenges. For example, tendering processes and documents are codified 
in market-based language (Erridge, 2007), and typically demand high 
levels of professional indemnity and company turnover are typically 
demanded (Perry, 2011), creating demand for rare and scarce resources. 
SMEs lack of knowledge of tendering opportunities, are challenged by the 
use of frameworks and have capacity issues, and are disadvantaged by the 
complexity of some procurement processes (Perry, 2011).  
 
The resource position of a company is relevant to analyse tendering 
demands. In the UK, with no preferential rules, or set-asides that exist in 
other countries, SMEs compete on an equal footing with larger ﬁrms 
(Morand, 2003). Appreciative enquiry into how small firms command and 
mobilise their resources to enact behaviour is lacking, though what is 
known is that small suppliers that are already affected by resource poverty 
are adversely affected by onerous requirements (Michaelis et al, 2003) “and 
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where these demands are greater and more highly varied than those on 
private sector procurement.” (Telgen et al, 2007, p.17).  Research has 
found that many companies who had little or no experience of tendering in 
the public sector felt that they did not have the appropriate capability in 
terms of knowledge and skills, and/ or they described other issues around 
inadequate resources or critical mass (Perry, 2011).   Loader (2013) 
presented a typology of twenty-three barriers that small firms face. Twenty 
relate to the structural conditions of tendering, such as pro-large business 
attitudes, but three refer to small firm resource deficits in skills and attitudes. 
These are the poor completion of bids, a lack of required tender completion 
standards and a reluctance to engage with a process perceived to be unfair. 
Remedies for these resource deficits are suggested to: develop expertise 
and competence, learn to identify appropriate opportunities, achieve high 
technological and quality assurance standards, show interest and build 
relationships, and, consider entering the market as a subcontractor. The 
remedies are useful empirical observations, but the study stops short of 
demonstrating how a small firm could reconfigure its resources, or invest in 
new ones, to implement each remedy. 
 
Starting with Karjaleinen & Kemppainen (2008) four survey-based studies 
(Freshminds, 2008: Baden et al; 2011; Pickernell et al, 2011; McKevitt and 
Davis, 2013) contributes towards a general knowledge of resource 
requirements.  The first electronic survey conducted on tendering focused 
on Finnish SMEs (Karjaleinen & Kemppainen, 2008), and investigated 
obstacles SMEs encounter when tendering.  Five forms of tendering 
resource were examined as obstacles to small firm tendering:  i) legal; ii) IT 
capabilities; iii) administrative; iv) supply capabilities for central 
government; and, v) receipt of adequate tender information. SMEs were 
also asked if firm employee size altered perceptions of involvement (firms 
were differentiated as having nine or less or more than nine employees). 
The survey instrument used questions with a continuous rating scale, 
multiple choice and open-ended questions to test five specific resource 
perceptions. The types of resources tested were drawn from a literature 
review that identified three major obstacles for small firms: the bidding 
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process, large contract size and inadequate information to tender. A four 
per-cent sample of 203 firms was drawn from a cross-sector random 
sample of 5091 SMEs. Tendering experience was not used as a criterion 
for selection, limiting the utility of this study to understand capability. The 
selection of five factors to investigate also lacks a conceptualisation of how 
firms believe the resources or knowledge should be put to work in a 
tendering episode. 
 
Results found that lack of legal and administrative expertise are the biggest 
obstacles to involvement, meaning that SMEs who consider their legal or 
administrative resources as a significant obstacle are less likely to be 
involved in public procurement.  However, this is perceptual data, and can 
only be judged as partial evidence of reality. The factors were tested 
separately and without a process perspective, so resource combining is 
overlooked. The study was the first to report perceptions that firms with 
more than nine employees are more likely to participate in tenders. Later, 
Flynn et al (2013) also investigated the influence of firm size upon tendering 
resources, behaviour and success in Ireland. Firms were split into micro, 
small and medium categories, with micro being less than nine employees, 
small (10-49) and medium (50-249) employees. Following a pilot of the 
electronic questionnaire with 20 Irish small firms, a sample size of 4567 
usable responses was drawn from 57 per-cent micros firms, 28 percent of 
small firms and 15 percent of medium-sized firms. In each case, a positive 
relationship was found between firm size and tendering resources  (the 
number of years’ tendering experience and the number of employees 
involved in tendering), tendering behaviour (defined as number of contracts 
tendered for in 2012), typical contract value, participation in tender training, 
percentage of tenders on which feedback was obtained, percentage of 
contracts sourced online) and tendering success (revenue attributable to 
public contracts and a firm’s own perception of success). A key learning 
point is recognition of heterogeneous firm endowment with resources, 
evidenced through different levels of tendering experience, people involved 
in tendering inside the firm and willingness to invest in tendering training, 
61 
 
suggesting the need for “more fine grained analyses” at the SME-tendering 
interface (Flynn et al, 2013, p. 457).  
 
The results from Flynn et al (2013) challenge implied assumptions that 
small firms are similarly disadvantaged (Freshminds, 2008; Loader, 2013). 
However, tendering activity is poorly conceptualised from a process 
perspective. Results imply increased firm size delivers a proportionate 
positive effect on tendering resources, behaviour and outcomes. It does not 
tell us what happens inside a more successful firm (in the 50-249 bracket) 
that differentiates them from smaller businesses. Micro-firms with nine or 
fewer staff display different perceptions than small firms. Micro firms have 
an increased belief in their lack of administrative and legal resources and 
possess less capability for supplying central government. Enterprise size 
also affects how small firms perceive difficulty in accessing tender 
information. The results show that perceptions of the lack of legal expertise, 
administrative resources, and access to information sources on tenders 
significantly limit SME involvement in public procurement. What cannot be 
learnt from the study was information on the minimum stock of resource 
levels required that SMEs say they lack, or any data on how capability is 
actually built through the resources examined. 
A practitioner survey (Freshminds, 2008) investigated a small firm 
perspective about tendering resource challenges. It inquired about barriers 
to SME awareness of public procurement opportunities, awareness of 
public procurement opportunities, SME activity in the public sector 
(frequency of bidding for government work, percentage of turnover from 
public sector) and SME perceptions of the drivers behind success and 
failure in bidding for UK government contracts. The purpose of the online 
survey was to gain a broad understanding of SME experiences of bidding 
for public sector contracts and also perceived current drivers and barriers 
to winning contracts. Headline findings showed that small firms do not know 
where to look for opportunities, lack the time to research, are reluctant to 
bid for public contracts because of the resources required (articulated only 
as time, effort and cost) and often do not know why bids fail. Small firm 
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respondents did perceive that “developing teams and processes to produce 
bids creates positive outcomes” (p.28), so staff and processes produce bids 
and research opportunities. Follow up semi-structured interviews failed to 
distil further what skills and knowledge staff need to have. There is no 
discussion in the types of processes that support tender search and 
completion.  
 
A separate study focused on one specialist form of knowledge - corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) - that is posited as a mandatory resource firms 
need to qualify for tendering. Baden et al (2011) used 25 SME interviews 
followed by an electronic survey with 68 respondents to question the effects 
of environmental and social criteria upon small firms when responding to 
tenders. CSR capability is positioned as a pre-condition of entering into a 
competitive tender. Findings reveal two interesting issues. Firstly, 82 
percent of respondents agreed that including social and environmental 
requirements as preconditions to supply would increase their motivation to 
engage in CSR. Motivation and a commitment its practice is in place, but 
firms deride a tokenistic display by having a policy. Secondly, SMEs 
interpret CSR differently to public purchasers. SME owner-managers 
viewed their social responsibilities as primarily related to their staff (and 
employment law). Less emphasis was placed on firm contribution to wider 
society. In a tender situation, this may cause a firm to be disqualified or lose 
points in a scored tender. Thirdly, firms were found to lack resources, 
although it is not stated which resources, to meet expected pre-conditions 
of CSR activity. In turn, CSR demands in tenders and excessive legislation 
demands in general, caused increased costs in SMEs to meet expected 
standards. However, ‘expected standards’ was found to implicitly refer to 
formal processes such as policy statements and strategies oriented 
towards positive recruitment practices of minority groups, rather than 
recognition of an informal set of CSR values embedded within firm culture. 
The study tells a story of CSR aspects of tendering linked to a lack of 
understanding by public purchasers about how small firms operate. It offers 
insight into the depth and breadth of CSR tendering demands: “sustainable 
initiatives in construction, waste policy, training, pollution prevention, use of 
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recycled materials. Visibility of management of key construction issues 
(pollution prevention, environmental protection, waste recycling/disposal, 
emergency preparedness, company targets and initiatives” (Baden et al, 
2011, p.262). The study could have gone further and been specific about 
which resources were scant and mechanisms to acquire them. Again, firms 
studied were not selected for, or asked about, their individual tendering 
performance outcomes. It is unclear whether surveyed firms struggled with 
CSR dimensions of a tender specification more than other aspects, such 
as answering technical or financial questions. A take-away point got this 
study is that CSR is a specialist form of human capital associated with 
tender completion. 
 
2.6 Empirical observations of structural conditions and market 
access  
 
This section critiques studies that shed light on the effects that arise from 
the tendering environment within which small firms compete. Findings point 
to structural conditions small firms face that shape agential efforts to gain 
market access.  Conditions are characterised by competing regulatory, 
commercial and socio-economic goals seen within UK public procurement 
policy (Erridge, 2007). Public procurement is used as an innovation policy 
to resurrect the demand side (Edler and Georghiou, 2007) and to foster 
SME growth and innovation (Perry, 2011). An analysis of factors that 
influence SME action to win public sector contracts included access 
restrictions, although the practice of segmenting tenders into smaller ‘lots’ 
increases the probability of SMEs winning the contracts (Perry, 2011). 
SMEs feel excluded from accessing public procurement contracts because 
they do not have capacity to tender for the entire contract (European 
Commission, 2008). Large contract size is seen as probably the most 
significant barrier for SMEs accessing public procurement (GHK, 2010). It 
is unclear if access restrictions are actually a smokescreen for capability. 
Trust in relationships is a common cultural theme that is expressed as a 
social factor in small firms’ own purchasing practices (Morrissey and 
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Pittaway, 2006), and  as a supplier trust can offer a small firm an alternative 
to power for managing inter-firm relationships (Mishra, 2011).  
 
The buyer supplier relationship literature charts a movement from an 
adversarial approach towards a collaboration one (Hines, 1994; Holmlund 
and Kock, 1996) where procurement practice has shifted towards  
encouraging suppliers to join together to offer a joint supply solution. 
Collaboration between suppliers is invited in response to a particular set of 
contract needs or it can be routinely exploited as an opportunity where 
geographical, resource or expertise limits restrict a solo bidder. Small firm 
experience of engaging in consortia approaches (defined as two or more 
persons, at least one of whom is an economic operator, acting jointly for 
the purpose of being awarded a public contract) reveals that they are limited 
by their perception that public sector procurement prefers to deal with a 
single major supplier over a consortia (Scottish Government and Research, 
2009). By contrast, public bodies expect small firms to be alert to 
collaboration opportunities and consider collaboration in order to grow 
(Roots Review, 2009).  
 
 More competitive and transparent procurement practices were intended to 
have a positive impact on the European economy by unlocking the growth 
and innovation potential of SMEs (Perry, 2011) but SME perceptions do not 
acknowledge this intended impact. Measures to support SME access to 
procurement are summarised by Perry (2011): simplifying procurement 
processes, dividing larger contracts into lots, setting requirements that are 
proportionate in relation to the size of the contract and building capacity 
among SMEs. 
 
Bannock and Peacock (1989) used multiple sources of contemporary small 
business survey data to examine the ‘form of burden’ placed upon small 
firms through taxation and regulation. Compliance with paperwork 
associated with tender compliance is a generalised barrier, and not just as 
an SME issue. Five regulatory conditions towards improving SME supplier 
access were to: i) provide a stable environment; ii) simplify administrative 
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requirements, for example, standardised templates; iii) reduce tendering 
requirements, for example, reduction in financial information requirements; 
iv) offer SMEs specific treatment, and; v) change attitudes towards SMEs 
by careful drafting of specifications, encouraging appreciation of benefits of 
SMEs and avoiding bias in favour of large firms. Findings contribute 
examples of external environmental factors that can affect SME capability 
where the authors are effectively arguing for an environment that supports 
fair and equal treatment for SMEs to operate within.  
 
Marketplace exclusion is a dominant theme in the literature that describes 
the effects of public sector tender processes on small firms that perceive 
public procurement processes as complex, costly and time-consuming 
(Intertrade Ireland, 2009). Government buying power aggregates contracts; 
cutting transaction costs by rationalising the supplier base and managing 
potential suppliers. Risk is minimised by requiring experience and 
reputational resource from suppliers, a key structural condition for SMEs 
looking to win their first public contract. Such practices clearly disadvantage 
small businesses whose limited resource base means they can only supply 
small contracts, compete as part of a diverse supplier base and 
demonstrate limited experience and reputational capital (Loader, 2005, 
2007). They feel ill equipped to follow arduous tender procedures, 
scrutinise and comply with legal clauses, meet requirements for formalised 
management processes such as quality procedures and metrics and to 
demonstrate reputation (Freshminds, 2008; Karjaleinen and Kemppainen, 
2008). Instead, they would prefer more informal supply chain relationships 
(Morrissey and Pittaway, 2006).Thus, macro-level trading conditions, 
complex and formal commissioning procedures strategies and bias in the 
assessment of risk creates ‘generative mechanisms’ that structurally 
exclude the small supplier (Loader, 2007). 
 
Loader (2005) shows how the public sector deals with and perceives SMEs 
in the supply chain. Evidence of procurement practice is presented using a 
case study approach with seven public sector organisations in North East 
England (a police authority, a fire authority, three local authorities, a health 
66 
 
trust, and a regionally based government department). Loader interviewed 
an unspecified number of senior procurement officers, and reviewed 
documentary and web-based evidence to uncover examples of 
procurement practice to evaluate perceptions held of SMEs as competitive 
bidders. Respondents were asked to comment on their existing practices 
and emerging trends. All respondents identified achieving value for money 
as a most significant driver and two of the seven organisations raised 
equality of opportunity for SMEs as important. Collaboration was introduced 
as a way to obtain cost savings by the emergency services, where regional 
contracting for uniforms had reduced spending in 2005 to below that of 
locally sourced uniforms in 2000.  
 
Loader discussed the impact of collaboration to mean fewer contracts and 
therefore fewer suppliers, which adversely affected small firms in two ways: 
i) the cost of tendering becomes prohibitive, and; ii) the scale of a contract 
becomes beyond their ‘capability’. Therefore, capability is referred to, but is 
not defined or explored. A second question that asked about previously 
identified small firm benefits (OGC and SBS, 2001a) saw responsiveness 
and flexibility as attributes. The ability for SMEs to deliver on cost and 
quality was agreed upon by just two organisations. Findings resonate with 
Penrose (1959) who expressed that the competitive advantage of larger 
firms resulting from both size and experience is a prevalent belief that 
disadvantages small firms. The existence of conflict was evident in 
competing policy priorities: obtaining the best price and encouraging the 
use of SME suppliers. Respondents expressed a view that SMEs are less 
able to compete on price. Research evidenced how procurement was being 
used as a vehicle to address multiple policy agendas and how SMEs were 
both a victim and a socio-economic target of policies that seemed to 
exclude them. 
 
Pickernell et al (2011) link tendering to firm growth. They utilised data from 
the Federation of Small Businesses 2008 biannual survey to investigate if 
a significant link existed between procurement and firm growth to explore 
whether public procurement should be used as a policy instrument to 
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support SMEs. Result were based upon 5,425 responses, although less 
than seven percent of respondent firms had more than twenty employees. 
Five propositions considered if different forms of public purchaser, such as 
central government departments, universities or local authorities impacted 
differently upon small firms through their location and size of budgets. It 
asked whether SMEs supplying government and their geographical 
clustering differed from non-suppliers in terms of basic firm characteristics 
including sector, but also size, age, and use of the internet, and owner-
specific characteristics including age and gender. For the public 
procurement types respondents were asked whether (in the previous two 
years) they had supplied (directly or indirectly) to eleven government or 
quasi-government public sector organisations (coded `yes' or `no'). Results 
showed that a significant link between procurement and firm growth did not 
exist, but that supplying the public sector seems to be an important for 
SMEs.  
 
Findings inform macro-level judgement about austerity effects and the use 
of public procurement to support SMEs in local and regional economies. 
The study details a broad range of basic characteristics that underpin 
drivers ‘for’ and barriers ‘to’ SME participation. Pickernell et al (2011) 
suggest a general degree of inertia within the public sector procurement 
regimes about contemplating new sources of supply. However, differences 
in the basic characteristics found in the study, including owner-manager 
characteristics, do not offer clues about capabilities or resources 
associated with tendering practice but develop the argument against 
adopting an homogenous approach towards how SMEs are treated through 
structural conditions. Tendering is conceptualised in terms of its economic 
importance, but not in terms of how the environment creates demand for 
firm capability. 
 
A further qualitative inquiry about procurement-driven entrepreneurship 
studied the 2008 Olympic Games and The Olympic Development Authority 
(ODA) about its supplier diversity (Smallbone et al, 2009). Its purpose was 
to discover if the ODA could increase SME access to public procurement 
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contracts. The UK government saw the 2008 Olympic Games as a lever for 
economic development by supporting small firms to win more public sector 
business, and so it made an interesting project. Research used the SME 
perspective and analysed the expectations and experiences of SMEs in 
London when accessing a budget of more than £7 billion for ODA funded 
work. The researchers used an initial desk-based review of the ODA’s 
procurement policies, a series of face-to-face interviews with selected ODA 
staff, interviews with business support and membership organisation 
representatives, focus groups and 31 face-to-face interviews (with six 
contract winners, four unsuccessful small firms and a further 21 aspirant 
small business owners). Findings again largely conceptualise tendering 
from a resource poverty perspective (Loader, 2005, 2013), cite internal 
barriers as lack of firm preparation or record of accomplishment, and 
external barriers including the need to “to comply with a raft of statutory 
requirements such as having particular policies and documents in place” 
(Smallbone et al, 2009, p.2). All six contract winners had previously won 
public sector contracts, highlighting the importance to purchasers of prior 
experience in working for public sector organisations. Contract winners 
drew upon existing links with business or trade associations to find out 
about contract opportunities, and several attend procurement events. They 
had an existing awareness of the statutory requirements and policies in 
place to serve financial, social and regulatory requirements placed on 
suppliers.  
 
At least three contract winners reported having a lack of information from 
the client, both during the process of responding to and securing a contract, 
and in the early stages of contract work, which they noted as a cause for 
concern. The study did not establish what it is about the successful firms 
that make them winners. Cited use of successful prior public contract 
awards by winning firms is where the steepest learning curve applies, and 
how tendering capability is built remains in the black box of the small firm 
experience.  Perhaps the methodology used has imposed limitations upon 
data findings: all contract winners had prior contract winning experience 
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and yet results do not offer a full explanation about how resources are 
deployed to create a successful outcome. 
 
Findings show that the structural conditions shaping SME market access 
to public contracts are political, regulatory, economic and social. SME 
capability development has to be able to respond to these forces through 
agential efforts, yet it is unclear how in practice in contexts this can occur. 
The next section focuses on one of these conditions, regulation, in more 
depth. 
 
2.7 Regulation and empirical observation of its causal powers  
 
Regulation is an external, environmental criterion, and tendering is a 
specialist form of regulation to manage public purchasing. Kitching et al 
(2015) argue for a critical realist understanding of regulation. This approach 
positions regulation as a social-structural entity with causal powers on 
business performance, and presents a view of social reality as stratified. 
Their study opens up a contemporary debate to position regulation as a 
dynamic force, where effects from intentional and inadvertent human 
behaviour create different firm performances. Kitching et al’s study of 124 
SMEs using semi-structured interviews focused on the micro-level impact 
on small firms. Firm respondents were approached to investigate “the 
influences on, and barriers to, performance – not to assess the specific 
impact of regulation” (Kitching et al, 2015, p. 138). Findings show indirect 
and direct forms of influence. An example of indirect regulatory 
performance effects on firms is when public bodies are mandated to 
purchase a service or product through new legislation such as new 
protective clothing, and the public market has to increase its budgets to 
spend with suppliers. A direct effect is how firms choose to exploit 
opportunities that arise from market conditions. An empirical example in 
this study is a firm expanding its outsourced document storage business to 
new locations, offering legal and health professionals a solution to meet 
their professional standards:  
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“Direct and indirect regulatory influences combine to shape 
small firm performance, with or without agent awareness of 
effect. All regulatory effects on performance are contingent 
upon small business agents and stakeholders acting in 
particular ways in particular circumstances.” (Kitching et al, 
2015, p.140). 
 A key point is that SME understanding of regulation only offers a partial 
reality. Regulation stimulates forms of adaption by firms, stemming the 
effects of knowledge expiry as firms adapt in different ways. This renders 
firm performance variable. A critical realist perception of regulation portrays 
the effects of regulation as contingent on agency as it relates to context. 
This study marks a turn in the literature to engage scholars in looking at 
what individual firms do.  Kitching (2016) separately explores the indirect 
effects of regulation upon firm action by studying the ‘ubiquitous effects’ of 
regulation. He describes regulation as:  
“A ubiquitous influence on entrepreneurial action that is 
substantive, pervasive and enduring” (Kitching, 2016, p.215). 
 
Its utility lies in an empirical demonstration of how regulation generates 
indirect impacts on small companies that arise through their relationships 
with stakeholders whose actions affect them. Kitching describes regulated 
environments as having active institutional forces that shape how small 
firms and stakeholders act. A mixed method study using 255 validated 
survey responses and twelve interviews show three types of indirect 
effects, all of which influence firm capability: i) firm processes are shaped 
by stakeholder actions, ii) stakeholders generate response to firm 
compliance and, iii) stakeholders as regulated entities themselves have to 
adapt to their own stakeholders.  
 
Tendering is largely under-theorised in relation to the notion of context and 
causal powers arising from regulation.  Small firms do not fully appreciate 
all the effects regulation has, and as such, an exploratory methodology into 
tendering capability should embrace causality as well as effects. To 
observe and understand regulatory effects, empirical work should 
investigate both indirect and potentially unobservable powers that are in 
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force and shape SME tendering behaviour. The explanation by Kitching et 
al (2015) of social stratification fits with a study of SME tendering capability 
at micro-foundational level. The next section opens us discussion into 
empirical findings. 
 
2.8 Discussion of empirical findings  
 
Quantitative surveys provide value to offer an initial explanation of relational 
factors, yet findings generate limited implications for studying a capability-
based perspective of tendering; explanation and prediction are not the 
same. The studies suggest clues, but do not answer questions about 
deeper causal structures that exist in society. They presuppose a closed 
view of social reality, whereas firm tendering behaviour exists in an open 
system where actions can become shaped by interaction with internal (past 
experience) and external influences (the competitive nature of a local 
supply base or the volume of tenders).  
 
An assumption is made that firms respond to a normative set of processes, 
overlooking heterogeneity in resource demands for different tenders in 
different circumstances. This in unproven. Predictions cannot explain the 
underlying causes and uncover generative mechanisms behind an event. 
Limited qualitative inquiries have attempted to investigate aspects of firm 
level tendering practices and to explore the foundations for how tendering 
capability is conceptualised. Discussion of empirical findings in relation to 
the literature review questions are organised into three sections. They are 
i) firm-level resources and processes associated with competitive tendering 
ii) SME owner/manager strategic orientation towards winning public 
contracts and the exercise of agency; iii) the nature of tendering as a 
dynamic environment.   
2.8.1 Firm-level resources associated with competitive tendering  
 
Previous academic studies have largely focused on interactivity of small 
firms with public procurement being problematic in general and that it is 
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resource constraints per se that restrict small firm engagement in the 
resource-demanding processes. However, empirical results do not offer a 
full explanation about firm resource types used to command and mobilise 
tendering behaviour or how these resources are actually built or deployed 
to create a successful outcome. Whilst appreciative enquiry of successful 
small firms is lacking, it is possible from the literature to view the stock of 
resources that allow firms to operate from a resource-based view as forms 
and levels of capital.  Indeed, the presence of specific forms of knowledge, 
skills or other resources helps to understand market positioning or market 
exclusion.  
 
Human capital is examined in the literature in the form of previous tendering 
experience and owner manager characteristics. Successful case firms had 
found resources to develop policies to serve financial, social and regulatory 
requirements placed on suppliers. Tendering processes and documents, 
codified in market-based language (Erridge, 2007) with strict scoring 
criteria that accompanies each part of a tender response, require technical 
language skills for interpretation. Company action in the codified 
organizational setting of competitive public sector tendering is couched in 
terms of compliance and institutional rules, whatever the company size. 
Language can be ambiguous to the interpreter and it can distract suppliers 
from being able to articulate their key messages about service or product 
fit. Literature suggests that confusion or at least a lack of clarity exists within 
SME owner-managers and their interpretation of tendering requirements. 
For example, interpreting social responsibilities as primarily relating to their 
staff (and employment law), rather than local communities or the wider 
society (Baden et al, 2011).  Therefore, understanding and interpreting 
criteria to decide how to select specific tenders may demand tacit 
knowledge, as does an ability to comply with rigid procurement rules 
encased within the offer. Mandatory questions that serve parallel policy 
agendas demand specialist knowledge of the meaning and form of answers 
required places resource demands on SMEs.  
 
73 
 
Social capital is introduced through participation in collaborative consortia 
and access to knowledge through business and trade connections about 
up-coming opportunities. Financial capital is also relevant to mention. 
Purchasing consultancy as a mechanism to buy in market knowledge is 
introduced as an external resource, but nothing is said about the 
effectiveness of deploying this approach. The cost of time to seek out and 
complete tenders is a key feature in empirical work. As tenders often 
operate as a multi-stage process over a protracted time, intermittent 
mobilisation of resources inside and outside the business alongside 
“business as usual” is a feature of supplier resource demands. This tells 
me that procurement activity demands utilisation of slack resources, or a 
‘reserve’ of resources that are in excess of what is needed for day to day 
firm operations.  
 
Key issues emerge from the literature show where small firms believe that 
resource deployment is critical; scrutinising and complying with legal 
clauses, meeting requirements for formalised management processes such 
as quality procedures and metrics, demonstrating reputation (Freshminds, 
2008; Karjaleinen and Kemppainen, 2008) having accreditations and 
certifications (Woldenbesat et al, 2011.)  SME perceptions about specific 
resources required for competitive tendering are also described as 
obstacles  i) legal, ii) IT capabilities, iii) administrative, iv) ‘supply 
capabilities’ for central government and v) adequate information about 
tender specifications.  
 
Insights into the perceptions of resources small business owners have to 
improve their chances of winning public sector contracts are interesting. 
SMEs can lack capacity but also vision to analyse opportunities that are 
within their reach. More research would help to determine how widespread 
these findings are in terms of generalisability. Case studies performed to 
date do not hint at scale or diversification of access and capability issues.  
 
Literature generally agrees that tendering is both resource intensive and 
demands specific forms of knowledge and skills, making it highly specialist 
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in nature for market entry and competition. Firm resources underpin how 
competitive strategies can be built. Literature identifies some specific firm 
resources (skills and knowledge and operational and financial resources 
required to tender). Six aspects of knowledge have been identified. They 
are knowing  about: i) the rules of competitive participation for information 
exchange (Reijonen et al, 2014; Flynn and Davis, 2016);  ii) where tenders 
are advertised and what each procedure type means (Woldesenbat, 2011; 
Flynn and Davis, 2016); iii) how a tender specification is constructed and 
scored (Woldesenbat, 2011; Flynn and Davis, 2016); iv) what social and 
environmental legislation is embedded within tender response demands 
(Baden et al, 2011); v) how to write a company policy document (Flynn and 
Davis, 2016); and, vi) specialist technical, legal and public policy language 
(Karjalainen and Kemppainen, 2008). From a skills perspective, firms are 
known to require i) information search skills (Woldesenbat, 2011; Flynn and 
Davis, 2016); ii) being able to articulate their strengths as a supplier in a 
written format (Flynn and Davis, 2016); teamwork (Woldesenbat et al, 
2011); interpretation skills – what procurers mean by e.g. ‘innovation’ 
(Tammi et al, 2015); business to government marketing skills (McKevitt et 
al, 2013) and; experiential learning skills (Smallbone et al, 2009).  
 
Resources are often implicit in their absence in studies, with SMEs 
characterised by resource scarcity and a lack of specialised structures and 
competences, suggesting a reason for firm tendering failure. By default, 
they are deemed necessary then for success to occur. Resources are also 
implicitly assumed to reside within a business, yet wider literature makes 
clear that resources can lie outside of a firm and be harnessed for use 
(Teece et al, 1997). It remains unclear whether all firms need to invest 
equally in resources for tendering on a level playing field or if some sectors 
demand more than others do. Overall, there is currently limited discussion 
of how resources become mobilised into routines or very informal 
behaviours to enact capability. The presence or absence of resources is 
not in itself a predictor of capability if it is unclear how resources are 
employed and combined, and what conditions trigger their competitive use. 
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Firm practices do not appear by magic; they are deliberately constructed 
from combinations of resources with an intention to create an effect. 
 
2.8.2 Strategic orientation towards winning public contracts: the exercise 
of agency 
 
Literature has a single study that proposes how tendering is amenable to 
routinisation (Woldesenbet et al, 2011) but no studies that discuss routine 
formation as a dynamic process. An interesting debate lies in 
understanding how firm agency responds to external influences and what 
scope exists for creating different outcomes. The institution of public sector 
tendering is not neutral in its impact on SMEs. It carries embedded 
conditions that can enable and constrain firm action, and need to be 
recognised as doing so. To concur with Kitching (2016), business owners’ 
experiences of regulatory effects are also fallible, and the implication of this 
is that structural conditions can be overlooked in analysing tendering 
capability. There are clues in the literature about environmental factors that 
might shape small firm success in competitive tendering.  The government 
has a focus and a target on SME engagement (UK government industrial 
strategy green paper, (2017) and it is known that behaving 
entrepreneurially is possible within public sector markets (Reijonen et al, 
2014; Tammi et al 2014). SMEs display a greater understanding of local 
cultural and political contexts, more links with local civil society, and a 
greater commitment to operating in a specific area (Baden et al, 2011). 
Holding other public contracts increases SME reputational appeal, 
including contract experience as market currency (Smallbone et al, 2009). 
Procurers universally accept an SME advantage of being responsive and 
flexible to contract needs (Loader, 2005) and that existing external trade 
links aid opportunity awareness (Flynn and Davis, 2016). Capability 
antecedents for small firms can and do arise from market conditions. The 
effect of already holding a public contract is seen as a reputational 
resource, yet it is unclear if failing to win a tender has an opposite effect 
upon capability intentions. There is consensus that the external 
environment is one where it is possible for small firms to build relationships 
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that are productive for tendering (Smallbone et al, 2009; Flynn and Davis, 
2016) and where they can behave entrepreneurially towards and within the 
public sector market (Woldesenbat, 2011; Reijonen et al, 2014; Tammi et 
al, 2014). Loader (2013), in a typology of approaches to improving small 
and medium-sized enterprise supplier success, states a business 
responsibility for SMEs to develop their knowledge and skills, but stops 
short of defining resource configuration and mobilisation.  
 
Literature is less forthcoming on specific examples of the causal effects of 
these influences at firm level, and it does not account for small firm 
homogeneity, dictated by factors such as sector, size, maturity, past 
experience, market strategy or competition base. Studies tend to examine 
specific aspects of tendering capability components in isolation, ignoring 
the notion of interplay between different aspects of capability and inter-
dependency that may exist. For example, how market orientation links to 
procedural capability or how pro-activeness links to relational capabilities. 
Quantitative studies that rely on statistical abstraction lack rich description 
of how a firm mobilises a tender response from start to finish inside the firm. 
It is generally unclear which relational conditions promote orientation 
towards tendering capability and which do not, and how a capability is 
influenced by firm processes. From a methodological perspective, 
quantitative studies (Reijonen et al, 2014; Flynn et al, 2015) emphasise 
prediction and limit description of firm agency. Quantitative research 
designs such as questionnaire surveys impede visibility of causal relations, 
especially as they examine populations of firms without detailed exploration 
into contextualised and other differences between firms. It is not known 
whether firm actions are deliberate or unintentional consequences nor does 
it reveal much about how or if firms build routines. There is fruitful 
discussion on characteristics that serve to constrain, but sometimes also to 
enable, small firms to develop capability. Findings would be enriched if they 
were more explicit at micro-foundational level, paying more attention to how 
firm actions become environmentally activated, and in doing so, and draw 
on context. Indeed, it is a key aim of this thesis to address these points. 
What is known about capability building and adaptation lacks causal 
77 
 
understanding. The next section seeks to understand more from the 
literature about what environmental factors cause small business owners 
to adapt firm practices for competitive tendering.  
2.8.3 The nature of the tendering environment  
 
Public procurers expect suppliers to be uniformly able to meet a wide range 
of socio-economic criteria expressed in tender documents as well as to 
supply the product or service to the agreed specification. Such criteria 
typically require demonstration of a positive impact upon workforce 
diversity, local employment and skills, low carbon productivity and 
alignment to specific policy agendas. This reflects the dichotomous role of 
the public sector to operate with a wider scope than profit (Zheng et al, 
2007; Murray, 2009) by simultaneously servicing the regulatory, 
commercial and socio-economic goals underlying UK public procurement 
policy (Caldwell et al, 2005). Small firm owners consulted have interpreted 
social responsibilities as primarily about how they treat their staff rather 
than the local community in general (Baden et al, 2011) and so confusion 
exists in the terms used within tender specifications. Undefined 
specifications during the application process, such as the balance between 
budget and service levels, are perceived to occur and could inadvertently 
lead to frustration. 
. 
Literature is clear and consistent about multiple external barriers that can 
affect SME tendering capability. Market conditions such as austerity or 
efficiency shape purchasing practices; for example, aggregating contracts 
above SME delivery capability or reducing contract budgets (Freshminds, 
2008; Loader, 2013), procurers lack purchasing professionalism and 
demonstrate policy ambiguity (Fee et al, 2002; Loader, 2005; Georghiou et 
al, 2014; Flynn and Davis 2016). Public sector tendering is bureaucratic, 
formalised and legalistic in nature and qualification standards 
disproportionate to contract size and nature (Fee et al, 2002; Baden et al, 
2011; Cabras, 2011; Loader, 2015) and opportunities have high transaction 
costs; bureaucracy creates high compliance costs (Fee et al, 2002; Erridge, 
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2007; Flynn et al, 2013). Capability is by nature temporal in a dynamic 
environment (Woldesenbat et al, 2011) and procurers seek a public sector 
contract track record from bidding firms Loader (2005); Preuss and Walker, 
2011; Pickernell et al (2011). Procurer attitudes are risk averse to SMEs 
(Loader, 2007; Freshminds, 2008) and supplier requirements exclude 
SMEs and SMEs lack capacity to take advantage of opportunities 
(Freshminds, 2008). SMEs are poor at ‘business to government’ marketing 
(McKevitt and Davis, 2013). Tendering failures limit SME orientation 
towards learning (Smallbone, 2009). Public sector purchasers do not 
understand SMEs (Pickernell et al, 2011) and an assumption by large firms 
that formal standards and accreditations are a relevant measure of SMEs 
(Spence, 2007). Studies are still limited in how they can explain variation of 
small business tendering performances. Public procurement resides within 
a multi-stakeholder environment (Erridge, 2007; Erridge, 2009) and there 
is a gap in consideration and understanding of the impact of procurement 
models and their associated practices on SMEs (Loader, 2007).   
 
Interest remains in the resource position of SMEs (Loader, 2011) to 
investigate whether public sector procurement models hinder SME 
suppliers through their purchasing approaches in an “environment of 
austerity” (p.287). Loader’s study with English local authorities builds upon 
Erridge (2007) to assess the use of public procurement to support 
government policy in its broadest sense, and to build evidence about the 
impact of procurement approaches upon SMEs from local authorities in 
England.  Two studies adopt a capability perspective (Flynn and Davis, 
2016; Reijonen et al, 2014) where tendering capability is presented as a 
process rather than as a static concept. One study uses a dynamic 
capability perspective to explicate capability as a process or as an 
integrated task from an entrepreneurship perspective at micro-foundation 
level (Woldesenbat et al, 2011). However, the review exercise has 
identified knowledge deficiencies in relation to the focus of this thesis, and 
the research gap is explained in the next section  
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2.9 Location of a research gap and research questions 
 
This chapter has critiqued literature on firm tendering capabilities, the 
tendering environment and firm resources required to act within it. 
Research on the small firm and public procurement relationship problem 
has, to date, made a clear observation that small firms struggle to resource 
the tendering process. It has not, however, identified exactly what 
resources are needed to be competitive. Neither does it explain how these 
resources are acquired by SMEs that are competitive, how the resources 
are organised to competitive effect or how small firms learn to draw in and 
organise resources competitively. It is also unknown if procurement is 
actually a framework of capabilities. In short, the mechanisms of successful 
tendering remain in a 'black box', as do the processes that might help us 
develop competitiveness in more small and medium-sized businesses. 
Tendering capability is inadequately conceptualised to account for variable 
capability performance from firms. Descriptive data does not build 
understanding of causal structures and the exercise of agency by small 
firms is largely overlooked. Studies to date lack a processual approach to 
observe micro-foundational actions, so do not recognise capability as an 
evolutionary continuum, and the role that learning plays within incremental 
capability growth. 
 
Knowing about how capability is physically developed through the 
experience of doing it and the processes built to support capability in small 
firms is another distinct research gap. It relates to the need to increase our 
knowledge of capability development from the SME perspective; the 
number of prior studies that represent the small firm perspective are few 
(Woldesenbat et al, 2011; Reijonen et al, 2014; Tammi et al, 2014; Flynn 
and Davis, 2016). Research on the small firm and public procurement 
relationship problem has, to date, made a clear observation that small firms 
struggle to resource the tendering process (Karjaleinen & Kemppainen, 
2008; Baden et al, 2011; Pickernell et al, 2011; McKevitt and Davis, 2013; 
Loader, 2013). It has not however identified exactly what resources are 
needed to be competitive. Neither does it tell me how these resources are 
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acquired by small firms that are competitive, how the resources are 
organised to competitive effect or how small firms learn to draw in and 
organise resources competitively. Procurement capability is poorly 
conceptualised, and this is a key point. In short, the mechanisms of 
successful tendering remain in a 'black box', as do the processes that might 
help us develop competitiveness in more small and medium-sized 
businesses. This creates the first research question: 
 
RQ1: What are the practices, expressed as routines, that generate 
capability to successfully tender in the case firm?  
 
We are provided with a static and limited insight into the nature of the 
problem of resourcing public sector tenders. It is not yet understood why 
some small firms successfully compete to fulfil competitive tenders while 
others do not. There is limited understanding of the potential for overcoming 
barriers to public sector tendering as learning emerges through routines 
that command resources effectively, not just resource ownership. 
Furthermore, discussion of routines in small firms that apply to small firm 
tendering practice is absent. A much more theoretically informed and 
causal analysis is required to know what preconditions need to exist for firm 
capability to emerge. 
 
Literature is also unclear on the relationship between firm actions (agency) 
in its capacity to unlock resources to tender. Firm agency is partly 
elucidated through exploration of entrepreneurial orientation through pro-
activity and innovation (Reijonen et al, 2014) but it is not known what 
triggers firm behaviour beyond rent-seeking self-interest. For example, 
what conditions, internal and external conditions to the firm, need to exist 
for a firm to behave more proactively, or invest in opportunity seeking or 
market intelligence gathering? Current literature has not sufficiently 
addressed these questions from a micro-foundational or a causal 
perspective. Equally, small firm agency effects on the market are not 
adequately researched. It is unclear how SMEs can exert market power 
themselves on opportunity construction.  
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Existing empirical work displays limits to what is known about how small 
firms tender. It is unclear where this information resides within the business 
in routines, in owner tacit knowledge or not at all. We are not informed how 
small firms succeed the first time, only that it is the steepest learning curve. 
Empirical work offers scarce examination of physical tender documents or 
the completion process by SMEs to draw conclusions about routines or 
habits that are effective. 
 
No empirical evidence has been found to suggest whether competitive 
SMEs actively seek tendering experience in new recruits, to buy in, rather 
than to grow knowledge and skills, or how many SMEs give up after the 
first time. This thesis cannot answer all of these questions. With on-going 
recalibration of resource demands, it is unknown whether there have been 
any particular triggers to procurement processes or demands that have 
triggered a particular reaction. Nor is it clear whether SMEs who orient their 
business practices to fit public sector supply end up specialising in the 
public sector marketplace, and distract from private sector contracts.  
 
Firm tendering practice is characterised by having to cope with increasing 
external institutional pressures, but explanation offers only a one-
dimensional interpretation of effects associated with resource intensive 
processes.  There is minimal exploration of firm strategies to exert upward 
influence on the system. Existing knowledge shares perspectives about 
public policy and procurement processes. This tends to make assertions 
about small firms rather than examine what they actually do and why, so 
looking at public procurement engagement from the small firm perspective 
offers originality. This leads to formulation of a second research question 
(RQ): 
 
RQ2: What causal powers exist within the tendering environment to 
constrain and enable small firm tendering performance? 
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Existing literature is not able to explain the macro operating conditions that 
firms find themselves in when they place themselves in tendering 
environments, or to tell us if procurers are sensitive to effects on small firms 
when they exercise power. Tendering performance contexts are generally 
treated as a static rather than a dynamic concept and do not position firm 
performance in a wider institutional framework of engagement within a 
national tendering regulatory framework. There is a gap in exploring the 
discrete contextual factors of each case that sit alongside omnibus or 
marketplace contextual factors of how tendering works as a form of 
competition, its regulatory framework and the form of language used in 
knowledge exchange attempts.  
 
Further, discussion of the dynamic nature of tendering as a social institution 
would indicate a risk of skills and knowledge atrophy if continuous learning 
does not occur, yet there are scarce references to how firms learn from 
tendering experience and apply it to adapting situations and new resource 
demands.  This creates a third research question,  
 
RQ3: To what extent, and how, do firms learn to improve their 
tendering capability through repeated experience?  
 
Further enquiries into how small firms acquire, assimilate and apply 
knowledge to tendering performances would aid understanding of 
capability emergence and adaptation to its dynamic operating environment. 
Routines for seeking knowledge and improving practices can be explored 
through case findings, observable at micro-foundational level. 
 
2.10 Chapter summary 
 
This chapter has reviewed extant literature to focus on what is known about 
small firm tendering capability. A structured approach has critiqued studies, 
asking questions about what is already known about firm ability to tender, 
how efficacy to tender is shaped by firm interaction with the market 
environment to emerge from context, and upon what resources practice 
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depend. Literature has shown existing studies to be multidisciplinary in 
nature, from economists to CSR interests, and substantially a-theoretical. 
Existing empirical studies of capability development are informative but 
limited. This thesis fulfils a theoretical and methodological gap in the current 
literature.  It is a critical realist study on small firm tendering that is able to 
capture the complexity of relationships between small firms and public 
purchasers.  
Three research questions have been constructed from the knowledge gap. 
A much deeper conceptualisation is required to account for the dynamic 
and idiosyncratic nature of the tendering environment, the importance of 
agency in constructing firm tendering behaviour and to develop a process 
perspective of capability enactment. Theoretical considerations to 
conceptualise tendering capability that can address each research question 
are explored in the next chapter.  
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Chapter Three: Theoretical framework to 
conceptualise tendering capability  
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter explains the theoretical framework, constructed by the 
researcher, through which tendering capability is conceptualised. The 
framework is required because an existing definition that can explain 
capability in the context of firm agency and structural (operating) conditions 
does not exist, either to understand empirical claims or to offer a process 
perspective. A critical realist study lends itself to investigating small firm 
tendering capability as contingent on its environment and context. This 
renders capability theory on its own valid, but insufficient.  
 
Capability theory can define the nature of firm resources, explored in this 
chapter as forms of capital with a focus on human, social, entrepreneurial 
and financial capital. Human capital is defined as stocks of knowledge, 
skills and experience that reside in people (Becker, 1964). Social capital 
refers to the ability to facilitate external knowledge acquisition and support 
knowledge exploitation (Yli-Renko et al, 2001). Entrepreneurial capital is 
the skill or ability to organise the function of entrepreneurial competence 
and commitment (Erikson, 2002) and financial capital is the money, credit 
and other forms of funding that companies require to invest in their 
business. Critical realism facilitates exploration of routines as building 
blocks of capabilities (Dosi et al, 2000) and account for their operational 
and dynamic nature (Zollo and Winter, 2002).  
 
Capability theory has several interpretations to offer; a resource-based 
view (Penrose, 1959; Barney, 1991), a knowledge-based view (Grant, 
1991) a core rigidities view (Leonard-Barton, 1992) and a dynamic 
capability perspective (Teece et al, 1997; Eisenhardt and Martin,2000; 
Teece, 2007). What it is unable to do is to describe the nature of the public 
sector tendering environment and its impact on small firms as institutional 
inhabitants.  
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Ultimately, firm capability must respond to market demand, and that is why 
institutional theory is utilised to frame the second research question in 
Figure 3.1. Institutional theory can examine the structural context and 
conditions of tendering practice. Finally, as tendering knowledge can be 
accessed from the external environment as well as through experience 
accumulation inside the firm, a theoretical explanation of putting knowledge 
assimilation and application to productive and sustainable use can be met 
through absorptive capacity theory. This theory explains capability renewal. 
Collectively, the theoretical framework shown in Figure 3.1 address the 
three research questions posed at the end of chapter two. 
 
3.1.1 Establishing the research framework  
 
The theoretical framework displayed in Figure 3.1 is the result of continuous 
reflection on case findings, and a desire to articulate a better explanation 
of tendering capability emergence, and its sustainability, inside a firm. Each 
theoretical perspective corresponds to a specific research question.  
Figure 3.1: Theoretical framework to study small firm tendering capability  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Capability Theory  Institutional theory  Absorptive Capacity  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To understand the 
nature of the public 
sector tendering  
environment, and how it 
impacts upon  
small firms 
 
To explore what 
different forms of 
capability exist and the 
nature of routines and 
resources that support 
them 
 
To examine how 
small firms acquire 
and assimilate 
knowledge into the 
firm through forms of 
learning 
Dynamic capabilities built inside a firm to compete 
in an external environment.  
 
 
RQ1: What are the 
practices, expressed 
as routines, that 
generate capability to 
successfully tender in 
the case firm?  
 
RQ2: What causal 
powers exist within the 
tendering environment 
to constrain and enable 
small firm tendering 
performance? 
 
RQ3: To what extent, 
and how, do small firms 
learn to improve their 
tendering capability 
through repeated 
tendering experience? 
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Capability theory is discussed first in the next section as the study is about 
capability and it is a logical place to start. It posits competitive ways that 
firms accrue, combine and reconfigure their resources into routines that get 
crucial work done, in this case, public sector tendering. Secondly, 
institutional theory is utilised to pursue the first research question to 
examine the structural context and conditions of tendering practice. Finally, 
absorptive capacity theory is employed to address the final research 
question. It aids understanding of how firms ‘know what they know’. Existing 
literature alludes to the benefits of tendering experience accumulation 
(Smallbone et al, 2009), yet it is interesting to see how experience 
accumulation relates to upgrading firm knowledge. In other words, the 
dynamic capability aspects of learning from experience.   
 
The chapter is structured into five sections. Following the introduction, 
section two raises questions about how capability theory, including dynamic 
capability theory, can be used to examine tendering practices. This is the 
largest section, as it discusses capability, routines and resources as a 
hierarchy of firm assets. Section three introduces an institutionalist 
approach to inquiry to explore aspects of institutional power within 
institutional theory. Section four focuses on the utility of absorptive capacity 
to understand firm-level market learning and contextual adaptation to 
market practices. Section five concludes with a summary of ideas taken 
forward into an integrated framework that enable tendering capability to be 
conceptualised.  
 
3.2 Capability theory and tendering practices   
3.2.1 Defining what capability means  
 
An accepted definition of capability is: 
“a set of differentiated skills, complementary assets, and 
routines that provide the basis for a firm's competitive 
capacities and sustainable advantage in a particular 
business” (Teece et al, 1990, p.28). 
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The term ‘capabilities’ is traced to 1972, where it was expressed that 
organisations will tend to specialise in activities for which their capabilities 
offer a comparative advantage (Richardson, 1972). Capability theorists 
view capabilities as a key dimension of ﬁrm heterogeneity and as part of 
the evolutionary development of organisations as social artefacts (Nelson 
and Winter, 1982). The capacity to perform reliably an activity of some type 
implies only that a capability meets a minimum standard of acceptable 
functionality (Helfat, 2007).  As Winter (2000) notes, how well a capability 
performs its intended function is a matter of degree.  
 
The purpose of capabilities is to get things done, but they also deal with 
adaptation, change and learning (Bingham et al., 2007) and enhance the 
productive value of resources (Makadok, 2001). Similarly, Teece (2007) 
calibrates capabilities into a display of technical fitness (to perform a 
function and get the job done) or a display of evolutionary fitness - a 
dynamic capability to help shape the environment. These effects are 
important to enabling market access and sustainability. Capabilities 
develop in part through practice. As a firm gains experience performing an 
activity, the capacity to perform it again in the future tends to improve, 
particularly early in the development of a capability (Zollo and Winter, 
2002). Capabilities are introduced in literature as interlinked with knowledge 
and resources (Barney, 1991). 
 
Capabilities have an intended and specific purpose (Amit and Schoemaker, 
1993; Dosi et al, 2000; Helfat et al, 2007; Winter, 2003) and they can be 
can be operational or dynamic. They evolve through three stages of 
development: founding, developing and maturing, known as the capability 
lifecycle (Helfat and Peteraf, 2003). At maturity stage, capabilities are 
routines that are embedded in the firm through repetition. They offer the 
firm an ability to coordinate and deploy resources in order to achieve the 
firm’s goals (Amit and Paul, 1993). Capabilities rely extensively on 
organisational processes (Amit and Schoemaker, 1993; Eisenhardt and 
Martin, 2000; Helfat et al, 2007), otherwise described as routines that 
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persist beyond typical tenure of individuals in organisational roles (Winter, 
2012). 
3.2.2 Models of capability theory 
 
Theoretical interpretations of capability begin to address the second 
research question, ‘What are the practices, expressed as routines that 
generate capability to successfully tender in the case firm?’ The evolution 
of organisational capability can be traced back to Penrose (1959), who laid 
the foundations for the resource-based view (RBV) in strategic 
management literature. Subsequent definitions later emerged (Barney, 
1991), with the addition of a core capability perspective (Leonard-Barton, 
1992), a ‘knowledge-based theory of the firm’ (Grant 1996) and a dynamic 
capability firm perspective (Helfat, 1997; Teece, 2007; Teece and Pisano, 
1994; Teece et al, 1997; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000).  Capability literature 
spans a wide field, but there are two broad interpretations in strategic 
management literature about capability building mechanisms as shown in 
Figure 3.2 below: the resource-based view (RBV) that also incorporates the 
knowledge-based view (KBV) and core capabilities and rigidities; and a 
dynamic capability perspective.  
 
Figure 3.2 Broad interpretations of capability  
 
Conceptualising firm capability 
     
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
The resource-based view (RBV) is a dominant and influential theory in the 
strategic management literature to conceptualise firm competitive 
advantage and management decision-taking (Barney, 2001).  It explains 
The resource-
based view of 
capability 
(RBV)  
A dynamic 
capability 
perspective 
  
Core capabilities and rigidities  
The knowledge 
based view of 
capability  
(KBV)  
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sustainable, competitive advantage through rent-earning capabilities of 
internal firm resources that are protected from imitation. Penrose (1959) 
highlighted the importance of resources to a firm's competitive position and 
the fact that firm growth is aligned to how its resources are deployed. RBV 
continues to be recognised as an accepted model of business growth 
(Macpherson & Holt, 2007). Penrose conceptualised a firm as “a collection 
of productive resources” (Penrose, 1959, p.24) where their competitive 
capacity relied upon effective internal exploitation of resources. The focus 
of attention of the RBV is the internal environment of the firm (Wernerfelt, 
1984) and resources are expressed as forms of capital. The RBV is also a 
vehicle to formulate an explanation of the foundations of capability as it is 
about the ownership and mobilisation of resources around opportunity. It 
can explain how firms acquire and keep competitive advantage over time 
(Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000), when strategic capabilities are the enactment 
of internal resources.  
 
Sustained competitive advantage comes from the resources a firm controls 
(Barney, 1991,2001). RBV literature focuses on four firm attributes to hold 
sustained competitive advantage, being valuable, rare, imperfectly imitable 
and non-substitutable (Barney, 1991). Exploration of firm processes will 
identify how resources to successfully tender fit within the VRIN framework. 
The RBV suggests that the profit-generating potential of resource 
heterogeneity and immobility is greater when these attributes are 
generated inside the firm through in-house resource investments. This 
model does not take account of the structural conditions and social 
complexity of the wider tendering environment, which can render firm 
access to information as incomplete and heterogeneously distributed. 
Indeed, the static nature of the RBV, 'the processes through which 
particular resources provide competitive advantage remain in a black box' 
(Barney, 2001, p.33), has been criticised for lacking a more dynamic 
approach (Priem and Butler, 2001). The RBV has not taken into account 
how resources accrue through social structures acting on entrepreneurs 
and firms. Finally, the RBV fails to address the dynamics of competition. 
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Grant’s knowledge based view of the firm (1991), or KBV, is situated within 
the RBV to present the notion of firm’s resources and capabilities as the 
building blocks for strategy formulation. Grant refers to six types of 
resources (financial, physical, human, technological, reputational, and 
organisational) and he places knowledge (human resources or people-
based skills) as the primary strategic resources of a firm. Grant (1991) 
analysed capability in terms of the role of knowledge within a firm, which 
concurs with an organisational competency perspective (Prahalad and 
Hemel, 1994). Knowledge is positioned as the primary productive resource 
in a firm, and assumptions are made about knowledge characteristics. The 
assumptions are that knowledge as a primary resource has strategic 
significance, that it can exist in explicit and tacit forms, that knowledge 
transferability is key, and that, where information resides in a tacit format, 
individuals are the primary repositories.  
 
A five- step analytical framework for a resource-based approach to strategy 
formulation is proposed (Grant, 1991) to: i) analyse its resources; ii) 
appraise its capabilities; iii)  analyse its competitive advantage; iv)  select a 
strategy; and, v) identify resource gaps, using  resources and capabilities 
to  upgrade them. The KBV offers a useful insight into the microstructure of 
capabilities for team-based integration accessing and integrating 
knowledge and focusing on the role of knowledge in routine creation. In a 
dynamic external market environment, Grant positions a firm’s resources 
and capabilities as reliable and enduring for competitive strategy 
deployment. Based upon the literature review it is likely that knowledge will 
emerge as a primary productive resource. Thesis fieldwork will look for its 
existence in tacit and codified processes.   
Staying within a knowledge-based view, Leonard Barton (1992) claims that 
it is a firm’s knowledge set that provides and distinguishes its competitive 
advantage. She classifies capabilities according to their function, and her 
work is cited in dynamic capability literature by Teece et al (1997) and in 
RBV literature (Wernerfelt, 1984). Capabilities are categorised as core, 
supplementary or enabling. A core capability refers to a firm’s resources, 
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processes, or abilities that make it distinctive from its competitors, and it 
possesses four dimensions: i) skills and knowledge; ii) physical systems; 
iii) managerial systems; and iv) values and norms. As such, it will provide 
sustainable competitive advantage (Leonard-Barton, 1995) and it 
contributes to the perspective of absorptive capacity (Cohen et al, 1990). 
Supplementary capabilities exist to add value to core capabilities and are 
open to imitation. In contrast, enabling capabilities not only add value, but 
also are also necessary to distinguish a company competitively. The 
question arising is whether tendering is itself a core capability, with firm-
specific skills that are less open to competitor imitation. If it is, then Barton’s 
claim that a core capability can also act as a liability must be considered. 
In dynamic environments, a core capability can act as a rigidity (Leonard-
Barton, 1992), precluding a firm from flexing and shaping its way of acting.  
A second broad interpretation of capability theory in strategic management 
is dynamic capability theory, defined as the “firm’s ability to integrate, build, 
and reconfigure internal and external competences to address rapidly 
changing environments” (Teece et al, 1997, p. 516). Whereas the resource 
based view focuses on resource possession, dynamic capability theory is 
concerned with resource utility. It may assist with exploration of the often 
hidden processes that enable a firm to respond to change and tackle new 
opportunities. A dynamic capability (DC) perspective (Amit and Paul, 1993) 
also sees a firm’s capability in deploying resources through firm processes. 
DCs are further described as “tangible or intangible processes that are firm 
specific and developed over time through complex interactions of a firm’s 
resources.” (Amit,1993, p.35). Whereas the RBV focuses on a firm’s 
internal strategy in stable environments (Priem and Butler, 2001), a 
dynamic capability viewpoint can offer an explanation about how firms 
sustain resource-based advantages in dynamic environments (Ambrosini 
et al, 2009). A dynamic capability perspective pays attention to the external 
focus of a firm’s resources to respond to environmental evolution (Teece 
and Pisano, 1994; Helfat, 1997; Teece et al, 1997; Eisenhardt and Martin, 
2000; Teece, 2007). In a changing environment for procurement routines, 
suppliers are being required to modify their resource base.  Dynamic 
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capabilities are considered to be built rather than bought (Makadok, 2001) 
because they are difficult to imitate, and as organisational processes 
(Helfat, 2007) or routines that evolve. A typology of dynamic capability 
routines already exists, including ideas generation, new product 
development, and new process development capabilities (Ambrosini et al, 
2009). However, it is known that in small firms the founder and firm 
resource capital continually changes over time, and that this affects the 
development of dynamic capabilities (McKelvie et al, 2009).  
 
Several ideas are taken forward from DC theory to examine empirical 
findings; are there any dynamic routines that support tendering?, what role 
does DC play in resource renewal, and, how can DCs be observed in 
fieldwork? The next section pays attention to literature about routines.  
 
3.2.3 Capability examination and firm routines 
 “Any form of capability consists of routines or processes that 
are formed through experience” (Woldenbesat et al, 2011). 
 
All capabilities consist of routines to perform tasks and to co-ordinate them, 
so theoretical insight into routines is necessary. Routines are the skills of 
an organisation (Nelson and Winter, 1982): units or ‘chunks’ of organised 
activity with a repetitive character. Organisational routines may be formally 
codified into tools such as manuals, check-lists and training books or 
depend on tacit knowledge and be only quasi-repetitious, offering 
managers a set of rules of thumb (or heuristics) that enable efficient 
processing and flexibility (Bingham et al, 2007; Winter, 2003). Heuristics 
literature extends knowledge of how to observe and understand habits and 
routines. The term ‘heuristic’ refers to experience-based techniques for 
problem solving, learning, and discovery, and is often described as ‘rule of 
thumb’, an educated guess or an intuitive judgement.  Firms may learn high 
performing processes by simply accumulating particular types of 
experience, or translate their experience into articulated heuristics.  
Heuristics might be at the heart of firm capabilities to engage in competitive 
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tendering in small firms. If so, staff members must actively translate their 
process experience into shared heuristics for opportunity capture in order 
to develop a high performing process, and hence a firm capability.   Static 
routines cause inertia in process development (Zollo and Winter, 2002) and 
create core rigidities (Leonard-Barton, 1992). On the other hand, constantly 
tinkering with capabilities is costly (Zahra et al, 2006).  Like capabilities, 
routines are conceptualised as both operational and dynamic (Zollo and 
Winter, 2002). Operational routines enable a ﬁrm to perform an activity on 
an on-going basis using more or less the same techniques on the same 
scale, and described as ‘ordinary’. Dynamic routines change existing ones 
to play a more transformational role in firm practices (Winter, 2003; Helfat 
and Winter, 2007).  
 
Firm leaders engage episodically in tendering practices using routines as 
building blocks for capability. Each tendering episode mobilises resource 
stocks into activities that propel the creation of firm-level routines to 
produce and display general and specialist forms of knowledge to interpret 
the demands of a tender in a dynamic procurement environment. Literature 
on routines and resources introduces a micro-foundational aspect to the 
conceptual research framework. There are two streams of literature on 
routines; the empiricist approach that emphasises experience 
accumulation through repetition  and the importance of external stimuli to 
drive change (Helfat and Winter, 1982), and the rationalist approach that 
sees routines as disposition (Hodgson, 2004) where capability can be 
understood by the triggering role of the experiential environment. The latter 
approach is useful to study the underlying ‘micro foundations’ of a small 
firm and the corporate agency or collective action that is taken by 
individuals in a firm (King et al, 2010). 
 
The nature and characteristics of routines have been defined and 
interpreted in literature as primarily enacting organisational stability 
(Weber, 1984; Baum and Singh, 1994; Schultz, 2008) but also amenable 
to adaptation (Cyert and March, 1963), mutation (Nelson and Winter, 1982). 
Latour (1986) identifies and distinguishes routines as ostensive or 
94 
 
performative in nature; ostensive referring to the ideal view of what the 
routine should accomplish, and performative pertaining to what actually 
happens. Three dimensions of routines - cognitive, motivational, and 
normative (Nelson and Winter, 1982) are said to interact with each other. 
 
Whilst the concept of routines goes back to 1940 (Stene), interest in 
studying routines has evolved from its original conception of individual 
habits into group action. The former interpretation of stability enactment 
views resources independently from people, whilst the latter is concerned 
with how the role of agency shapes routine enactment and vulnerability to 
change. Feldman and Pentland (2003) develop the ontology of routines by 
describing their nature as having two parts:  
[one part is] “the abstract idea of the routine (structure), while 
the other part consists of the actual performances of the 
routine by specific people, at specific times, in specific 
places (agency). Each part is necessary, but neither part 
alone is sufficient to explain (or even describe) the properties 
of the phenomenon we refer to as “organizational routines.” 
(Feldmand and Pentland 2003, p. 95).  
 
The claim then is that, to understand the interactions between the abstract 
idea and the actual execution, firm routines should be characterised as a 
source of change. This is reinforced by the improvisatory nature of 
performing a firm level routine (Weick and Roberts, 1993).   
 
3.2.4 Capability examination through a firm’s resource base  
 
A firm’s resources are founded on their current internal resource base 
(RBV) and by their ability to optimise the availability of resources (DC). 
From a strategic management RBV perspective, Grant (1991) identifies 
resources as technical, financial and reputational. Resources are treated 
as internal sources of competitive advantage in RBV, and the firm is seen 
as a bundle of resources (Penrose, 1959), whilst they are treated as 
embedded performance assets in DC theory (Teece et al, 1997). 
Irrespective of each position, owning a business per se is reliant upon 
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access to both financial and non‐financial resources (Firkin, 2003) and 
scrutiny of the form and level of resources absorbed by public sector 
tendering is important to determine of what capability comprises. The 
existence and levels of forms of capital are relevant to examine, as 
empirical literature confirms that resource scarcity severely limits the 
development of small firm tendering capability (Loader, 2007; FSB, 2012). 
Resources, however, play a varying role in capability development 
(McKelvie and Davidsson, 2009) so it is important to go beyond establishing 
their existence to examine in fieldwork how they are built and put to use in 
a procurement environment.  
 
Contemporary organisational theory argues that the competitive 
organisation should invest in a more conscious, patterned and long-term 
process of change that integrates explorative and exploitative learning and 
capabilities. Explorative learning involves organizational members’ pursuit 
of new experimental alternatives to improve business operations (Jones, 
2010) and exploitative learning refers to learning gained experientially, 
including the selection and reuse of existing routines” (Su, Li, Yang, & Li, 
2011). This process must be embedded in routine or quasi-routine 
knowledge search and articulation conducted during both opportunity and 
advantage seeking (Siren et al, 2012). Knowledge must then be integrated 
to envision new resource combinations and result in the addition, adaption 
or removal of capabilities. This process means changing the firm’s resource 
base through leveraging (putting existing fungible resources to new uses), 
accessing (drawing in external resources) and releasing (dispensing of low 
productivity resources to release capability or to avoid bad costs), 
(Danneels, 2008).  
 
Four types of resources are introduced as forms of capital that access, 
release, codify and innovate firm-level knowledge. They are: i) human 
capital, ii) social capital, iii) entrepreneurial capital, and, iv) financial capital. 
Collectively, resource stocks can be deployed into different combinations 
within a firm to codify knowledge into routines. 
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Human capital  
Human capital is characterised as affecting “the identity, role and influence 
of the entrepreneur and manager in the exploration for, and exploitation of, 
knowledge resources“ (Thorpe et al, 2005, p.262), and “the knowledge and 
skills of a firm’s entire workforce” (Hitt et al, 2001, p. 501).  Human capital 
is known to create functional capabilities that include decision making and 
the ability to solve organisational problems (Penrose, 1959), but knowledge 
resources need to be combined with tangible resources, such as ﬁnancial 
means and technical equipment, in order to have full effect (McKelvie and 
Davidson, 2009). Measures of human capital already identified as critical, 
non-tangible resources include experience and functional expertise 
(Becker, 1964; Davidsson & Honig, 2003; Camacho & Rodriquez, 2005; 
Manigart et al, 2007; Shrader & Siegel, 2007). Other types of experiences, 
such as family background or the presence of partners (Coleman, 2007) is 
also considered. In general terms, companies understand how to use 
human capital as a driver of competitive business advantage (Young, 2005) 
and of profitability and growth (Coleman, 2007). These findings have a 
direct relevance to how firms tacitly and explicitly promote and enact their 
levels and types of human resource in a procurement routine. Notably, 
limited literature exists about the human capital needed to enter the 
procurement process. 
 
Social capital  
Social capital is conceptualised within literature as an intangible resource 
arising from relationship structures (Putnam, 1995) and as the result of 
actions of a group that affect its economic goals (Portes and 
Sensenbrenner, 1993). In practical terms, social capital describes the firm’s 
ability to draw resources, such as knowledge, out of networks (Edwards et 
al, 2006). A public sector procurement journey requires a firm to 
demonstrate a “multi-criteria” approach to demonstrating its capability to 
fulfil the contract. Social capital can describe the ability of the small firm to 
compensate for resource constraints internally by acquiring resources 
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through its partnerships and associations. It is the existence and enactment 
of social capital that facilitates firm-level information search and gathering 
(Thorpe et al, 2005). Smaller firms’ use of social capital to respond to the 
tendering challenge is portrayed in empirical literature as networking and 
bridging skills (Woldesenbat et al, 2013) and relational capabilities (Flynn 
and Davis, 2016b).  The concept has evolved over time to refer to specific 
benefits derived from relational or structural alliances such as “privileged 
access to knowledge and information, preferential opportunities for new 
business, reputation, influence and enhanced understanding of network 
norms” (Inkpen & Tsang, 2005, p.150).   
 
Social capital has been associated with many aspects of organisational 
structure, such as brand identity (Runyan et al, 2008) and entrepreneurship 
(Anderson and Park, 2007). Its multiple applications and constructs have 
led the term to be described as a “definitional jungle“ (Neergaard, 2004, 
p.107), and “a revolving mutual fund of traded and un-traded 
interdependencies” (Andersen et al, 2007, p.246). It is referred to as social 
connections used to obtain resources (Kim and Aldrich (2005), as 
networking capital (Anderson and Jack, 2002) and as difficult to see and 
measure (Ostrom, 2000). Other perceived benefits of social capital include 
influence, control and power (Adler and Kwon, 2002).Nevertheless, social 
capital provides a useful notion for exploring how small service firms 
approach networking to build relationships and foster their reputation 
(Almeida et al, 1998; Shaw et al, 2008) and to investigate how relationships 
and reputation are enacted within tender responses. The networking 
behaviour of firms has been linked with their innovative capacity (Pittaway 
et al, 2004) and this is relevant to how SMEs access knowledge about 
tender opportunities and requirements. Networking theory argues that 
“academic literature presents alliances and networks as viable 
development options to compensate for internal knowledge deficiencies” 
(Valkokari and Helender, 2007, p.602). Networks, then, may create access 
to resources through trust and knowledge acquisition. Empirical research 
that investigates the meaning of relationships to owner-managers of small 
firms has value within this field because themes such as trust are 
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interpreted differently according to the nature of their relationship with 
existing and prospective customers: 
“Relationships are conceptualized as the mechanism that 
links the firm to its environment and causal to the impact that 
change in the environment has on the firm” (Fuller & Lewis, 
2002, p.371).  
 
If an association between performance and social capital, used at firm level, 
is a resource to be exploited for organisational performance enhancement 
(Cooke et al, 2005) then trust as a dimension of social capital used within 
networks may have an influence in raising SME capability. Knowledge 
acquisition is also identified as a direct benefit of social capital (Adler & 
Kwon, 2002) and as ‘”the ability of entrepreneurs and managers to acquire 
and exploit knowledge arising from external relationships” (Thorpe, et al, 
2005, p.268). There is a well-established body of literature that cites the 
importance of the relationship between knowledge and networking with a 
strategic alliance, described as a group of firms voluntarily exchanging, 
sharing, or co–developing products, technologies, or services (Gulati, 
1998). This postulates that strategic cooperation and networks allow SMEs 
to compete and innovate. All firms practice some degree of social capital 
exploitation, with innovative and knowledge-intensive firms known to be 
high users of social capital (Cooke, 2005; Cooke et al, 2007). Social capital 
has been partly conceptualised in literature in relation to procurement 
behaviour  and it is an enabling influence upon  public sector market 
access. The definition being taken forward is that firm level social capital 
may unlock resources through building relationships with external 
organisations and unearth knowledge about rare markets. 
 
Entrepreneurial capital  
Entrepreneurial capital is the skill or ability to organise socially embedded 
resources used in the creation and exchange of goods and services 
intended for profitable market exchange. The entrepreneurial process itself 
is described as “the pursuit of opportunity and the mobilization of resources 
to create, deliver and capture value through business activity” (Garnsey, 
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Stam and Heffernan 2006, p.5). Furthermore, entrepreneurs’ networks are 
known to be important to opportunity recognition (Hills et al, 1997). As firms’ 
success relies upon on their capability to develop relationships and build 
their reputation within a target customer base and key stakeholders, 
entrepreneurial capital is an important and relevant concept for exploring 
how small firms secure public contracts by orienting resource combinations 
to a perceived market need. 
 
Entrepreneurial capital at macro-level is society’s capacity to generate 
entrepreneurial activity (Audretsch and Keilbach, 2005). However, it is 
typically expressed as forms of innovative behaviour that business owners 
or leaders possess, both within existing organisations as well as with 
business start-up. Higher levels of entrepreneurial capital can result in 
improved capacity to adapt to a changing business environment, and 
business leaders who exercise entrepreneurial capital in how they conduct 
their firms can impact upon how they choose to combine and reconfigure 
resource stocks. It is debatable whether entrepreneurial capital is a form of 
capital in its own right or a way of describing a combination of how social 
and human capital can be enacted. It has been applied to define 
entrepreneurial competence as a specialist form of human capital (Erikson, 
2002) and to describe both human and social capital (Zorn, 2004). For the 
purposes of this study, it refers to a form of action that mobilises resources 
to generate innovation and risk-taking behaviour and relies on 
entrepreneurial self-efficacy (Chen et al, 1998). The impact of 
entrepreneurial capital is central to tendering capability (Flynn and Davis, 
2016); Woldesenbat, 2011). It is also discussed in literature in relation to 
small firm reputation and performance (Shaw et al, 2008) with the 
entrepreneur identified as a special resource in SMEs (Rangone, 1999). 
Entrepreneurial capital is seen as a dynamic rather than a static concept 
(Firkin, 2001), and this highlights the role of entrepreneurial capital as a 
resource in its own right to be alert to, and to co-ordinate resources around, 
new opportunities.  
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Financial capital  
Financial capital is relevant to small firm tendering capability because 
aspects of a firm’s levels of financial capital are assessed through tenders, 
often demanding a minimum existing turnover or implicitly seeing risk in 
awarding a tender to a firm with a turnover deemed too low to represent a 
sustainable business. Time to tender is an upfront investment activity that 
costs a business through employee salaries. Purchase of financial 
indemnity is required to be awarded a public contract and other costs 
associated with market legitimacy such as membership recognition through 
awards such as Investors in People. Complex tenders typically involving 
staff staying on a contract but changing employer to the awarded firm or a 
‘transfer of protected employment‘ (TUPE) agreement. Managing this can 
require firms to purchase very specialist forms of legal advice and to have 
latent management capacity to deal with it if the contract is won.  There is 
an interesting question to ask about how the scale of a firm’s financial 
resources relate to the size and proportion for which smaller firms can go.  
3.2.5 Synthesis of discussion on capabilities, routines and resources  
 
Tendering is a relatively technical and highly formalised market institution. 
Unlike most market capabilities (Danneels, 2008). Tendering may be 
relatively difficult to learn over short periods. It is therefore a rare resource, 
amenable to protection by secrecy. Thus, developing organisational 
capability to tender competitively is likely to represent a considerable 
combination of resources and routines. Having reviewed capability 
literature, two conclusions can be drawn: first, that the notion of capability 
is not uniformly understood in the literature; second, that the primary 
opposing notions represent either an ‘inside out’, resource ownership 
perspective, or a capabilities-building Schumpeterian perspective (Wojcik, 
2015) that analyses key aspects of innovation-led growth.   
 
Resources are necessary to deliver capability, but action cannot be fully 
explained through RBV, as it does not allow for the flow of resources. RBV 
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fails to address the dynamics of market competition and how this affects 
capability demand (Montgomery and David, 1995). It does not recognise 
how firms exercise agency in creating and disturbing the distribution of 
resources and their rents. Regardless of their dynamic capability, small 
firms lack assets. It has been suggested that organisational processes are 
not just crucial to strategy, but rather are the strategy of firms, especially in 
entrepreneurial firms and dynamic markets (Bingham et al, 2007). 
Resources seldom lead to performance differences on their own; it is the 
application of resources (i.e. capabilities) which results in performance 
differences (Grant, 1991). This capabilities approach thus overcomes the 
critique of whether possession or usage of resources is the primary concern 
(Wiklund and Shepherd, 2003; Wiklund et al, 2005).  
 
Finally, capabilities can be distinguished from routines; they do build 
capability but they are not their only component. Firm resources are also 
vulnerable to depreciation or atrophy, and they may or may not reside 
inside a firm. They are a necessary bedrock of firm performance, but their 
existence does not in itself create all the conditions necessary for 
competitive advantage. Some resources may be amenable to market 
exchange, such as staff knowledge, but others, such as firm reputation, 
may not. A key consideration for this study is how capabilities, routines and 
resources link together into a hierarchy of assets. Capabilities then refer to 
an assembly of routines, routines to a combination of resources or ‘forms 
of capital’ and resources to stocks of knowledge, skills, firm networks, 
reputation, finance and operating collateral.  
 
3.3 Institutional theory: legitimacy, isomorphism, and structural 
rules  
 
Institutional theory fulfils a missing gap in capability conceptualisation about 
how firm behaviour is shaped by, and reacts to, its external environment. It 
enables consideration of processes by which structures, rules, norms, and 
routines become established as authoritative expectations for social 
behaviour. It can offer a critical view on important aspects of conditions to: 
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study environmental constraints on action, to explain why small firms may 
adopt similar practices, to examine at micro-foundational level firm 
capability characteristics and understand authority that is exerted from the 
institution and the types of pressure that a social structure can exert upon 
its inhabitants (Kitching, 2016). Its application fits with a critical realist 
perspective to assist with the abduction (observation of empirical data 
through a theoretical lens, and the postulation of underlying mechanisms 
(retroduction) of findings data.  
 
Institutional theory pays attention to three specific aspects that exert 
institutional power: i) tendering as a legitimate purchasing mechanism; ii) 
forms of isomorphism (pressure) that legitimacy exerts; and iii) its structural 
rules. The first research question, ‘What causal powers exist within the 
tendering environment to constrain and enable small firm tendering 
performance?’, is concerned with institutional stability, power and its 
environmental effects, hereafter referred to as causal power. Institutional 
theory (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Di Maggio and Powell, 1983) is relevant 
as it focuses on forms of social structure in society, recognising at its core 
that firms are embedded in wider political and social environments that 
influence practices and structures. Its application to explain small firm 
behaviour in relation to a complex and idiosyncratic institution of public 
procurement is novel, and yet it is useful to consider the national 
environment for the institution of tendering in terms of its regulatory 
authority. An institution in theoretical terms is a sense-making social 
structure. An institutionalist approach to enquiry perceives actors as 
embedded in institutional environments (Ebbinghaus, 2006) and that forces 
consideration of case firms within a wider operational context.  An institution 
need not be a physical entity. It is defined as: 
“Formal or informal procedures, routines, norms and 
conventions embedded in the organizational structure of the 
polity or political economy” (Hall and Taylor, 1996, p. 938).  
Tendering is a social system with multiple actors. As such, it is classed as 
an institution where the focus of study is wider than just case firms; it takes 
account of institutional actors in the entire system, their interaction and the 
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impact this can have upon case firms. It is useful to explain how a firm 
‘adapts to a symbolic environment of cognitions and expectations and a 
regulatory environment of rules and sanctions’ (Argote and Greve, 2007, 
p.340) and can tease out the distribution of power amongst social groups. 
The following sub-sections of section three define organisational legitimacy 
as a societal construct, examine forms of isomorphic pressure that exist 
within public sector tendering and the nature of structural rules that are 
open to investigation in this thesis. 
3.3.1 Organisational legitimacy 
 
Suchman (1995, p. 574) defines organisational legitimacy as “a general 
perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are appropriate within 
some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions.” 
Public sector tendering operates under government mandate (De Maggio 
and Powell, 1983) and with  pressure for firm compatibility to meet 
prevailing norms. In this sense, if the institution of tendering encourages 
and rewards legitimacy seeking behaviours in its supply chain, then 
legitimacy is a part of a firm’s tendering capability. Institutionally, both 
compliance and social forms of legitimacy requirements arise that, in turn, 
can encourage legitimacy-seeking behaviours that pressurise practices 
and priorities that may not actually improve efficiency (De Maggio and 
Powell, 1983; Sonpar et al, 2010).  
 
Legitimacy is owned objectively but created subjectively (Suchman, 1995). 
It can be critiqued from the perspective of tendering as a societal construct 
and also from the firm’s viewpoint. The public sector has legitimised 
tendering as a purchasing mechanism to uphold core values of 
transparency, openness and fairness.  Therefore, it is able to justify its 
heavy resource demands upon bidding firms as a quality assurance 
mechanism, and this is referred to as structural or moral legitimacy 
(Suchman, 1995).  Firms that purposefully fulfil actions using external 
environmental knowledge can calculate what conforming and manipulating 
legitimacy seeking attempts will pay off to build their capability 
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demonstration. This is classed as strategic legitimacy and it includes the 
role of active agency, unlike a purely institutional approach. Understanding 
firm strategies to gain and then maintain legitimacy in the public 
marketplace is part of this investigation.  Empirical literature on firm 
practices alludes to institutional gravitation towards legitimacy through its 
demands for socio-economic goal fulfilment, driven by tender specification 
requirements and scoring criteria (Baden et al, 2011). It does not however 
recognise the role of agency, which is where strategic legitimacy becomes 
useful to understand market competitiveness. 
3.3.2 Institutional Isomorphism  
 
Institutional isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) is a generic term 
applied to three types of pressure that can arise from within an institution 
and cause actions that are aimed at social legitimacy or acceptance. 
Coercive isomorphism is a term to describe regulatory compliance 
pressures that emanate from public sector tendering environments felt by 
small firms. Mimetic isomorphism deals with influence exerted on small 
firms in uncertain conditions. In particular, where legitimacy of practices is 
sought through imitation of other firms and normative pressure effects are 
generated through processes of professional behaviour development. An 
example of mimetic isomorphism could be a firm’s decision to hire a 
tendering ‘expert’ because SME leaders are confused by language used in 
a tender and require their knowledge upgrading. Normative isomorphism 
implies suggested behaviour that is tacitly embraced, such as acquiring 
forms of accreditation. Collectively, the notion of isomorphic pressures can 
be applied to investigate and perhaps explain why firms behave the way 
they do in terms of performance contexts and variations.  Isomorphic 
pressure is a structural condition that links to legitimacy building processes 
as agential action. It is an idea that is taken forward into the design of a 
tendering capability framework.  
3.3.3 Structural rules  
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Tendering is a persistent form of competitive public sector purchasing that 
influences the market conditions under which small firms operate. Within a 
critical realist study, institutional theory can be applied at macro-level to 
look at the stratified levels or entities in public procurement and at micro-
level inside case firms. Adopting a laminated view of how public sector 
tendering is structured is introduced briefly here, but warrants significant 
deeper exploration. Chapter four is dedicated to explicating the theoretical 
relationship that exists between levels of entities (structure and conditions) 
at macro-level using institutional theory. Chapters six and seven then 
examine the effects of such conditions inside case firms within its findings.  
 
3.4 Absorptive capacity and firm level learning about tendering 
capability  
 
Research question three, ‘To what extent, and how, do firms learn to 
improve through repeated tendering experiences?’ is concerned with firm-
level market learning and contextual adaptation to competitive practices. 
Competitive tendering is a process of knowledge exchange between a firm 
and a public institution. Absorptive capacity (AC) is a theoretical construct 
introduced by Cohen and Levinthal (1990) as a function of prior knowledge 
that confers acknowledgement of its value. It is defined as a firm’s ability 
to: 
 “recognize the value of new, external information, assimilate 
it, and apply it to commercial ends” (Cohen and Levinthal, 
1990, p.128).  
Mowery and Oxley (1995) call it a broad set of skills to deal with the tacit 
component of transferred knowledge and to modify imported knowledge 
and Kim (1998) refers to AC as a capacity to learn and solve problems. Two 
key components of AC are external knowledge acquisition and integrating 
that knowledge inside the firm. Starting with the notion of individual AC 
building, knowledge exposure is described as insufficient; intense effort is 
required to access and use knowledge. Firm level AC is dependent upon 
individual AC building, but it is distinctive in focusing on the accumulative 
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transfer of knowledge between people into organisational memory, 
primarily through routines (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990).  
 
The structure of communication between a firm and its external 
environment comprises inward and outward looking AC components. An 
inward looking component enables a firm to assimilate and exploit 
knowledge, and is strengthened by a critical perception of ‘who knows what’ 
as well as technical or sector knowledge. An outward looking component 
enables knowledge acquisition. An underpinning generalisation of AC is 
that it is the existence of previous knowledge that enables the assimilation 
and exploitation phases. Absorptive capacity levels are influenced by firm 
mechanisms, such as knowledge transfer between individuals and teams, 
or between the firm and its external operating environment (Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1990), as well as through accumulation of experience. Indeed, a 
priori knowledge of tendering environments is evidenced as a key 
contributor to firm-level absorptive capacity (Van den Bosch et al., 1999). 
 
As a concept, AC focuses attention onto inter-organisational relations whilst 
simultaneously paying attention to internal firm processes of learning from 
past experience and current actions (Easterby-Smith et al, 2008). It is a 
useful concept to investigate how it is acquired at firm level rather than just 
residing in individual human capital, how it develops cumulatively, and what 
levels of absorptive capacity are required to stay relevant and competitive 
in public sector markets. Internal mechanisms influence a firm’s absorptive 
capacity level and more generally what incentives exist for firm learning to 
take place. Zahra and George (2002) reconceptualise AC in several ways. 
Firstly, they broaden the theoretical concept to describe AC, like other 
dynamic capabilities, as amenable to change through human effort. 
Secondly, they distinguish between potential (what could be) and realised 
(what is) forms of AC, as set out in Figure 3.3 below. 
Figure 3.3 Forms of absorptive capacity  
 
 
 
 
 
AC 
Potential AC 
 Acquisition 
 Assimilation  
Realised AC 
 Transformation 
 Exploitation 
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Source: Adapted from Zahra and George, 2002, p.192) 
 
Figure 3.3 shows a conceptual model with four dimensions of capability that 
each relate to a specific process. Acquisition and assimilation together 
constitute a potential absorptive capacity, and transformation and 
exploitation form realised absorptive capacity. The essential difference to 
Cohen and Levinthal’s model is dealing with knowledge transformation or 
a capacity to develop new knowledge by combining the new knowledge 
absorbed with the knowledge already inside the firm.  Two features of AC 
are its cumulativeness (its accumulation of knowledge gradually through 
repeated experiential episodes) and its ongoing effect upon performance 
expectations. Some firms can experience ‘lockout’ or reach a state of 
arrested development (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990) where new knowledge 
fails to be absorbed. This has been termed as ‘not invented here’ 
syndrome. Table 3.1 is adapted from Easterby-Smith et al (2008) and 
summarises the key concepts of absorptive capacity:  
Table 3.1 Adapted version of key concepts of absorptive capacity (Easterby-Smith et al, 
2008) p 486 
 
Concept  Author  
Recognition, assimilation and use of external 
knowledge 
Cohen and Levinthal 
(1990) 
Relevance of internal knowledge base Cohen and Levinthal 
(1990) 
Analysis of AC through dimensions of efficiency, 
scope and flexibility 
Van den Bosch et al 
(1999) 
A focus on internal processes of AC as potential 
and actualised; knowledge transformation 
aspect of AC and re-conceptualisation aspect of 
AC as a dynamic capability  
Zahra and George (2002) 
Activation triggers associated with assimilation 
of knowledge  
Zahra and George (2002) 
Social integration mechanisms Zahra and George (2002) 
Individual agency Jones (2006) 
A process perspective on absorptive capacity. 
Examination of AC in diverse organisational 
contexts. 
Easterby-Smith et al 
(2008) 
  
Direct interface with the external environment does not constitute a firm’s 
AC, rather, it represents potential AC and it needs internal structures in 
place to assimilate or ‘realise’ knowledge. This means that AC requires 
investment. Internal mechanisms that develop and influence firm levels of 
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AC for tendering capability are not known, nor is it yet understood what 
types of information are difficult to absorb. Firms with higher levels of AC 
are more productive and sensitised to recognising institutional change 
(Cohen and Levinthal, 1990) and this may help firms pursue collaborative 
opportunities. Absorption of external knowledge requires specific forms of 
coordinating and formalising, and a social integration capability (Zahra and 
George, 2002). Activation triggers (Zahra and George, 2002) affect firm 
ability and motivation to assimilate knowledge. Examples of activation 
triggers are often circumstantial, such as market turbulence, lack of 
expertise, and other operational pressures. Social integration, however, 
refers to social structures that promote greater employee interaction and 
knowledge management systems. Formalisation of practices associated 
with an activity, such as tendering, enhances knowledge transformation 
(Jansen et al, 2005), particularly as it is a domain of expertise.  
 
Van Den Bosch et al (1999) analyse AC through three dimensions of 
efficiency, scope and flexibility. For example, there may be economies of 
scale and therefore efficiency achieved with a certain level of identification, 
assimilation, and exploitation of external knowledge. Empirical investigation 
in case firms in this study can evaluate the role of AC in tendering practices 
and whether they are sensitive to tendering episodes as learning 
opportunities. At a more general level, knowledge management about 
tendering requires deliberate practice to engage in formal and informal 
modes of learning, including firm-level reflective practice. Schön (1983) 
defines the central characteristics of reflective practice as reflection-in-
action and reflection-on-action. Experiential learning may peak when 
managers reflect on experience of similar market settings or capabilities 
(Bingham et al, 2007) and, so, draws on detailed understanding of how 
processes relate to market advantage (Simsek and Heavey, 2011). 
 
The ability to envision and transform capabilities may itself be a skill that is 
improved with experience (Danneels, 2008). The motivation to reflect, 
codify and enact knowledge may be highest when managing unsatisfactory 
operational capabilities (Zollo and Winter, 2002) or small losses (Sitkin, 
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1992). Learning is suppressed under conditions of failure when managers 
tend to blame external forces rather than internal resource strategies 
(Zahra et al, 2006; Danneels, 2008). Visioning and action to change 
resource combinations will also depend on manager disposition (Zahra et 
al, 2006) and organisational culture. For example, the manager’s 
entrepreneurial intention (Simsek and Heavey, 2011) will affect whether 
they perceive threat or opportunity more strongly (Bingham et al, 2007) and 
their entrepreneurial alertness will affect the vision they create for an 
uncertain future (Foss, 2011).  
 
The accumulation of knowledge is at the individual and organisational 
levels. Knowledge may also be shared through inter-organisational 
relational ties (Simsek and Heavey, 2011). Shared cognitive effort, 
managed under conditions of constructive conflict (Simsek and Heavey, 
2011), can help to penetrate the ambiguity of understanding  environmental 
change, the deficiency of current capabilities, the potential of resources as 
distinct from the capabilities in which they are embedded (Danneels, 2010) 
and the options available to create new resource combinations and, so, 
lead to innovations (Zollo and Winter, 2002). Shared learning encourages 
and modifies the articulation of knowledge and creates variety in articulated 
strategic options.  
 
Changes to the competitive environment, including regulatory shock, are 
likely to undermine a firm leader’s capability to interpret accurately their 
environment and adapt firm capabilities to be competitive (Foss et al, 2011). 
Active engagement in explorative learning is required (Bingham et al, 
2007), including experimenting with what works in different environments, 
and identifying what can be effectively imitated and integrated from 
competitor behaviour (Miner et al, 2001). Simply improvising solutions to 
new challenges may not yield learning without systematic reflection, 
communication and integration (McGrath,2001). Small firms may, however, 
fail to engage in explorative learning or to adapt systematically and innovate 
due to a focus on exploitation driven by resource constraints (Jones et al, 
2011). They may also only learn in discontinuous ways, through 
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improvisation and trial and error. Small firms’ tendency to learn by doing is 
only likely to result in the ambidexterity necessary to build and exploit 
innovation in older and more developed small firms (Zahra and George, 
2002; Zahra et al, 2006). 
 
Entrepreneurship opportunity literature introduces the contemporary 
concept of the ‘ambidextrous organisation’ (Helfat and Winter, 2011). It 
posits that firms must balance and integrate capabilities that enable the 
explorative (and entrepreneurial) process of identifying and developing new 
opportunities and the exploitative process of creating returns on 
opportunities, for which firms have built capability in service or product 
delivery and market understanding (Danneels, 2008; Siren et al, 2012). 
Market change can render existing resources and capabilities useless or 
undermine their scarcity as market demand moves on to products or 
services with superior benefits (Danneels, 2012). Equally, firms cannot 
invest too much resource in learning about unfamiliar environments like 
public sector tendering. They must direct enough resource into short-term 
income generation via markets they already have. 
 
The cost of learning and change may be reduced by effectively integrating 
activities in the ambidextrous firm (Siren et al, 2012). Managers may select, 
prioritise, synchronise and pace opportunity identification, development 
and exploitation so that managers have sufficient experience to develop 
specialist learning but also adequate time between experiences to absorb 
new knowledge and codify it into routine or heuristic improvement (Bingham 
et al, 2007). Managers may also use these techniques to balance the cost 
of exploration with the income generated through exploitation (Siren et al, 
2012). By planning for the costs of explorative learning, and synchronising 
outcomes into a transition pathway (Bingham et al, 2007), entrepreneurial 
behaviour may become more palatable to risk-averse managers (Garrett et 
al, 2009). Dynamic capabilities, however, create direct costs in explorative 
and exploitative learning and building new routines that often have high 
capability levels and represent ‘sunk’ investments in order to survive (Helfat 
and Winter, 2011). Knowledge must be combined with tangible resources 
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(such as financial means, premises or technical equipment) and slack 
manager development time to create dynamic capabilities (McKelvie and 
Davidsson, 2009). 
 
Learning routines, that integrate with processes to review and renew 
resources and capabilities, are themselves termed dynamic capabilities 
(Teece et al, 1997; Winter, 2003; Danneels 2008; McKelvie and Davidsson, 
2009). Key tasks in explorative learning have low visibility and may lose 
status in a resource-constrained organisation (Easterby-Smith et al, 2009) 
even though, as capabilities that are difficult to detect and imitate, they may 
be primary forms of competitive advantage (McKelvie and Davidsson, 
2009). For example, environmental scanning (i.e. time spent learning about 
events and trends in the organisation’s environment) builds understanding 
of customers and competitors, but its value may only become visible when 
knowledge is codified and creates change to partner configurations or 
operational capabilities in the exploitative stages. Exploitative learning may 
also be viewed as too risky unless learning produces quick results. For 
example, the direct cost of assigning development processes to specialist 
personnel to create a locus where experience can accumulate (Zollo and 
Winter, 2002; Winter, 2003; McKelvie and Davidsson, 2009) might be 
considered too risky, especially when it creates an opportunity cost for busy 
leaders. However, if a firm does not systematically develop and embed 
individual learning into firm-level processes, change may become 
discontinuous and learning may be lost when staff leave (Zollo and Winter, 
2002). Finding a ‘sweet spot’ for effective but lean learning about tendering 
can be critiqued through empirical cases in this thesis. 
 
3.5 Chapter summary  
 
This chapter has produced a distinctive theoretical framework from which 
to collect and analyse empirical data about the nature of small firm 
capability to tender competitively. The framework is repeated below as 
Figure 3.1. It has linked theoretical perspectives to each of the thesis 
research questions. Understanding how small firm leaders vary in their 
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ability to create vision and action from available constrained resources is 
key to understanding why performance varies from similar resource bases 
(Baker and Nelson, 2005). It is likely to relate to their institutional setting 
and their personal agency (Desa, 2012). It is received wisdom that small 
organisations are more agile because they are less bound by organisational 
routines. Equally, however, most small firms fail to develop the efficient 
capabilities and dynamic capabilities required to grow, and many fail. 
Although lack of capability does not impede business entry, it does impair 
survival and growth (Danneels, 2008).  
 
Each research question draws on theory to conceptualise the challenges 
of public sector tendering in SMEs. Institutional theory enables study of 
case firms as inhabitants of a social system where its structural conditions, 
such as regulation, interact with firm agential efforts. Capability theory 
underpins a micro-examination of tendering performance in case firms, and 
it look beyond what firms ‘do’ to how capability theory can also explain 
adaptation through experience accumulation.  
Figure 3.1: Theoretical framework to study small firm tendering capability  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Capability Theory  Institutional Theory  Absorptive Capacity  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Absorptive capacity theory has introduced ideas about conceptualising 
firm-level market learning by considering the relationship between a firm 
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the nature of routines 
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small firms acquire 
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learning 
Dynamic capabilities built inside a firm to compete 
in an external environment.  
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as routines,that 
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the case firm?  
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tendering environment 
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small firm tendering 
performance? 
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and how, do small firms 
learn to improve their 
tendering capability 
through repeated 
tendering experience? 
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and its external environment. Knowledge acquisition and deployment 
emerge as a continuous and central theme, but it is not known what degree 
of formality is required or if it is a capability specifically built for public sector 
tendering. This thesis will explore firm learning as contextually contingent 
and how absorptive capacity is shaped by structural conditions and firm-
level agency. The  theoretical framework built to examine firm tendering 
capability sets the scene for chapter five, which is the methodology chapter. 
Chapter four, next, serves as a contextual chapter to provide an institutional 
analysis of tendering. 
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Chapter Four: The stratified context of public sector 
tendering  
 
The properties possessed by social forms may be very different from 
those possessed by the individuals upon whose activity they depend. I 
want to distinguish sharply then between the genesis of human actions, 
lying in the reasons, intentions and plans of human beings, on the one 
hand; and the structures governing the reproduction and transformation of 
social activities, on the other (Bhaskar, 1998, p.79). 
4.1 Introduction  
 
Chapter three (the theoretical chapter) identified that a conceptualisation of 
tendering capability needed to account for the complex and dynamic 
relationships between firms and stakeholders, especially public procurers. 
This chapter, by way of context, provides an institutional analysis of 
tendering. It approaches the study of tender capability through an 
identification of the structures, mechanisms and processes that can explain 
the nature of capability.  Public sector tendering is a multi-layered social 
institution, of which small firms are institutional inhabitants and actors. The 
act of responding to a public tender is primarily a social phenomenon, 
where firms are embedded corporate actors. Firm tendering behaviour is 
positioned as one of several layers within an overlapping structure, 
explained as the interaction between structure and agency, where reality is 
accessed through exploration of social mechanisms that create causes and 
effects. This chapter outlines a critical realist social ontology and 
epistemology from which to explore small firm tendering capability within a 
social setting. A critical realist ontology focuses on the notion of a social 
structure that people (agents) interact with, but that exists independently of 
observable phenomena.  
 
A critical realist epistemology looks at facts at the level which is 
experienced and purports that they exist through interpretation. This is 
because institutional environments contain hidden structures that can affect 
firm behaviour and performance that are not observable through personal 
experience. This chapter shows how the nature of reality is stratified, and 
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secondly, that causal effects (or mechanisms) arise from different layers of 
the social system and interact in an open-system macro-environment. An 
open system is one where entities (parts of the system) as analytical 
components of institutional analysis cannot be understood in isolation from 
their environment (Bhaskar, 1993; Edwards et al, 2014). It expresses 
tendering as a multi-level structure, with interlocking power relationships 
that govern its conduct and behaviour. The nature of the social system 
comprises overlapping and interdependent layers of power that exist, but 
remain distinct from, agential perception. Equally, firms as corporate actors 
are not passive recipients of the effects of structure; they can, and do, 
shape social structures through deliberate action, although their power to 
do so is limited. By constructing public sector tendering as a social 
institution, structure and agency are presented as dual concepts, each with 
powers to influence social change. Bhaskar’s quote (1998, p.79, above) 
emphasises an important distinction between human action and the social 
structure, both of which are elements of context. Critical realism upholds 
that agents can choose how to respond to their environments, even if their 
perception of it is always partial (Archer,1995), although they can’t control 
the environmental response to their actions.  
 
Outlining a social ontology for the public sector tendering contexts enables 
description of the context of action within which small firms tender and the 
parts or entities of that system that interact. Whilst it does not explain 
empirical settings (in which structures interact uniquely), it can elucidate the 
kind of things that exist in any tendering event and the broad ways in which 
they relate. This chapter deals with structural mechanisms that pre-exist 
small firm tendering action contexts, enabling empirical investigation to 
focus on the discovery of agency-activated mechanisms inside the small 
firm at micro-foundational level. By doing so, it addresses the second 
research question in this research project, concerning the context of 
practice, ‘What causal powers exist within the tendering environment to 
constrain and enable small firm tendering capabilities?’   
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Chapter four comprises six sections. Section one is the introduction. 
Section two explains public sector tendering in institutional terms to outline 
how it is possible to observe how firms act beyond their own conception of 
context. It defines what is a social institution, and examines the ontological 
and epistemological considerations of using a critical realist approach. This 
section explains the stratified nature of reality, and provide a coherent 
framework to conduct an investigation that can build understanding of 
causal mechanisms in play. The macro-institutional environment is 
described as a laminated structure in section three, with exploration of the 
entities and their exercise of structural power. Section four expands on this 
by focusing on the role and importance of agency in institutional analysis. 
Section five interprets tendering as a morphogenetic cycle of events and 
explains the concept of emergence. Section six is a chapter summary, with 
a conclusion about how to take forward a critical realist methodology into a 
research design, which was described in chapter four.  
 
4.2 Public sector tendering explained as a social institution 
4.2.1 Defining tendering as a social institution  
 
‘Institution’ is a term used to describe a type of social structure that exists 
where social actors or individuals grouped together by a common and 
boundaried purpose (Hodgson, 2006). The institution of public sector 
tendering is constituted through multiple interacting social structures, 
shaped by, and emergent from, pre-existing structures. Institutions have 
systems of established social rules that structure social interactions 
(Hodgson, 2006), which can be enabling as well as restraining. 
Explanations of resource-seeking and capability-building attempts by small 
firms to compete in public sector tendering environments need to be 
contextualised in the institutional domain of public sector tendering. 
Institutions have been described as formal or informal procedures, routines, 
and as durable, socially-embedded rules (Hodgson, 2006). 
 
117 
 
Any institution has a set of rules, as shown in chapters two and three. Public 
sector tendering is a highly complex institutional arrangement. It is 
characterised by compliance to EU procurement and fair competition law, 
by actors within a supplier and competition base, by specific spatial socio-
economic priority mandates for policy direction and through documentary 
artefacts as carriers of institutional elements, upon which information 
exchange resides. Public sector tendering is a specific convention to 
socially transmit the institutional rules of one type of public sector 
procurement, tendering. The way the rules are replicated depends upon the 
existence of a normative social culture and language to make it exist. 
Institutional rules are therefore codified, and may not be easily understood 
and exploitable by SMEs. Some of these rules will be legal, others will be 
customary and some may be dynamic and emergent. Repeated exposure 
to rules and observations of what works channels agency to develop 
customary habits (Hodgson, 2006).  
 
The interpretation and appreciation of rules is a social act. Tendering for 
contracts is a convention for imposing form, resource demands, 
consistency and language as part of the rules of market exchange with 
public sector customers. To conduct an empirical or theoretical analysis of 
how an institution works requires a conception of what an institution is, as 
much of human interaction and activity is structured in terms of overt or 
implicit rules (Hodgson, 2006).  As Scott (2001) stated, in order to survive, 
organisations must conform to the rules and belief systems prevailing in the 
environment. Tendering therefore is the outcome of formal practices that 
become shaped by its institutional context.  
 
Scott (2001) described three dimensions upon which coercive external 
pressure to change (discussed in chapter three) is applied to an institution: 
i) regulative, ii) normative, and, iii); cognitive. Regulative pressure refers to 
the bureaucratisation of the rules of tendering, normative behaviour links to 
the social pressure to copy firm appearances for legitimacy through policy 
alignment, value statements and so on, and cognitive pressure refers to the 
ability to ‘keep up’ with changing and idiosyncratic procurer behaviour. 
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Isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) is an outcome of coercive 
authority to describe external pressure to conform to the same set of 
environmental conditions, a principle that is also described as firms 
attempting to earn social legitimacy over market effectiveness (DiMaggio, 
1983). Searle (1995) identifies regulative and constitutive processes in an 
institution that are created and enforced collectively. Regulative rules 
influence exiting activities and are procedural. For example, a minimum 
time-period for which a public tender must be advertised, or the length of 
time set aside for receipt of a tender response. Constitutive processes are 
conditions that have to be met in a particular context for a certain status to 
apply. Tendering has, for example, created specialist roles as a condition; 
public sector procurement officials are required to be in post to implement 
and safeguard tendering procedures.  
 
Institutional exertion of pressure towards conformity introduces the notion 
of agent sensitivity or insensitivity (Hodgson, 2006). Within an agent 
sensitive institution, conventions are modified to accommodate actor 
feedback. Conversely, agent insensitive institutions place their operating 
structures in primary place over the beliefs of their actors. This can 
influence agents into positions where people are incentivised to act in 
certain ways and may become disincentivised from acting otherwise. 
Importantly, agents always have the potential to act otherwise, but agent-
insensitive organisations may respond with strong penalties. Empirical 
findings err on the side of public sector tendering as agent-insensitive 
(Loader, 2011; Pickernell et al, 2011) with heavy compliance demands 
(Freshminds, 2008), conformative language imposition (Baden et al, 2011) 
and agent adaptation to regulation intentionally, inadvertently or not at all, 
being contingent on the agency of small businesses and their stakeholders 
(Kitching, 2006). 
 
A key concept in institutional theory is path dependence, which is used to 
explain institutional stability as well as institutional change. Path 
dependence refers to a sequence of events, where later decisions are not 
taken entirely independently of past experience. At firm level, this is known 
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as the trodden trail (Ebbinghaus, 2006). As such, social learning cannot be 
neutral in its impact. This is because whilst actors and institutional structure 
remain distinct, they remain connected in a circle of mutual interaction and 
interdependence (Hodgson, 2006). Section 5.3 analyses tendering as a 
social institution, and describes the layered or ‘stratified’ structure within 
which firms are situated after an exploration of ontological and 
epistemological considerations in the remainder of section 5.2.  
4.2.2 Ontological considerations for studying firm tendering capability  
 
Critical realism emphasises how the world exists independently of what we 
think about it, making experience of it fallible. This means that a reality does 
exist, but it is difficult to understand (Easton, 2010). The form and nature of 
reality in critical realism is stratified as a meta-theory, and as a model of 
social enquiry that has emerged as a popular cited philosophical position 
(Bhaskar 2009; Collier, 1994; Archer, 1995). Critical realists see the world 
as an open, complex system (Bhaskar, 1993) where reality is multiply 
determined (Bhaskar, 2008). Critical realists believe that the world exists 
but individuals construct different understandings of it. There is a stratified 
view of reality that is accessible even if it is not observable, and forms of 
reality continually mediate each other. Tendering action achieves a 
temporal outcome that is directed through regulation, and it requires 
patterns of deliberate co-operation from businesses to enter into a specific 
form of knowledge exchange framework. Furthermore, it is as an enduring 
social structure. This investigation recognises that whilst agents require 
some conception of what they are doing, case firms may not be conscious 
of the laminated structures that make up the tendering environment.  
 
Social structure is dependent on human actions but that we cannot rely on 
agents’ conceptualisations to ‘know’; experience is merely the starting point 
for explanation as agents have an inadequate understanding of societal 
structures that make certain actions possible (Ackroyd & Fleetwood, 2001). 
This affords an opportunity to observe the resources available to case firms 
and to look at corporate agency to help identify potential transformational 
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processes that they could take on to overcome structural constraint to 
procurement opportunities. Small firms as bundles of human agency draw 
on existing external and internal structures and practices that are then 
reproduced and/or transformed in action through tendering. 
4.2.3 Epistemological considerations for studying firm tendering capability 
 
Social structures include structuring factors that remain external to actors, 
but are open to agency interpretation as a form of reality. Emphasis is 
placed upon investigating empirical and actual domains (Bhaskar, 1979) to 
the deep causal mechanisms that govern events. For example, claims 
made in empirical literature that tendering is increasing resource demands 
on firms would, from a critical realist perspective, look at mechanisms by 
which this has occurred. This makes a realist evaluation place context 
centre stage and be considered as dynamic in nature. It is interested in 
answering questions  about ‘what works for whom in which circumstances’ 
(Nielsen and Miraglia, 2017). Three questions to address are; i) what 
makes a firm routine work; ii) under what conditions can it be effective and; 
iii, what capabilities can be elicited? This approach is described as the 
context-mechanism-outcome (CMO) configurations (Pawson and Tilley, 
1997). Realist evaluation also implies that tendering actions as firm 
intervention work differently depending on the context, and how 
mechanisms trigger outcomes depend on the context (Greenhalgh et al, 
2015). 
 
Epistemological considerations explain the utilisation of the realist concepts 
of   embeddedness, mechanisms and context. Embeddedness means that 
voluntary individual action is always viewed through social relations in the 
environment where the firm exists. Mechanisms are causal structures that 
can explain a phenomenon. They are a central feature in critical realist 
theory, mostly uncovered indirectly by analytical work (theory-building).The 
existence of mechanisms in an open system are unobservable but 
knowable, and generative in nature.  The context of organisations requires 
knowledge of both omnibus and discrete contexts (Nielsen and Miraglia, 
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2017). In existing literature, findings generally only refer to context at a 
ubiquitous level, without examination of individual tender and firm situation. 
Examples of omnibus contexts are high entry barriers, formal language and 
regulation complexity, or the liability of smallness compared to large firms. 
Investigation into case firms looked at under which environmental 
conditions action is taken and mechanisms that have triggered those 
actions to improve understanding of how actions improve tendering 
performance. The notion of context is important to understand the nature 
of reality and access to it through fieldwork.  
 
4.3. Reality as a stratified concept   
 
Bhaskar (1978) contested it is possible to view reality and knowledge as 
distinguishable from each other, with separate operating paths. He outlined 
three domains of reality that exist but are conceptually separated: i) 
mechanisms, ii) events and iii) experiences, as shown in Figure 4.1 below. 
The real is the mechanism and structures that generate the social world. 
The ‘actual’ refers to what events actually took place. The ‘empirical’ 
domain refers to what is believed to be the case, meaning the experience 
of tendering from the viewpoint of a small firm or from the procurer 
perspective. The ‘real’ is whatever exists, whether it is visible or 
understandable or not. Its existence possesses generative mechanisms 
that are independent of individual human action. The institution of tendering 
as a public procurement system is real, regardless of whether it is enacted 
as an empirical object for not, and whether we have an understanding of it 
or not. 
Figure 4.1: Bhaskar’s three domains: populating entities  
 Real  Actual  Empirical  
Mechanisms  X   
Events  X x  
Experiences  X x x 
 
(Source: Bhaskar, 1978, p.13) 
This notion requires an acceptance that explanations will be, in part, 
interpretivist in nature, and an appreciation that all levels of reality act 
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simultaneously in a given context. Mechanisms may not be obvious within 
a case, but worked out theoretically from a broader observation of the case. 
Tenders can be advertised without firms seeing them, but it is also possible 
that they are observed and experienced. A particular agent’s experience of 
an event will not necessarily reveal the full event: small firms do not know 
all that has occurred in the public sector body that culminated in releasing 
a particular tender document, for example. Therefore, the full complexity of 
public sector tendering is not solely revealed in individual actors’ 
experience of tendering. 
 
4.4 Public sector tendering as a laminated structure  
 
Public sector tendering can be conceptualised as an institution that 
operates as a laminated structure in a complex, open system.  An open 
system is one where entities as analytical components of institutional 
analysis cannot be understood in isolation from their environment (Bhaskar, 
1993; Edwards et al, 2014). This means that the form of social structure 
that produces a laminated or stratified view of reality is multiply determined 
(Bhaskar, 1978). Through interaction in open systems, entities can 
materialise (or not) and change in multiple ways: 
“Events occur when actors mobilize the resources they have 
in particular contexts to shape change, which, in social 
contexts, unfolds in open systems where generative 
mechanisms (social, cultural and biological) operate 
independently or in concert in complex interactions” 
(Hodgkinson and Starkey, 2011, p.362). 
As a social system, public sector procurement is composed of stratified 
layers of interaction. Figure 5.2 is the researcher’s own interpretation of the 
layers of compositional structure or entities in laminated terms (Bhaskar, 
1978). In public sector tendering, the powers of one entity can interact with 
another. For example, the way a procurer chooses to attribute scoring 
criteria to tenders such as policy demands may act as a relational and 
transformational power in its supply base to increase its resources in a 
certain way. Structure holds power, exercised between compositional 
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layers, called entities, through rules and communication that shape 
practices. This is referred to as a laminated structure.  
 
Figure 4.2: A laminated structure of public sector tendering 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Entities in an open system observed cannot be understood in isolation from 
the environment they inhabit. Lamination is a metaphor to convey idea of 
social levels or entities that interact. Figure 4.2 is perhaps overly simplistic 
and appears to show each layer as separate. It is the intention of the arrows 
to show how many social domains seem better described as a continuous 
flow of interaction from lower to higher levels and from higher to lower 
levels. The primary societal entities identified in Figure 5.2 are: i) the market 
economy; ii) European law; iii) UK government regulations; iv) individual 
public procurement agents; v) competing firms within a competitive supply 
base and vi) individual firm practices.  
 
An entity is a theoretical building block used to explain relational 
arrangements and it is possible to examine the nature of their effects, 
exercised through downward and upward causation. In simple terms, 
tendering is an economic exchange model (Easton, 2002) with sellers, 
buyers and exchange entities. Relationships between entities can take two 
forms, necessary and contingent (Sayer, 1992). Necessary relationships 
connect entities in how they are defined by each other. A public contract 
UK government  
The market economy 
European law 
Public procurement units  
Competitive supplier base   
Individual firm  
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award from a procurer necessitates a named contracted supplier. 
Contingent relationships, on the other hand, only suggest ‘potential’ 
linkages between them; a public procurer tendering for pencils and a 
supplier of pencils will only become linked if the pencil supplier voluntarily 
responds to a particular tender. The ways in which entities use their powers 
through necessary or contingent relationships to make a particular event 
occur are called mechanisms.   
4.4.1 The nature and role of generative mechanisms  
 
Generative mechanisms activate resources to find, select and orientate 
resources to public sector tenders.  Mechanisms or ‘generative 
mechanisms’ (GM) offer explanations of why things occur in the ways that 
they do. They are usually hidden, sensitive to contextual changes and they 
generate outcomes (Dalkin et al, 2015). A critical realist perspective 
enables a review of mechanisms that underpin tender capability 
generation. Empirical information is observable manifestations of 
underlying causal mechanisms. Further accumulation of empirical evidence 
will not transform understanding until the underlying mechanisms that 
cause behaviour to occur are identified. Mechanisms link empirical and 
causal aspects of theory building. Generative mechanisms activate causal 
structures. De Landa (2006) suggests building explanations on two types 
of mechanisms; i) micro–macro mechanisms, to explain the emergent 
behaviour, i.e. how different components interact in order to produce an 
outcome at a macro level; and ii) macro–micro mechanisms, to explain how 
the whole enables and constrains the various parts. By doing so, it is 
possible to explain assemblages of casual powers and how different levels 
interact with one another.  
 
Figure 4.3 below illustrates how mechanisms connect social structures to 
observable events. The responses they trigger can be capabilities. They 
connect inputs and outputs and they exist at a deep level. The idea of them 
and the potential for them exists, even when they are not being enacted as 
an event. The emergent causal powers of entities remain distinct from those 
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of people, but often dependent on people to enact them (Elder-Vass, 2013), 
who also argues that there are specific groups of people that have social 
structural power, and where “tendering is a social interaction process that 
carries expectations of an interactive situation” (Elder-Vass,2013, p.146). 
Mechanisms also have tendencies. Tendering paperwork has the tendency 
to affect behaviour by making firms comply with aspects of socio-economic 
law, for example. It also has the tendency to make people create policies 
in firms that engage in tendering activities. This thesis will seek out 
generative mechanisms and identify their tendencies, that is, the conditions 
that need to exist for them to be activated. 
Figure 4.3  A critical realist view of causation 
 
 
(Source: Sayer, 2000, p.15) 
 
Small firm difficulty engaging with public sector tendering highlighted in 
existing literature (chapter two) does not clearly highlight the nature of GMs 
that arise at every level from the structural conditions of tendering which 
pre-exist their exercise of capability. Attention is drawn to macro-
environmental influences, such as the dynamic nature of procurement 
goals (Erridge, 2007), procurement knowledge and information demands 
(Baden et al, 2011; Loader, 2011), and idiosyncratic interaction practices 
(Stake, 1995). The significance of social structure and the potential of 
human agency is characterised by how firm tendering practice is embedded 
in social systems: 
It is through the entire workings of entire systems of social 
relationships that any changes in behaviours, events and 
social conditions are effected (Pawson. 2006, p.30). 
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4.4.2 The structural powers of entities in a laminated tendering institution 
 
i) The market economy is based on participation with market forces for 
voluntary exchange of rent. A competitive, capitalist market is the key driver 
of the UK market economy, and UK firms’ ability to win tenders is controlled 
largely though market forces, i.e. the mechanism of competition in a market 
sector. What has and continues to happen in the UK as a capitalist society 
is transfer of public assets into private ownership, which has consequences 
for economic welfare, such as privatisation of National Health Service 
component activities. It also causes fragmented governance of services. 
The state acts as a mediating force, using public management principles to 
shape a market for delivery of market services. Public management reform 
can be defined as “deliberate changes to the structures and processes of 
public sector organisations with the objective of getting them (in some 
sense) to run better” (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011, p.2).  By setting up 
tenders, the public sector is positioning particular public services within that 
market environment on the assumption that this makes public services 
purchasing more efficient, effective and transparent.  
 
ii) European Law is incorporated into UK government policy, so tender 
documentation is itself situated within EU procurement legislation. EU law 
is driven by the principles of creating a fair, transparent, competitive market 
place. Compliance to EU law shapes complex regulation implementation 
using complex tendering regulation mechanisms. For example, how, and 
for how long tenders are advertised, the way tender documentation is 
constructed, and the transparency of tender specification requirements, 
scoring and firm response times. Following the UK’s Brexit decision in 
2016, whilst it remains a member state of the EU, the UK government is 
obliged to advertise its tenders across all European states and apply equal 
status to bidding organisations, whether they are based in the UK or in 
another European country. The key power exerted is 5 in nature. A critical 
realist conceptualisation of regulation (Kitching et al, 2015) proposes that 
regulation has causal powers that small firm agent experiences cannot fully 
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appreciate. They, therefore, only have a partial view of the effects that EU 
regulation law creates, for example in shaping market place transparency 
and preventing corruption.  
 
iii) The UK government is historically and politically variable. The 
economic health of the UK shapes public service priorities and volume, but 
so do political responses. In 2017, the UK economy remains in an extended 
era of austerity, where many public institutions and departments are asked 
to deliver services from a reduced income stream. Constrained public 
sector budgets open up competitive rivalry where fewer contracts are put 
out to tender. Firms can face unexpected competition in a marketplace 
where supply dynamics are driven by economic conditions. Changing local 
socio-economic goals that reside within the public sector policy 
environment also affect the shape and weighting of tender specifications 
and scoring mechanisms that are displayed within tender advertisements. 
Every tender specification has specific priorities and idiosyncratic scoring 
criteria exist at points in time and in different tender exercises, even to 
deliver the same service in two local authorities. Procurer expectations of 
firm normative behaviour are being constantly redefined through a multi-
stakeholder environment (Erridge, 2009). 
 
iv) Public procurement units are also subject to ongoing changes in 
resources, including staff turnover and ‘knowledge turnover’. They operate 
within a rigid, regulatory environment but with their own, localised 
institutional practices.  Tender documents emerge from a procurement 
team’s response to their laminated context. Structures are mediated by 
human beings or teams who, to a limited extent, are able to make creative 
decisions about how to shape specific tenders. This means tenders are 
always different, but does not imply procurement teams are agent sensitive. 
Documents are large and complex. Reduced public sector spending 
through austerity has produced multiple social effects, such as a 
reallocation of budgets towards and away from procurement entities, 
services being cut altogether and pressure on the supply base to compete 
for contracts with compressed pricing models. Relations are multi-
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directional, with tender production teams inside tendering firms competing 
with, and shaped by, teams in other firms as a form of competition. Rising 
resource demands can preclude or limit accessibility for any given supply 
base. 
v) A competitive supplier base  is where firms are structurally shaped to 
be in competition with each other in specific sectors. Both firms and sectors 
remain heterogeneous; firms are comprised of different resource bases and 
intentions, and some sectors will have many more firms competing to 
supply contracts than in others. Equally, demand for products or services 
fluctuates across  sectors, regions and time. Through austerity, smaller 
contracts are targeted by larger national firms, redefining local competition. 
 
vi) Individual firms have structural properties that enables them to have 
capacity to act in a competitive manner and, potentially, to shape higher 
layers of context. Firm structural properties can exercise influence upwards 
upon public procurers, subject to conditional and temporal contexts. This 
introduces the notion of agency, as structure and agency are engaged in a 
recursive relationship (Archer, 1995). The firm as an entity embodies 
resources that can exert market influence. Resources require a person to 
orient them, and this is eferred to as agential power. For example, being a 
legally established and trading firm with three years’ accounts and having 
an existing contract award history with public bodies, acts as financial and 
social capital. Firms are incentivised to develop the resources and 
capabilities needed to comply with public sector procurement rules. To 
become a legally contractible entity with market power to attract invitations 
to tender, a firm’s owner requires resources. Resources include capacity to 
hire staff and develop routines that turn staff and non-human resource into 
a competitive offering within the laminated system of public sector 
procurement, as it occurs in the procurements events in which the firm is 
positioned. They must be willing to accept a tender specification as a legally 
binding document if they win. Extant literature refers to strategic reflexivity, 
which describes reflexive interpretations about developments in the firm’s 
environment or market (Sundbo & Fuglsang, 2006). This can apply to the 
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way a firm adapts their behaviour based upon its own interpretation of the 
future environment. The structural properties of the business are anchored 
in routines and capabilities. Capabilities and routines then become 
structural properties of the business. These capabilities and resources are 
the core subject of this research, contextualised within this laminated 
system of public sector procurement. 
 
4.5 Firm agency and reflexivity  
 
Human agency is the choice to attempt to change the initial conditions of 
an event.  Routines are the result of active agency. Agency refers to the 
intentional and :practices and efforts made by tendering production units in 
firms in their continual response to contextual factors; dynamic external 
conditions created by public procurement systems, regulations and policies 
at different levels, and the internal conditions of the firm. Being an agent 
means exerting some control over social relations, which in turn implies the 
ability to transform social relations (Sewell, 1992). The exercise of agency 
itself is therefore a capability, albeit dependent upon resources. Archer 
(2000) argues that people as human agents have a property of creative 
reflexivity, although the environment may respond positively or negatively 
to their actions. It conditions an agent’s understanding of their action 
situation. Collective action by groups of individuals is an emergent property 
of agency, called corporate agency. It describes the properties and powers 
that exist within a group of individuals with self-declared goals that acquire 
organisation to articulate self-interest. Archer doesn’t refer to corporate 
agency in the sense of corporate businesses, but often referring to political 
groups advocating specific interests, such as environmental groups. 
Archer’s ideas can be expanded upon in this study to think about how a 
business, even a small one, might organise its resources around a 
shared/managed intention to succeed in public sector tendering and, so, 
how agency may exist at an corporate level and not just individual level, 
through the formation of semi-automatic systems. Based on the empirical 
evidence, this in itself may be an institution. 
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Corporate agency can exert pressure to influence decision-making, and the 
way practice is conducted to serve their social interests. Agential power is 
exercised through social interaction, yet always conditioned through social 
context. Human agency can be organised into collective or corporate 
agency. In addition, it is the people that shape or change corporate agency. 
This is relevant to observe as investment in new staff or skills may produce 
a change effect to corporate agency. Corporate agential power may exist 
at different levels of structure within public sector tendering; at the level of 
the country’s legal system, in public authority procurement teams, across 
firms that have a vested interest in winning public sector contracts in 
alliance, and at firm level.  
Relationships are formed amongst people and mechanisms are developed 
that have causal power. Agents have their own causal history that binds 
individual staff together that can produce a causal group power of 
“combined productive activity” (Archer, 2006, p.467) or “co-ordinated 
interaction” (Elder Vass, 2013, p.155). Firms are reflexive agents within a 
system that occupy a social position in relation to a tender opportunity. They 
have capacity to transform themselves through deliberate action that is 
achieved through a set of capabilities and underlying routines. Firm 
reflexivity refers to how individuals collectively reflect upon and adapt their 
tendering practices and behaviours. It reveals how corporate agents have 
to diagnose their situations, they have to “identify their own interests and 
they must design projects they deem appropriate to attaining their ends” 
(Archer, 2003, p 9) and reflects the past experiences of actors (Suddaby et 
al, 2011).  
The resources that exist inside a firm, such as capacity for learning or policy 
document creation are agential and can form routines. Yet behaviour is not 
necessarily routine at all. Routines and capabilities are only successful 
when they respond to the contextual tendering environment, and to act 
capably firm leaders need to learn about the environment and be able to 
‘read’ the structural conditions of a tender opportunity. Conventional 
wisdom exists about what constitutes appropriate behaviour. As such, 
behaviour is influenced by a set of regulatory norms specific to tendering 
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practices and policy. Agency, however, is about capacity that may or may 
not be exercised. Differences in the context of agential performances can 
create capability differences, dependent upon the context or structure 
within which agents are embedded. This makes the study of capability more 
interesting and yet more complex. Agents are themselves formed within a 
set of social structures. Public procurement, for example, has its own sets 
of rules, language and dominance in its relationships with a supply chain.  
In the case of tendering, firms are required to interpret requirements, 
usually expressed through resource demands, and develop individual 
practices to enact capability. This is the focus of study, and it links to the 
theoretical chapter. The knowledge gap, in terms of structure, agency and 
emergence theory, is to discover what influences capability enactment. 
 
4.6 Structure and agency: Emergence and the morphogenetic 
cycle  
 
Structure and agency provide a social theory perspective to explain how 
public procurement operates as an institution, and are situated within a 
temporal process of interaction, as proposed by Archer’s morphogenetic 
cycle (Archer, 1995). Emergence through interaction, creating reproduction 
or change, shows theoretically how social effects emerge through 
interaction, shaping both structural and agential properties.  The term 
‘emergent’ is used to understand interactions between the parts of a system 
and that the behaviour of a system as a whole can feed back on the parts 
which make it up, changing the behaviours of those parts. Emergence is a 
term that can describe outcomes from the recursive interaction between 
firms and the tendering system; “a continuous cycle of interaction between 
social structure and individual actions” (Elder-Vass, 2007, p.26). 
Emergence is about power that is not causally attributable to individual 
people. Rather, it means ‘what comes about’ as change or transformation 
that emerges from structure-agency interactions within firms and between 
the corporate agency of firms and the laminated context of public sector 
tendering. Causal relations can occur in different patterns across layers to 
create emergence. For example, the application of European Law to UK 
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public procurement has transformed how the public sector trades through 
tendering systems and documentation. In turn, firm interaction with tender 
processes has both created a demand for specialist knowledge of tendering 
language and processes inside businesses. This is called downward 
causation, as a higher-level entity has influenced the rules a firm believes 
it must follow, such as creating resources to hold specialist knowledge of 
tendering language. By applying emergence theory to an analysis of the 
social structure of tendering, it is possible to identify entities that possess 
emergent properties. Emergence then is a relationship between entities 
(structure) and their properties and capacity for agency (Elder-Vass, 2013).  
The relationship between structure and agency can be explained through 
consideration of inter-connected social mechanisms at work that operate 
between parts of the institution, best described as a morphogenetic cycle 
of activity (Archer, 2000). Archer offered structure and agency equal 
prominence, although not equal power to influence one another. She 
introduced that things unfold with time, alongside context, to explain 
interplay and its effects on social mechanisms. Archer states:  
“Results of past actions are deposited in the format of 
current situations” (Archer 1995, p.201) 
The quote summarises how historical context influences the interactions 
between parts, called a morphogenetic cycle. It implies that society does 
not have a pre-determined state, but is shaped by agent and structure 
activities at all levels: capitalism, government laws, the institution of public 
procurements, tendering systems local procurers and bidding firms. Each 
is seen to exert some autonomy from each other within a market institution. 
Archer proposed that a morphogenetic cycle has three analytical phases 
that occur at different points in time. Figure 4.4 below shows Archer’s 
phases: i) structural conditioning; ii) social interaction, and iii) structural 
elaboration (Archer, 1995). 
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Figure 4.4 Adaptation of The morphogenetic cycle  
 
 Social conditioning (structure) 
 
  T1  
Social elaboration (action)     
 
 T2                                                        T3 
Morphogenesis (structural elaboration)  
        T4 
 
Source: (Archer, 1995, p.157) 
 
A morphogenetic cycle explains the temporally distinct sequence where 
structure predates activity that may reproduce or change it. Structural 
elaboration then takes place after interaction post-dates actions (Archer, 
1995). Broader structural conditions arise from the conceptualisation of the 
relationship between agency and structure, and the potential to explore the 
importance of agent reflexivity in public procurement. Taking a laminated 
approach, T1 (social conditioning or structure) refers to the power entities 
set out in section 4.4.2. As well as referring to external structural conditions 
made by power holders that affect an agents’ control of resources, it also 
concerns internal structures inside the firm, such as leadership, strategy 
and resource orientation. Stage T2 to T3, social elaboration, is concerned 
with effects that arise as a result of interplay between structure and agency. 
Effects may not be experienced or discernible until after a period of time. 
For example, observing how firms perform competitively in demonstrating 
enhanced socio-economic demands made through tenders. Social 
mechanisms operate through any case and specific contextual 
mechanisms will exist as changes and shifts in procurer and supplier 
behaviour mediate over time, making it also a dynamic context that requires 
constant capability development for firms to remain competitive. This 
means that tendering actions by a small firm cannot be explained in 
isolation from the external tendering environment, which itself carries 
statutory recognition as a way of doing business. In this sense, the notion 
of context, where organisational, regulatory and social conditions pre-exist 
choice as to how to compete for business advertised via a tender, required 
explanation at the beginning of this chapter. Structural conditions can have 
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independent causal mechanisms that enable and constrain tendering 
practice.  
  
4.7 Chapter summary  
 
Chapter four has contextualised firm tendering practices within a much 
broader context than what happens inside a firm. It has discussed the 
power of social structure as arising from people plus  the relations that 
comprise them. It illustrates that a firm’s procurement capabilities are the 
outcome of human agency and its temporal (and therefore dynamic) 
relationship with social structure in a conditional context. Firm tendering 
behaviour emerges from a dynamic relationship with context. Through a 
critical realist lens, individuals’ positions within markets are governed by 
external structures (made by power holders that affect an agents’ control of 
resources and set rules for competitive behaviour) and their behaviour is 
governed by their own internal structures (their understanding of their 
position within external structures and how they should act).  
 
Critical realism offers a novel conception of public sector tendering and 
small firm capability to answer the research question about the nature of 
causal powers in the tendering environment. Structure and agency act as 
social theory concepts to analytically separate domains of knowledge about 
how a tendering system is produced and how it functions through cause 
and effect. Reality can exist at different levels, recognising the importance 
of context and time as significant for accessing knowledge. A stratified view 
of the tendering to explain how knowledge findings through case research 
can be interpreted as ‘multiply determined’ (Bhaskar, 1978). It positions 
analytical dualism as a critical realist methodology that is set out in chapter 
four. 
 
Complex interdependencies exist within a network of actors in public 
procurement with structural and social conditioning influencing firm 
demonstration of capability in a wider morphogenetic cycle. A 
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morphogenetic explanation draws attention to the interplay of actors over 
time and allows for examination of practice in interaction with context. 
Structures are emergent from action and an objective context or future 
action, linking firm action of tendering to a wider context. The effectiveness 
of a tendering system is contextually conditioned by an established base of 
regulatory arrangements within a social interaction pattern. In practice, 
there is co-evolution of structural factors and firm reflexivity of corporate 
agency.  
 
The social context of tendering is important to analyse as it plays a primary 
role in stimulating routine emergence and adaptation. The social 
mechanisms that operate within and between entities hold structural 
powers, with causal effects described. The notion of generative 
mechanisms or causal powers at work means that firm capability has to 
serve a context, and needs to be judged as such. Firms organise routines 
into operational and dynamic capabilities that respond competitively to 
tender demands. This sets the scene to examine case knowledge findings, 
starting, in chapter six, that analyses how that has occurred in primary case 
firm Fit for Life. 
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Chapter Five: A qualitative and critical realist 
research methodology 
“Events occur when actors mobilize the resources they have 
in particular contexts to shape change, which, in social 
contexts, unfolds in open systems where generative 
mechanisms (social, cultural and biological) operate 
independently or in concert in complex 
interactions”. (Hodgkinson and Starkey, 2011,p.262) 
 
5.1   Introduction 
 
This chapter is the only one to be written in the first person, and in the past 
tense, to emphasise my reflexivity. It retells my journey of conducting a 
qualitative inquiry, building interpretive theory through a case study method 
and applying a critical realist methodology. My intention from the beginning 
has been to build theory through an inductive process. I used case study 
fieldwork to listen to situated small firm experiences in different contexts, 
and I collected evidence of tendering practices at micro-foundational level. 
I thematically coded case data about firm resources and routines before 
exploring findings through a constructed theoretical framework. My 
research took place through two data collection stages and three data 
analysis phases over a six-year period, between April 2009 and November 
2015. By doing so, I have detected and described a plausible and novel set 
of sensitising concepts that create performance differences to explain why 
some small firms tend to be more or less successful than others at public 
sector tendering.  
 
When considering a suitable methodology, I reflected deeply on the nature 
of the problem I was trying to solve within my thesis. Small firm tendering 
capability is under-theorised in the literature beyond an idea of resource 
scarcity. I had to better understand the role of agency in capability 
enactment and how to examine conditions under which capability emerges, 
or does not emerge. Previous literature does not adequately open up the 
‘black box’ to look inside the firm: 
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A significant element of agency is effectively being attributed 
to a black box. Actors may well be influential elements of 
institutional agency, but we must also develop an 
understanding of how institutional pressures might affect 
how these actors and their actorhood are socially 
constructed (Suddaby et al, 2010, p.1238) 
 
The dominant rhetoric of a resource-constraint argument ignores the ‘black 
box’ through which organisations acquire and target resources to create 
capability and, therefore, provides a static and limited insight into the nature 
of the problem of building capability to compete for public sector tenders. 
Hence, a primary design consideration was to locate methods of data 
collection and analysis that could access a rich description of the nature of 
firm-level agency in tendering, to ensure I could study how agency connects 
to other levels within tendering as a social institution.  
Murcott (1997) set out three key questions for a writing a qualitative 
methodology chapter: i) ‘How did you go about your research?’ ii) ‘What 
overall strategy did you adopt and why?’ and, iii) ‘What design and 
techniques did you use? Why those and not others?’ I answer each 
question in this chapter. I argue that methods I selected enabled exploration 
of what case firms do and what causes changes to their tendering 
capability. The unit of analysis in terms of social agency is at firm level, set 
within a wider institutional structure, articulated in chapter four.  
 
Critical realism looks for causal explanations beyond the situated 
experiences of case firm respondents. What follows is an honest account 
of my research design and practice, including blind alleys. The chapter 
charts my processes of trial and error in research focus and methods.  It 
includes elements of bricolage to the research design, and it reflects an 
iterative cycle of reflection on how I interpreted, through multiple attempts, 
case study material. First, Figure 5.1 below is a reminder of the research 
questions that I sought to address through a self-constructed theoretical 
lens. 
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Figure 5.1: Theoretical framework to study small firm tendering capability  
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This chapter has six sections. Section one is the introduction. Section two 
outlines a qualitative mode of inquiry, use of a case study method within a 
critical realist mode of perception and the research timeline. Section three 
outlines the data collection stages process used to operationalise a case 
study method including data recording, transcription, data quality. It 
introduces case description and access, sampling, research ethics 
considerations and data collection methods. Section four explains the three 
phases of data analysis with focuses on abductive analysis of case data 
and the organisation of my findings, Section five explains my role as the 
researcher in the research process. Section six is the chapter summary. 
 
5.2 Outline of a qualitative inquiry and case study method  
5.2.1 A qualitative line of inquiry 
 
A starting point for methodological choice was the empirical literature 
review and the gaps in knowledge that remained. Primarily, the purpose of 
my research was aimed at explanation over prediction and control. The 
intention of my research has been to identify underlying influences that 
To understand the 
nature of the public 
sector tendering  
environment, and how it 
impacts upon  
small firms 
 
To explore what 
different forms of 
capability exist and the 
nature of routines and 
resources that support 
them 
 
To examine how 
small firms acquire 
and assimilate 
knowledge into the 
firm through forms of 
learning 
Dynamic capabilities built inside a firm to compete 
in an external environment.  
 
 
RQ1: What are the 
practices, expressed 
as routines, that 
generate capability to 
successfully tender in 
the case firm?  
 
RQ2: What causal 
powers exist within the 
tendering environment 
to constrain and enable 
small firm tendering 
performance? 
 
RQ3: To what extent, 
and how, do small firms 
learn to improve their 
tendering capability 
through repeated 
tendering experience? 
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condition firm action, not to produce empirically generalisable findings that 
would fit with a positivist mode of inquiry. A positivist response to social 
behaviour would see SMEs as rational entities and could only offer a 
deterministic ontological framework for seeing “social action and interaction 
as the product of external forces” (Blaikie, 1993, p.402) where individualistic 
action is excluded. This paradigm is rejected as it carries an assumption 
that SME behaviour can be measured and modelled rather than seen as 
social constructs that are driven subjectively by business owners. A 
positivist paradigm limits the kinds of questions that can be asked to answer 
the problem of capability emergence.  
 
My research questions are framed qualitatively; ‘understand’ and ‘explore’. 
A qualitative investigation was required for this research question to inform 
a conceptual model of capability enactment, with rich empirical data 
required to provide more understanding of the combination of firm routines 
and resources that underpin capability. Qualitative methods can be more 
flexible than quantitative methods, allowing concepts and ideas to evolve 
throughout the research project (Blaikie, 1993).  Furthermore, qualitative 
data has great validity because it is based on detailed, in-depth information 
on unique cases (Churton, 2000). 
5.2.2 Use of a case study method 
 
Small business methodology literature (Perren and Ram, 2004; Chetty, 
1996; Curran and Blackburn, 2001) provides helpful insight into the use of 
case study research. It measures and records behaviour (Yin, 2003); it acts 
as a useful vehicle for policy and management research (Yin, 1994); it 
offers an intensive examination of the setting (Bryman, 2004); it offers the 
researcher an opportunity to use multiple sources to gather information 
(Yin, 2003); it has the ability to uncover the structure of underlying reality in 
cases to validate and articulate theory (Eisenhardt, 1989; Easton, 2010); 
and it can allow for a more dynamic understanding of how firms configure 
resources (Byrne and Ragin, 2009). A case study method can focus on 
understanding the dynamics present within a single setting (Eisenhardt, 
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1989) and it is a rigorous methodology that allows decision making 
processes and causality to be studied from multiple perspectives (Chetty, 
1996). What a case study can produce, for the purposes of evaluating 
capability, is contingent on the characteristics of the setting (Kœnig, 2009).  
The purpose of the case study method in this thesis has been to understand 
complexity (Stake, 1995), analyse context and processes that can 
illuminate theoretical issues (Hartley, 2004) and build theory (Eisenhardt, 
1989; Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007), especially because relatively little 
prior research has been conducted (Benbasat et al, 1987). Case research 
is described by critical realist practitioners as being very useful to explain 
complex social phenomena, and to locate deep processes and structures 
that cause particular events to happen and the conditions for this to occur 
(Easton, 1998). A comparative case approach has enabled me to study 
patterns common to case and theory and avoid ‘chance associations’ 
(Eisenhardt, 1991). A case study method is a common approach to 
conducting qualitative research (Creswell, 2007). Table 5.1 is a summary 
of case study characteristics that frame my comparative case study 
approach. My case study method complied with all the characteristics 
described in Table 5.1. The hallmark of good case study research is 
“building a bridge from rich qualitative evidence to mainstream deductive 
research” (Eisenhardt, 1989 p.30) and I believe this is what I have 
achieved.  
Table 5.1 Case study characteristics  
Characteristics  Description of case study characteristics  
Focus Developing an in-depth description and analysis of a case or 
multiple cases  
Type of problem 
case study suits  
Providing an in-depth understanding of a  case or cases  
Unit of analysis  Studying an event/activity of more than one individual 
Data collection 
forms  
Using multiple sources; interviews,, observations, artefacts  
Data collection 
strategies 
Analysing data through description of the case and themes 
and cross-case themes  
Written report  A detailed analysis of more or more cases  
(Table adapted from Creswell, 2007, p.78-79) 
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5.2.3 Critical realism as a mode of perception  
 
Critical realism as a philosophy has significant implications for my research 
design and selected methods for data collection and analysis. It starts from 
the viewpoint that case firms under study are situated in an open system 
where external conditions have power, even if that power is not observable 
to case participants (Bhaskar, 2008). Conditions for practice are not fixed, 
and firm experience can vary in different contextual conditions, such as 
their sector, the point in time or by geographical location. Capability is a 
relational concept that arises from a firm’s own behaviour, suggesting 
active agency and deliberate intention. As a mode of inquiry, critical realism 
offers a theoretical conception of firm action situated within a wider, 
stratified social institution, described in chapter four. A critical realist 
explanation asks me to suggest explanatory mechanisms that connect 
structure and agency, and then attempt to demonstrate that they exist as 
tendencies. To do this I need to understand agent conceptions of what is 
happening, as their experience forms part of the reality itself. Sayer (1992) 
sets out the principal ontological and epistemological nature of using a 
critical realist approach. Ontologically, I am looking at the independent 
existence of knowledge from observed reality in a stratified social world 
where objects or entities have powers of ways of acting. Epistemologically, 
social phenomena are conceptually dependent, observable through 
interpretation, where conditions and social relations influence knowledge 
production.  
 
5.2.4 Research timeframe  
 
Figure 5. 2 sets out my research in terms of two data collection stages 
depicted in yellow, three data analysis phases shown in green, plus the final 
write-up and presentation of data.    
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Figure 5.2 Research timeframe 
 
      
 
 
      
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* First period of suspension of studies was October 2010 for12 months 
** Second period of suspension of studies was November 2014 for 11 months  
 
Section 5.3.below describes each data collection stage, each data analysis stage 
and how the study was written up into a thesis. 
 
5.3 Case study data collection stages and sources  
5.3.1 A theoretical case sampling strategy 
 
My process of data collection was driven primarily by the aim of 
generating theory. I used theoretical sampling to investigate actual cases 
of small firm procurement experience. It afforded an opportunity to access 
multiple sources to gather information (Yin, 2003). Miles and Huberman 
(1984) developed a typology of sampling strategies to use with qualitative 
Stage 1 of data collection : Initial boundaried case study that focused on  
resource enactment (as forms of capital) in four firms, bounded together by  
examination of a single tender case  
 
 
 Phase 1 of data analysis. Review and recalibration of research focus. New  
research aims constructed within a critical realist framework and a  
wider review of Sept 2011 – 
empirical and theoretical literature   
Stage 2 of data collection: Case study field-work with primary and secondary  
cases exceptionally successful at tendering and an interview with an expert  
informant on tendering  
 
Phase 2 of data analysis : Abductive analysis of stage 2 data collection, starting with 
thematic coding routines and forms of capability, moving on to a theoretical  
interpretation of case data 
 
 
Write up and presentation of data as one primary intensive case and all  
other case data compared against for the presence or absence of capability and  
routine findings 
Sept 2009-
August 
2011* 
August 2013 
Sept 2013 – 
October 
2015** 
Nov 2015 – 
Aug 2016  
Sept 2016-
August 2017 
Phase 3 of data analysis: Application of emerging theoretical framework to  
perform a secondary analysis informant interview interview scripts 
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inquiry. From this typology, I identified that my strategy needed to have a 
theoretical sample, from which to build interpretative theories from 
emerging data against my conceptual framework, and to select intensive 
cases, defined as information rich. When I began the first stage of my data 
collection I did not have a fixed, pre-conceived theoretical lens to apply to 
data. My approach was to collect data and (re) analyse it. I learnt to become 
sensitive to knowing what data was important to build my theoretical 
framework and also what data I could discard. Each case is in itself less 
important than how they contributed to my understanding of how to link 
together my emerging theoretical ideas into a sense-making framework. A 
two-stage approach to data collection and a three-stage data analysis 
model widened the sample and achieved theoretical saturation. 
5.3.2 Data collection stages  
 
Data collection took place in two stages. In total, fieldwork utilised eleven 
interview transcripts. A case tender specification documentation acted as 
an additional supplementary artefact.  
 
The first data collection stage was though intensive examination of four 
firms and the procurer in one boundaried tender case for the supply of 
domiciliary services. One interview as with the regional manager of a large 
national firm that won the contract to supply domiciliary services. The other 
firms were all local and small. From stage one, I learnt about successful 
tendering strategies a large firm had used. I also learnt how differently the 
smaller firms had behaved, albeit in different ways. One of the four small 
firms was successful at tendering for other contracts, just not on this 
occasion. After an initial review of the literature relating to small firm 
tendering (Sept 2009-August 2011) I completed stage one of data collection 
as part of the researcher training and Masters in Research (MRes) 
programme. It was an exploratory study about the ways that small firms 
might behave, not an authoritative piece on how they do behave. The 
objectives of this study were to i) analyse the resource demands of one 
specific tendered opportunity from advertisement to contract award stage; 
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ii) use textual and interview case data to investigate three forms of non-
financial capital observed as a mechanism to identify procurement 
capability; and , iii) begin to evaluate critically not just the existence or 
availability of these resources, but how the enactment of resources actually 
shapes capability to exploit new opportunities. 
 
The study was qualitative and it examined one city council procurement 
opportunity outcome for a vulnerable person housing support service. The 
contract case was for an existing social care service, divided into three 
separate lots, nationally advertised. It utilised a tender description and 
feedback event prior to document release to gain feedback on delivery 
viability around proposed outcomes and unit costs. Forty-seven 
organisations expressed interest in this opportunity and seven returned 
submissions. No bidder used a partnership bidding model and six 
organisations applied to deliver all three lots. The tender was a one-stage, 
full electronic tender submission, and firms had three months to respond to 
this opportunity. 
 
I interviewed the local government procurer, the winning large firm and 
three small firms that had also submitted tenders. My unit of analysis was 
the perspective of the firm, with limited consideration of the social effects of 
structure and agency upon capability. In my study three types of non-
financial capital were under review: i) human: the skills and knowledge 
stock of an individual or group of individuals; ii) social: the firm’s ability to 
draw resources out of networks, and; iii) entrepreneurial: how an individual 
mobilises resources around opportunity. It was the conceptualisation of the 
relative importance and interplay of these forms that helped me to examine 
firm responses to tender events. Data were collected through participant 
interviewing and secondary case data sources. I attempted to use a critical 
realist paradigm to understand the role of social structures that are 
embedded, culturally and politically, within public procurement and small 
firms.  
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The second stage of data collection recognised a need to collect data by 
studying small firms that had themselves learnt to be successful at 
tendering, and this became my primary and secondary cases.  Stage two 
of data collection focused on two different small firms that were both 
successful at winning tenders, and by interviewing an expert informant who 
acted as a tendering consultant to small firms . Both small firms were rich 
in data about successful routines. The expert informant had supported over 
a hundred small firms with tender completions, so could draw upon 
observed experience. Stage two of data collection fieldwork took place 
between September 2013 and October 2015.  I located two firms as case 
studies that were successful at tendering to begin new fieldwork. I had 
datasets from my pilot study on small firms that reported a lack of success 
in one tendering occurrence. It was my intention to seek out firms that are 
exceptionally successful at tendering. I also wanted to access cases from 
a new sector, to broaden study of sector contextual influences, as my pilot 
work had focused on domiciliary care. Firms selected were not previously 
known to me but I knew of them anecdotally through personal contact with 
a university business growth programme. I discussed case requirements 
with colleagues. Through informal discussion I shortlisted two firms. At this 
point I was unsure if I needed both cases or indeed more than two cases.  
 
The first firm was Fit for Life, which I have used in this thesis as the primary 
case as I had been informed through colleagues that their tendering 
success was mature and to an impressive scale. My initial contact with the 
firm was using email followed by an on-site visit to the Managing Director 
(MD) to seek participation in the study. Having secured agreement, a 
second meeting took place to meet again with the MD and members of her 
executive team, all of whom were case interview respondents. I attended a 
team meeting where tender opportunities were discussed as part of the 
agenda. Two weeks later, I returned to the firm to conduct four one-to-one 
interviews on site. Upon completion of the interviews, I took away a copy of 
a recent and successful completed tender for textual analysis. In the 
following months I was also contacted by the MD who forwarded feedback 
on an unsuccessful tender as we had discussed the quality and utility of 
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procurer feedback. A similar process was followed with Software4U that is 
also successful at tendering in a different sector. Initially I made telephone 
contact with one of the owners and then set up a meeting with the Director 
and two of her staff that respond to tenders. A completed tender was 
reviewed on site. 
 
Stage two of data collection also included expert informant insight. One 
semi-structured interview took place at this stage with a consultant who 
specialised in offering tendering consultancy services to small businesses. 
This opened up new perspectives for me to explore within my small firm 
cases and it acted as a counterbalance to personal bias that comes from 
my own experience of supporting small firms to tender.  
5.3.3 Organisational attributes in case firms  
 
Table 5.2 sets out the income, employee size, sector, age and ownership 
status of each case firm. Table 5.3 lists the respondents from each case 
firm. Both tables provide background context to cases studied.  
Table 5.5 Summary table of case firm attributes  
 Primary 
intensive 
case  
Secondary 
intensive case  
Secondary 
analysis of 
pilot data  
Secondary 
analysis of 
pilot data  
Secondary 
analysis of 
pilot data  
Company  Fit for Life  Software4U The Big Carer Local Care 
Co. 
Domiciliary 
Ltd  
Number of 
employees  
62  42 200 11 45 
Sales turnover  £3,100, 
000 
£1,200,000 £19,000,000 <£400,000 £700,000 
Sector  Leisure  IT Domiciliary 
care  
Domiciliary 
care 
Domiciliary 
care 
Registered 
status  
Limited 
company  
Limited 
company 
Limited 
company 
Limited 
company 
Limited 
company 
Ownership   Private  Private Private Private Private 
Governance  Owner 
managed  
Owner 
managed 
Owner 
managed 
Owner 
managed 
Owner 
managed 
______________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 5.3: Description of Research Participants 
Respondent  
code 
 
Gender  Title  
FFL1 Female  Managing Director  
FFL2 Female  HR Director  
FFL3  Male  Marketing Manager  
FFL4  Male  Operations Manager  
S4U1 Female  Director/Owner  
S4U2 Male  Sales Team  
S4U3 Female  Sales Team 
EE Female  Expert informant  
TBCr Female  Business 
Development 
Manager 
LCC Male  Managing Director 
DLTD Male  Managing Director  
 
5.3.4 Conducting semi-structured case interviews  
 
I conducted eleven semi-structured interviews, and every respondent was 
interviewed once in their workplace. Analysis of each interview enabled a 
framework of final set of thematic codes to emerge. Semi-structured 
interviewing has been described as an ‘open’ conversation (Kvale, 1996) 
or a ‘guided’ conversation (Rubin & Rubin, 1995). Its application in fieldwork 
enabled me to access the insider perspective (Somekh and Lewis, 2005) 
through in-depth case study activity. The semi-structured format allowed 
me to ask follow-up questions as a prompt to explore a topic in more depth, 
and it gave participants more time to elaborate. The role of the researcher, 
and their preparation before the interview in producing a useful interview 
schedule are important in semi-structured interviews. As Kvale (1996, 
p.129) highlighted, “A good interview question should contribute 
thematically to knowledge production and dynamically to promoting a good 
interview interaction.” Use of semi-structured interviews in a case study 
design provided me with “a structured and standardised set of data to 
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investigate associations between variables” (Easterby-Smith et al, 2002, 
p.38) and its use incorporated a biographical account of experience from 
interviewees in interview datasets at stages one and three.  
 
I gave each interviewee a Participant Information Guide and confidentiality 
was assured. Interviews took place at employer premises and each lasted 
between 60-90 minutes in duration. Aspects of biographical study were 
incorporated by asking case study respondents to compare their past and 
current processes to reach and respond to new opportunities (Denzin, 
1989). Internal and external environmental and cultural contexts emerged; 
reflection on procurement routines and behaviours developed a longitudinal 
perspective that built an understanding of the evolution of the capability 
through the application of learning.   
 
My case approach allowed for intra-case and inter-case comparability 
whilst enabling participants to tell their stories and for new themes to 
emerge. Although some themes had been previously identified in the 
literature, the interviews were exploratory, encouraged discussion and 
were unconstrained by the pre-identified themes. Interviewees were asked 
about the most recent tender they had completed, and then asked to 
describe one successful, one unsuccessful and one other ‘memorable’ 
tender response they had participated in. This approach allowed me to 
gather lived situations of firm action, whilst seeking to explore hidden 
generative mechanisms that drive particular behaviours. Whilst introducing 
my study and throughout interviewing I was careful not to use the words 
‘capability’ or ‘routines’, as I wanted to listen to how firm respondents 
attribute success or deliberate action. Throughout eleven interviews, no 
respondent used the words ‘capable’ ,’capability’ or ‘routine’ as words to 
summarise firm behaviour.  
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5.3.5 Documentary artefacts  
Table 5.4 Description of other research artefacts used as data  
Artefact  Utility  
Invitation to tender documentation 
supplied to Fit for Life for guidance  
Coded thematically to look for structural 
conditions  
Fit for Life completed tender 
response to the tender  
Coded thematically to look for agency 
response  
Fit for Life procurer feedback on a 
separate unsuccessful tender  
Coded thematically to look for structural 
conditions 
Review of Software 4 U completed 
tender 
Coded thematically to look for agency 
response 
 
Artefact evidence: Secondary data sources (for case context) were used 
for textual analysis. A hard copy completed tender (2014) from FFL was 
scrutinised off-site. This was a response to a contract advert for the 
provision of leisure training and intervention programme for a public service 
organisation. The proposal had parts A-F that could be tendered for 
separately, and Fit for Life had tendered for all parts of the proposal, and 
was also the incumbent contract holder for the service. A copy of both the 
completed tender and the pre-qualification questionnaire (PQQ) were 
supplied.  The PQQ is a document that formed the first part of this tender 
response to capture legal, financial and technical information from bidders. 
To progress to the next stage it is necessary to demonstrate compliance to 
threshold levels set out in the specification. The tender contract 
advertisement was placed in the Official Journal of the European Union in 
2013.  It followed a process of PQQ submission, a full selective invitation 
to tender and a clarification interview. The tender process took eight months 
and was awarded to FFL late May 2014. It was interesting to assess the 
value placed upon this activity by the primary case firm team to look for 
systems of employing the learning, and for dynamic capability systems that 
use this to inform operational capability.   
150 
 
 
 
5.3.6 Field notes  
 
Throughout my study, I collected nine notebooks with observation notes, 
questions and thoughts about theoretical alignment. They are not dated or 
particularly well organised, and this is a learning point I am taking forward 
into future research. However, they have been invaluable to the writing up 
process, especially at times when ‘writer’s block’ has set in and I have 
needed to ensure I stay close to the data.  
5.3.7 Data recording and storage  
 
Descriptive data was collected in the form of transcribed taped interviews, 
extensive field and diary notes. For the final analysis, all interview data was 
then entered into the qualitative research software NVivoTM for thorough 
coding and further identification and refinement of themes and sub-themes.  
5.3.8 Ensuring case study validity and reliability  
 
Qualitative analysis results in a different type of knowledge than does 
quantitative inquiry, but all data has to fulfil quality criteria. Yin (2003) 
suggested case research evaluation should use the constructs of validity 
and reliability. Validity refers to the effectiveness of the research design to 
answer the research questions, and reliability is both internal (though a 
pilot) and external (the generalisabilty of findings to other situations).  I have 
applied a validity and reliability quality test to my case data, as illustrated in 
Table 5.5. 
Table 5.5 Case study validity and reliability test  
Quality Test Tactic I used  Research 
Phase 
Construct validity: 
ensuring I study 
appropriate concepts  
 Use multiple evidence sources  Data gathering  
Writing up 
Internal validity: 
confirming causal 
relationships 
 Pattern matching for  
 explanation building (Yin, 
2003) through narrative 
analysis 
Data analysis  
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 Analytic memos ( Corbin & 
Strauss, 2008)  
 Constant comparative method 
(Glaser and Strauss, 1967) 
External validity: 
Establishing the domain 
to which my study 
findings can be 
generalised 
 Use more than one case study  Research design 
Reliability: demonstrate 
that operations of a study 
are repeatable with same 
results 
 Use of a case study protocol 
 Semi-structured interviewing 
Data collection  
In the last twelve months I have thought more about the concept of 
‘trustworthiness’ of data, identified by Lincoln and Guba (1985). 
Trustworthiness comprises of credibility, transferability, dependability, and 
confirmability. 
 Credibility has been achieved in how I negotiated access to case firm 
participants. Use of thematic analysis has collected data and ideas that has 
remained congruent with theoretical framework for investigation.  
 Transferability is the assertion that thick description is essential for others 
who are interested to transfer my findings to another context, or individuals. 
My intention has never been to generalise, and my small case study 
population does not support such a claim. However, my use of a primary 
case with a comparative study to other data sets can lay claim to creating 
an empirically valid theory of practices and mechanisms that form 
competitive public sector tendering (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). 
 Dependability (reliability) and confirmability (objectivity) – I have 
deliberately used triangulation through multiple investigative methods 
(participant interviews, documentary analysis and third party insight). I also 
used different sets of data and a cross case comparative analysis. Re-use 
of my pilot datasets provided negative instances of capability (i.e. where 
firms were incapable of being competitive in public sector markets).   
Researcher bias is an important part of confirmability, and I have said more 
about this in section 5.5 below. 
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5.4 Data analysis phases  
Data analysis can be categorised as three phases, as shown in Figure 5.2. 
The first phase of analysis drew on findings and implications from the first 
stage of data collection. The second phase took place after the second 
stage of data collection and the third phase continued on from this with a 
re-analysis of specific interview transcripts from the first data collection 
stage. Each phase and the approach taken is set out in this section.  
5.4.1 Data analysis and findings from the first data collection stage 
 
To analyse and interpret my first set of data I developed a system of axial 
coding which identified relationships between existing codes, according to 
my concepts. Secondary and primary data sources were coded using a 
combination of free and tree nodes. My data analysis mode was, in part, 
predetermined by the RBV theoretical framework I used. It allowed me to 
code what was interesting for the emergent analysis of trends, and to build 
and test theory of resource enactment. Data reduction was achieved by 
sorting data into clusters using Spradley’s “family tree” concept (1980). This 
enabled me to identify taxonomic (grouped) relationship structures and 
links between my concepts. I assigned properties and dimensions to each 
category, applying criteria to determine if it qualified to assess my raw data.  
 
In terms of findings, the results from individual and across-case analysis 
highlighted mystery, organisational routines, learning processes, 
reputation, and scale as influencing factors upon agency responses. 
Structural demands noted from the initial boundaried case study were: i) 
procurement rules, legislation and language; ii) rising competition from 
national organisations for small localised contracts; iii) the complexity and 
depth of tender responses demanding high levels of human, social and 
entrepreneurial capital; iv) the format of capability demonstration through 
paper submission; and v) procurer assumptions about small firm resource 
access. Agency responses observed were: i) SME assumptions and 
“mystery” of procurer expectations leading to a sense of unfairness; ii) the 
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need to be more professional and routinised to compete with larger firms; 
and, iii) capacity to learn and improve for future opportunities. Several 
social effects of structure and agency arose; i) SMEs are in danger of 
becoming “marooned” from delivering local contracts; ii) practice-based 
entrepreneurialism within small firms appears to be excluded in a 
formalised tendering process; and iii) the loss of competition from small 
providers, creating new power for large providers that could push up 
delivery costs. The study had clear implications for knowledge. It began to 
inform me empirically about the structural demands and agency responses 
that shape SME tendering prospects. It was an effective method for 
collecting evidence of resource enactment linked to open and competitive 
tendering that had considerable potential for further research. My pilot study 
(Turner, 2013) helped me to develop an initial set of codes, set out in Table 
5.6. The codes and coding process were linked to three forms of capital; 
human, social and entrepreneurial. I draw on thematic analysis to refer to 
the initial coding process as thematic sensing (Boyzatis, 1998). 
Table 5.6: Initial development of thematic framework and codes from stage one of data 
collection 
Phase of study  Relationship to form 
of capital  
  
Pilot study  Human capital 
codes  
Social capital 
codes  
Entrepreneurial 
capital codes  
Stage 1: 
Triage  
Routines for decision 
taking  and planning 
time investment  
 
Knowledge & skills for 
deep assessment of  
procurer goals  
 
Leadership of triage 
process 
 
Ability to commit time 
for stage 2  
Ability to draw 
in internal & 
external 
knowledge 
stocks  
 
Identification of 
partnerships to 
increase scale 
Self-efficacy of 
business owner 
to develop the 
opportunity 
Stage 2: 
Mobilising a 
tender 
response 
 Acquisition or 
existence of skills and 
knowledge stocks  
 
Loose ties to 
build reputation 
and scale 
 
Brand identity 
Entrepreneurial 
business 
development 
processes 
Stage 3: 
Evaluating 
tender 
performance 
Knowledge and skills to 
review management 
action   
 
Development 
of loose ties for 
current/future 
opportunities 
Embedded firm 
capital in a 
feedback 
process   
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From this start-point, I began a process of thematic reflection. I had 
developed some codes inductively, but recognised the limitations of this 
work. First, the codes highlighted processes or resources used by tendering 
firms in a bounded case study, but they were not clustered hierarchically 
and they did not describe capability. Miles and Huberman (1984) refer to a 
requirement to cluster themes to achieve a higher level of abstraction.  
5.4.2 Review and recalibration of research focus after stage one  
 
A prolonged period of literature search and reflection over fifteen months 
(Sept 2011-August 2013) was beneficial to me to reflect on the limitations 
of my pilot study as well as build up a greater degree of confidence in my 
overall research approach. It confirmed to me that a critical realist 
perspective was valid and that I had not yet fully exploited its potential use. 
I began to see how the tendering process itself was seen to rely upon high 
levels of human, social and entrepreneurial capital that small firms do not 
necessarily have. In part, these capitals related to routines and firm-level 
learning, and yet I had not  captured either of these constructs in a 
meaningful way or thoroughly associated SME tendering capability as 
emergent from causal processes operating at the levels of political and 
regulatory structure. A key limitation from my pilot study was not having the 
opportunity to examine a successful small firm – I could merely interpret 
what a successful large firm did.  
 
My next step was to understand capability from a much wider perspective 
than from the resource-based view.  As a process, I employed a bricolage 
of thematic origins. My capability ideas arose through three routes; from 
existing literature, from my first data collection case and inductively through 
intensive comparative case research from the second data collection stage. 
Themes have been, in part, theory driven, for example use of dynamic 
capability theory (Teece et al, 1997). My fieldwork generated more codes 
inductively. I extended my theoretical and empirical literature reviews and 
developing codes that were theory driven and were present in existing 
literature (brought up to date in 2017).  Abductive and retroductive 
techniques made sense of the data. Expanding and collapsing codes until 
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an orderly and explanatory means of categorising the data has been a 
successful approach (Miles and Huberman, 1984). I used template analysis 
to summarise data for each case interview. I have used this in conjunction 
with the coded text to conduct within-case and across-case analysis. An 
iterative process of analysing the data was used to identify emerging 
themes during the case study process. I used a cross-case spreadsheet to 
identify themes and categorise information as the interviews were 
progressing. Information from documents and other case data was also 
entered into the cross-case spreadsheet.  
 
In thematic analysis the relevance and quality of a sample should meet 
three tests; efficacy, efficiency and ethics (Boyatzis, 1998). Efficacy refers 
to having a sufficient variety of units of analysis to analyse between to 
identify comparison and variance. It also demands multiple units of coding 
to understand each unit of analysis in the round. I have complied with these 
efficacy guidelines through my sample size and respondent range. 
Efficiency is about making coding time manageable. I significantly 
underestimated the time required to code, recode and cluster my themes. 
However, through supervisory discussion, I have completed coding and 
learnt lessons for managing future coding in research. Ethics is the 
protection of confidentiality of data. I have taken adequate steps to protect 
against source identification by changing or making vague the names, 
locations and sectors of case firms. I was also encouraged by my 
supervisor to become vaguer about specific details such as accreditations 
held by case firms.  
 
The use of memos helped me to initially understand the analytic story 
behind the data (Corbin and Strauss, 2008) and to connect disparate 
concepts together within my theoretical framework. This integration 
process was an iterative process of continual sense-making of key issues 
that are buried within the data to support a theoretical rather than just a 
descriptive explanation. 
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Further codes became apparent from a more extensive literature review, 
with a specific focus on several key studies, (Flynn and Davis, 2016; 
Woldesenbat, 2013; Reijonen et al, 2014). From here, I constructed an 
initial set of themes to begin fieldwork. As time progressed, I utilised further 
theory to ‘see’ codes through interpretative methods of data abstraction. 
Figure 5.3 (below) is my final thematic coding template. The template was 
constructed using four segmented themes: i) market knowledge, 
understanding and experience; ii) market engagement, influence and 
positioning; firm knowledge exchange, routines and adaptation, and, iv; 
resource demands, mobilisation and orientation.  Each segment was then 
afforded sub-categories where a detailed level of data analysis takes place. 
An initial set of codes that had emerged through the literature review had 
acted as potential thematic categories for initial data coding of interview 
transcripts (Corbin and Strauss, 2008). As coding began, categorical 
coding clusters became more visible. Pre-defined initial codes to adopt data 
led titling.  
Figure 5.7 Revised and final thematic coding template  
1. Market 
Knowledge, 
Understanding 
and Experience 
2. Market 
Engagement, 
Influence and 
Positioning 
3. Firm 
Knowledge 
Exchange, 
Routines, 
Adaptation  
4. Resource 
Demands, 
Mobilisation 
and Orientation 
1.1 Understanding 
tendering 
processes and 
regulation as a 
market mechanism 
2.1 Market 
shaping 
strategies  
3.1 Opportunity 
triage 
4.1 Specific 
resource 
demands 
observed 
 
1.2 A- priori 
experience   
 
2.2 Market 
positioning 
through 
networks and 
relationships  
3.2 Opportunity 
leadership, co-
ordination and 
distribution 
4.2  Company 
investment into 
resources as 
forms of  capital 
1.3 Competitor 
awareness 
 
 
 
2.3 Opportunity 
flow positioning 
3.3 Micro-routines 
observed 
4.3 Fluidity of 
resource access 
and exchange 
1.4 Utilising a 
tendering strategy 
 
 
2.4 Innovation 3.4 Aligning 
company ethics 
and values to 
decision making 
4.4 Resource 
orientation  
1.5 Effects of 
procurer behaviour 
on capability 
demonstration 
2.5 Motivation 
and agency 
3.5 Applying 
learning and 
reflection 
4.5 Risking 
resource effort 
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Before I settled upon using institutional, capability and absorptive capacity 
theories I also explored bootstrapping, bricolage and effectuation within 
entrepreneurship literature with a view to using it within a theoretical 
framework. I ‘played’ with the idea for nine months, convinced that 
entrepreneurial bricolage behaviours may provide a broad explanation of 
innovation to perform an exchange under resource constraints (Senyard et 
al, 2014) and could help unlock explanations for capability performance 
differences in case firms. Bootstrapping and bricolage entrepreneurship 
literatures gave me a theoretical perspective to examine resource 
command processes. I also recognised effectuation as a nascent literature 
that resonated with my interest in understanding human action.   
 
Effectuation is a process of thinking and a form of entrepreneurial expertise 
(Read and Sarasvathy, 2005) that starts with a general aspiration to use 
resources at immediate disposal rather than to exploit environmental 
contingencies. Effectuation describes small firm behaviour and I believed 
that opportunity positioning strategies and understanding opportunity 
formation under uncertainty may be illuminated through effectuation theory. 
Fundamentally, the behavioural principles of effectuation (Sarasvathy, 
2001, 2008) offer a paradigmatic shift away from rational (causative) goal 
driven behaviours where opportunities are found and exploited through firm 
controlled resources. Effectual logic would have meant embracing the five 
following principles: i) that a goal is replaced by a set of means; ii) expected 
return is replaced by affordable loss,. i.e. what is riskable; iii) competitor 
analysis is overridden by use of strategic alliances; iv) exploitation of pre-
existing knowledge is transformed into leveraging knowledge; and, v) 
effectual thinking does not try to predict the future (market) within uncertain 
environments. I personally struggled to apply these principles to my case 
data and became confused using effectuation, as my unit of analysis was 
the firm and not the leader. I would like to utilise these aspects of 
entrepreneurship theory in the future, but I concluded that a robust study 
could be conducted with a tri-partite theoretical construct using capability 
theory, institutional theory and absorptive capacity.  
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5.4.4 Phase two of data analysis - abductive and retroductive techniques 
 
The ontological and epistemological assumptions of critical realist theory 
have meant that data collection from case firms has involved continuous 
reflection to identify why events occur and how they can be explained. 
Empirical data collected has needed to relate back to the real nature of 
entities within a wider social structure, with an emphasis upon retroduction 
(to look for potential causes) and abduction (to infer the most plausible 
explanation). Critical realism has proved to be an appropriate paradigm to 
adopt in relation to understand the role of social structures that are 
embedded, culturally and politically, within public sector tendering and 
SMEs and it has enabled theoretical arguments to make sense of empirical 
data. 
Table 5.3 (ahead) frames my critical realist research approach. I have 
already stated that observable data lacks explanatory power to locate 
causal structures that exist within the cases to differentiate between 
empirical and actual knowledge. Access is gained through a process of 
abduction, or the process of identifying and matching the relationship 
between underlying mechanisms and observable data, by looking at data 
through a theoretical lens. My theoretical lens was described in chapter 
three, and was developed through a reflective ‘to and fro’ process between 
data and theory. Retroduction as a technique can observe how human 
action as forms of agency combine with structural conditions to produce 
interacting causal mechanisms. Retroduction is  described as  “…a 
movement . . . from the conception of some phenomenon of interest to a 
conception of some totality or thing, mechanism, structure or condition that 
is responsible for that given phenomena.” As a process it identifies the 
causes and conditions of case findings. A retroductive examination of 
findings moves from “a description of some phenomenon to a description 
of something which produces it or is a condition for it” (Bhaskar 2009, p.7). 
Application of a retroductive methodology is useful to identify potential 
causes to explain capability enactment by locating and understanding 
causal mechanisms underlying the emergence and success of competitive 
capability practices (Pawson and Tilley, 1997). I used five steps of 
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abductive reasoning that are set out in Table 5.3 below. Each step 
corresponds to Bhaskar’s ontological domains (2008), the empirical, actual 
and real that are discussed in chapter five.  Step 1, resolution, refers to the 
collection of case data, that is initially organised into thematic categories. 
Step two, re-description, examined the data  through the theoretical 
framework constructed, using capability theory, institutional theory and 
absorptive capacity theory as a constructed lens. The third step, 
retroduction, was to conceive of explanatory mechanisms that may be in 
play. I found this step challenging, and spent considerable time considering 
and dismissing possible generative mechanisms in my cases. 
Figure 5. 3 Steps of abductive reasoning within a critical realist approach  
                                                         
The research problem:  Small firm tendering capability is under-theorised 
to explain causal factors that underlie descriptions of practice 
 
        Abductive reasoning is applied, as follows: 
 
Observation of firm practices through cases 
 
 
Thematic coding and clustering to describe firm routines from resource 
combinations  
 
 
Re-description of case findings through a theoretical lens constructed 
through trial and error  
 
 
Causal explanations explored through: 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Generation of Context-Mechanism-Outcome (CMO)  configurations 
across comparative case data 
 
For the purposes of contextual broadening, I also applied scrutiny to 
existing data sets from pilot data and to an expert informant interview. The 
final steps are referred to as elaboration and elimination. The CMO  model 
(context mechanism, outcome)  pattern configurations is an analysis tool to 
Institutional 
mechanisms 
Capabilities and 
routines  
Absorptive 
capacity to learn 
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understand 'what works for whom in what circumstances' (Tilley, 2000) and 
I have applied it to case findings to uncover generative mechanisms inside 
case firms which shape agency responses in different contexts. Table 5.8 
illustrates how the steps of abductive reasoning fit into my research 
discovery.  
Table 5.8 Steps of abductive reasoning within critical realist ontological domains 
CR ontological 
domains  
Steps of abductive 
reasoning  
Research discovery  
Empirical  
(empirical 
knowledge)  
Resolution  Collection of empirical data from 
case study firms FFL and S4U. 
Focus on successful practices used 
and reflections on situated 
tendering experiences.  
   
Actual  
(all events and 
behaviours)  
Re-description 
(looking at empiric al 
data collected through 
my constructed 
theoretical framework)  
 
Thematic ‘sensing’ is applied to FFL 
primary case study. Thematic 
codes are repeatedly analysed 
through application of codes to the 
concepts of capability, institutional 
theory and absorptive capacity. 
   
Real  
(generative 
mechanisms)  
Retroduction  
(postulation of 
underlying generative 
mechanisms)  
Generative mechanisms are 
considered, dismissed, 
reconsidered and adopted 
 Elaboration and 
elimination of other 
explanations  
(are my GMs still 
relevant)  
Re-examination of data sets from 
pilot study and expert informant 
interview with S4U empirical data 
to apply the postulated generative 
mechanisms 
 
 
Pattern matching is a core procedure in every theory-testing study 
(Campbell, 1966; Dul and Hak, 2008), and I expected patterns of behaviour 
that emerged from data would allow me to conceptualise my process of 
data analysis and build an analytic structure. Use of the constant 
comparative method (Glaser and Strauss, 1967) encouraged me to stretch 
the diversity of data I collected to achieve theoretical saturation. Each 
incidence of tendering experiences I examine is likely to bring out different 
aspects of behavioural learning and process so this technique uncovered 
similarities and differences within my coding labels. 
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5.4.5 Phase three of data analysis - contextual broadening  
 
The final stage of data collection was to apply my emerging theoretical 
framework to perform a secondary analysis of datasets from three pilot 
study firms. Inclusion of the data stretched the diversity of my data by 
collecting it from small firms in different sectors. It highlighted comparison 
or differences in resource fungibility between tender responses for products 
over services.  
5.4.6 Write up and presentation of data  
 
A key challenge and learning point for me was my ability to identify and 
experiment with ways of presenting data. After some soul-searching, data 
on my findings were synthesised into a primary and comparative case 
report. Chapter six presents Fit for Life, a firm that has grown just over the 
medium-size business category (62 employees), primarily in a competitive 
public sector market. It is my primary intensive case, organised under an 
observed set of routines that comprise capability. Chapter seven uses a 
comparator approach to identify the presence or absence of routines and 
capability forms found in FFL with all other case firms. Primary case 
findings are compared against a secondary intensive case, Software4U 
(S4U), an analysis of datasets from three pilot firm and from an interview 
with an expert informant on tendering. Firms additional to FFL occupy 
different tendering conditions, different markets and different levels of 
product or service mutability. For example, S4U sell software which is a 
fixed product in a market with minimal direct competition. Their market 
procure on a small financial scale. Pilot firms are sized differently, from 
eleven, 45 or 200 employees and operate both successfully and 
unsuccessfully in a domiciliary care market. Data are presented in matrix 
and narrative formulae, with direct quotations from respondents. 
Respondent names and firms were anonymised (Douglas, 2005) and 
particular details of firm such as specificity of location are vague to protect 
firm identity. 
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5.5 My role as researcher in the study  
 
My role as a critical realist researcher is to locate deep social structures 
that are not observable through interview respondent accounts of practice, 
perceived by the teller through recollection. A process of retroduction is 
required as a mode of inference, “to move from a ‘surface phenomenon’ to 
some ‘deeper’ causal thing” (Lawson 2003, p.145). Retroduction as a 
process is iterative (Wynn and Williams, 2012) and creative (Bygstad et al, 
2016). It places the researcher centre stage as interpreter. There is no 
established methodology for the identification of mechanisms (Bygstad et 
al, 2016) although it is aided by theoretical discussion (Danermark et al, 
2002; Sayer, 1992; Pawson and Tilley, 1997).  
 
The retroductive process has been referred to as ‘thought trials’ (Weick, 
1989) to identify the properties of a causal mechanism at work. As the 
researcher I have been required to generate codes and then postulate 
generative mechanisms from thematically coded data. It has required 
confidence to decide which ones have the highest explanatory power. 
Learning to apply thematic analysis has been a laborious process that has 
required me to develop particular skills and behaviours, to recognise and 
overcome obstacles for unit analysis and code analysis identification and 
interpretation and to recognise what makes a good theme, or code. Case 
analysis has been more complex than I had anticipated as I started to 
perceive multiple causality in the small firm tendering domain and requiring 
an ability to conceptualise a broad set of relationships. In particular, I saw 
a benefit from my close knowledge of the topic under investigation. It helped 
me to apply theoretical sensitivity, awareness of theoretical understanding 
can influence empirical findings, to generate concepts from data.  
 
In previous roles, I have worked within a small firm to write responses to 
public sector tenders. I have also worked in a consultancy capacity to 
advise and mentor business leaders in small and large organisations to 
build processes and knowledge that increase their public sector tendering 
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competitiveness. This experience has been a useful reflection ground to 
support case comparison and to understand the nature of situated practice. 
However, my mode of investigation was not as an active participant that of 
an observer. Boyatzis (1998) identified three threats to the researcher of: i) 
projection; ii) sampling; and, iii) mood and style. Starting with projection, I 
understood that my subjective familiarity with tendering may increase the 
risk of layering my own judgements upon data. My strategy for ensuring 
against this was two-fold; firstly, to biographically account my situated 
tendering experiences, context and emotions to expose any bias, and; 
secondly to stay close to the data by citing participants throughout my 
findings chapters. With regard to sampling, I was keen to avoid 
contamination of data. I used a semi-structured interview plan to guide and 
collect information. Both primary and secondary case firms sought my 
advice and feedback on their tendering practices after interviews, and on 
occasion during them. I declined their invitation and offered a feedback 
session towards the end of my thesis. Thirdly, mood and style is important 
to information collection and analysis. Boyatzis (1998) refers to the ‘arousal 
effect’ of data on a researcher. My data analysis was delayed using a 
suspension period whilst I had significant challenges in my family life. I re-
engaged with coding and interpretation with a clear focus and exercised 
self-control in my frustration at having multiple attempts to develop a 
reliable coding template.  
 
5.6 Chapter summary 
 
Starting with limitations, my study cannot say which resources are typically 
needed or give a full account of possible capabilities. For example, 
resource efficacy or bootstrapping are not researched. I focus on private 
sector firms and my primary firm is medium-sized. Ideally I would like to 
understand their capabilities when they were smaller or newer, and the 
process of emergence. My study cannot address all research gaps. So, my 
primary contribution is to theorise capability using a novel theoretical 
framework, and this is a great foundation for future research.  
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Nevertheless, this chapter has addressed the utility of my comparative case 
study method to conduct my research and collect data. Use of a qualitative 
research strategy has enabled a micro-foundational approach. A critical 
realist research design is suitable to explore the interaction of structures, 
events, human agency and contexts, within which to identify and locate 
generative mechanisms (Wynn and Williams, 2012). In order to understand 
more fully events and mechanisms it has been necessary to conduct 
sophisticated in-depth research, collect multiple experiences, and use the 
logic of retroduction to theoretically analyse the causal processes at work 
in events and, behind them, in institutionalised mechanisms. This chapter 
has included an account of two data collection stages and three phases of 
data analysis. My data are presented in the following two chapters. Chapter 
six describes findings in the primary case, Fit for Life. Chapter seven 
compares the findings of the primary case to a secondary case, expert 
informant opinion and to a re-analysis of three small firms in the pilot data 
sets. 
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Chapter Six: Tendering routines in Fit for Life  
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents a micro-analysis of fifteen interlocking and 
competitive routines observed in case company Fit for Life, set within a 
structural analysis of context.  Routines are the practices in which firm 
capability is institutionalised for competitive advantage. They are enabled 
or constrained by the effects of structure and agency. This firm is 
exceptionally successful at tendering, and as such, its practices are worthy 
of scrutiny. Its routines are categorised into six types; i) information seeking; 
ii) strategic; iii) interpretive; iv) cultural; v) data mining; and, vi) 
transformational (otherwise known as dynamic capabilities). The typology 
of routines and capabilities described in this chapter is not the firm’s way of 
understanding or expressing their behaviour. It is the researcher’s 
interpretation through case analysis. Routines in themselves do not 
constitute capability; they serve capability by building it through 
combination efforts into successful performance outcomes. 
 
Competitive responses to tender completion are organised into three 
specific operational capabilities that situate the business in the public 
marketplace (with analytical ideas of what needs to be achieved as a 
capability and the operational practices that produce these). They are i) 
market analysis; ii) market positioning; and, iii) relationship building. Three 
further operational capabilities support tender productivity: iv) reading a 
tender specification; v) creative resource mobilisation; and, vi) the technical 
components of tender completion. The constant re-development of 
capabilities to be more effective to respond to changing market conditions 
relies upon two forms of dynamic capability (that are also routines) that 
operate across the task accomplishment routines to enable transformation 
to occur. These are vii) entrepreneurial orientation; and, viii) environmental 
learning.  
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Findings address the second and third analytical research questions for the 
thesis. The second question concerns the nature of the case firm’s 
competitive response: ‘What are the practices, expressed as routines, that 
generate capability to successfully tender in the case firm?’ The third 
question, concerned with absorptive capacity, asks; “To what extent, and 
how, do firms learn to improve capability through repeated tendering 
experiences?” In critical realist terms, the approach separates out each 
routine for analytical purposes, whilst acknowledging that in practice they 
are inter-linked. 
 
This chapter has six sections. Following the introduction, section two 
introduces the case firm, Fit for Life. Section three analyses, routine by 
routine, the six categories of operational routines discovered. Observation 
and retroductive analysis of the routines looks at task accomplishment and 
agency participation within it. Section four creates a link between routines 
and capability. It proposes clusters of routines that combine and inter-
dependently overlap to create specific forms of capability that firm leaders 
use to situate the business competitively in the flow of public sector 
tendering. Section five summarises the structural conditions that pre-exist 
agency, and the exercise of agency. The chapter ends in section six by 
summarising a case capability framework for successful tendering 
capability. Chapter Seven then compares the findings to additional cases 
and to tendering expert informant opinion to elucidate the contextual 
differences in the role generative mechanisms play in routine performance.  
 
6.2 Primary case description: Fit for Life 
 
6.2.1 Fit for Life company background and services  
 
Fit for Life (FFL) is an outdoor leisure training business, and is well known 
in its specific sector. It is a large provider of outdoor leisure training services 
within its niche market in the UK. The firm possesses about 11-13% of the 
overall UK market size of £11m in its area. Its clients are in public, private 
and voluntary sectors, and the firm holds contracts with nine local 
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authorities to deliver services in the UK and Ireland.  FFL is an active market 
shaper of UK outdoor leisure development and at the forefront of sector 
developments both locally and nationally, evidenced through its social and 
political networking activities.  
FFL’s headquarters are in a northern city, with satellite offices in the North 
East and in the North West. FFL is run as a company limited by guarantee. 
It was owner-managed when established in 2000. At the time of fieldwork 
it employed 62 staff and had an annual turnover of £3.1 million. It is a 
successful firm that has displayed significant growth in turnover and a rapid 
increase in staff over the last five years. In 2013, the owner participated in 
a university high growth business strategy programme. A clear growth 
strategy was apparent through respondent interviews, and increasing 
public sector contract service delivery is core to their growth plan. 
Approximately 60% of current income is generated from publicly funded 
contracts, although profit margins are significantly lower for public than 
private business. The management team has made a conscious decision 
to maintain a private and public sector contract balance. FFL has a five year 
business growth strategy, and approximately 50% of growth is expected to 
come from public contracts. Private sector work is more profitable but public 
contracts are generally larger in size and are the ‘bread and butter’ to 
maintain financial stability. So, a structural condition of public procurement 
is that it may limit contract profitability to below that of private sector work, 
whilst simultaneously creating access for small firms to public market 
revenue.  
6.2.2 Fit for Life vision and values  
 
FFL has clear goals to get people fit and to provide leisure training services 
that are profitable and effective. The goals are displayed on the business 
premises and enacted by management and operational staff. Several 
research visits to the Head Office gave an impression that the business 
mission, vision and values are shared and championed by the executive 
management team, and firm behaviour and routines can be described as 
consistent and consensual. The company’s mission statement captures its 
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social purpose to inspire everyday active travel and healthy lifestyles. It 
identifies five distinct customer groups: i) communities; ii) individuals; iii) 
instructors; iv) organisations, particularly those that require active leisure 
and fleet management services; and, v) drivers of leisure activities. The 
well-articulated vision and values are themselves a part of the firm’s 
tendering success. This semi-formalisation is part of what distinguishes 
FFL from other medium-sized firms. 
6.2.3 Fit for Life leadership and management  
 
FFL is a successfully led firm that has grown organically and fast through 
strategic leadership by the founder. The MD has an ability to influence 
others in the firm to act in a way that enhances the prospects for the firm’s 
long-term success while maintaining long-term financial stability. She is an 
entrepreneur, having started up the business with a core knowledge of the 
sector and an ambition to grow a nascent market. The HR Director is a co-
owner of the business and has worked in it since 2008. A Marketing 
Manager was recruited in 2009 and, in 2012, a new senior role of 
Operations Manager was created to expand internal capacity and expertise 
for service planning and delivery. By this time, the MD had introduced a 
more formalised approach to senior team recruitment. For the first time, an 
external recruitment expert was hired to support a full day recruitment and 
selection process, showing a more planned and distributed approach to 
business leadership. The decision to introduce structured candidate 
assessment activities later becomes significant to understand how the firm 
uses internal human capital to strengthen firm tendering capability. The 
executive team meets weekly with the MD. Observation of communication 
indicates that the executive team body language and conversation is that 
of personal commitment to company values, to delivering the business plan 
and to supporting each other.  
The executive management team has a diverse set of experience. The MD 
displays leadership of communicating sectoral market funding sources and 
innovation. She was involved in writing the Sports National Standards and 
some of the pilot schemes were delivered by FFL.  The HR Director had 
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previously worked for a local authority and has first-hand experience of 
constructing and scoring tenders. She has built symbolic capital for the firm 
by leading the firm to earn the Investors on People quality kitemark. Policy 
development to public sector standard has been driven by the HR Director. 
The Marketing Manager was recruited from a commercial sales 
background and he has learnt about public sector tendering from the MD 
and the HR Director. His experience has been put to work through 
mobilising resources to conduct a competitor analysis, upgrading firm 
branding and reputational capital and focusing on private and public sales 
activities. It is his role in the firm to project manage tender completion. In 
doing so, he has re-organised resources to a compliant, competitive 
standard. The firm’s appointment of an Operational Manager into a new 
post in 2012 was to embed a growth strategy for operational scaling 
geographically and by contract award size. Small firms tend to be 
operationally-led, but FFL has two senior managers involved in business 
development and one on operations. The company has unusually high 
levels of human and social capital to know and to interpret market 
demands. This is perhaps because Fit for Life is a firm with strong growth 
intent, showing signs of formalisation and specialist leadership. It has a 
clear mission and appreciates that public sector tendering is crucial to 
achieving that. Capability is built on resources, then, and on the expectation 
of reaping further significant reward based on those resources; growth is 
also dependent upon tendering. 
6.2.4 Fit for Life successful engagement with public sector tendering  
 
Fit for Life is an active participant in the active leisure services tendering 
sector.  Prior involvement with tendering, and as the current incumbent 
service contract holder in some locations, means that it is already known 
what firm resources are generally required to submit a tender. In this sense, 
experience acts as a form of emergence. FFL has a successful track record 
of contract award through tendering since 2006, with fifteen tenders 
awarded to them at a value of £3.5m. Interview respondents discuss 
examples of tenders won and lost. Proportionately, the HR Director states 
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that the firm has won about 75% of all tenders submitted. Whilst the market 
is well understood, firm tender submission results using identical resources 
can still produce unexpected results. Through discussion, it is the context 
of tendering that remains idiosyncratic. On occasion, the submission 
context has been as the incumbent supplier to a public body, yet more 
frequently tenders are submitted to unknown procurers in unfamiliar spatial 
positions. Temporal contexts also apply, as more or less public money 
becomes available to deliver a service, whereby service pricing becomes 
more sensitive and factored in scoring criteria. Competition is seen a 
dynamic force that causes market disruption, and in this case firm an 
example is given of pricing pitched below market norms. However, as case 
data will show, FFL is often the market influencer through inimitable 
structural properties that reside within the firm. 
6.3 Tendering routines  
 
Case findings identify six types of firm routine that drive competitive 
behaviour. The routine types are broadly categorised as i) information 
seeking; ii) strategic; iii) interpretive; iv) cultural; v) resource accrual; and, 
vi) transformational.  
6.3.1 Information seeking routines  
 
Information seeking routines refer to activities that draw knowledge into the 
firm to develop and maintain a current perspective on market opportunities 
and the competition base. The routines are i) market information gathering; 
and, ii) competitor surveillance.  
(R1) Market information gathering (MIG)  
 
Market information gathering describes the act of gathering information on 
evolving market contours and interpreting implications for firm tendering 
practices and opportunities. As FFL is already a supplier of publicly 
delivered services, its leaders analyse the market for consideration of both 
contract retention and contract acquisition purposes in targeted 
geographical areas. The business leaders all communicate a concern with 
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significant strategic developments within the sector at government level. 
They discuss examples of changes to national policy-making, budget 
setting and budget ownership by public entities, all structural conditions of 
the public marketplace in their sector. Procurer idiosyncratic behaviour is a 
separate but related point that is recognised by respondents.  Market 
analysis demands a constant flow of high quality information into the 
business. This is used to predict spend of public monies and the changing 
nature of public sector customers. Information is searched out through 
informal and formal micro-routines. A core mechanism to unlock 
information is the firm’s pro-active approach outside of the business. The 
MD’s activities within sector professional networks draw firm attention to 
upcoming opportunities through early contact with formal information and 
by ‘word of mouth’. The MD and the Marketing Manager actively engage in 
parliamentary steering groups, sector standards development and other 
thought leadership activities, such as lobbying and writing articles for ‘trade’ 
publication. The firm strategy is to influence resource deployment of monies 
towards services they deliver at a higher level than individual contacting 
units, such as with local authorities. To achieve this requires expert stocks 
of knowledge, influence and extensive social capital.  
 
Knowledge acquisition about new tenders before they are advertised is a 
powerful yet informal method Fit for Life uses. Informally, tacit knowledge 
is continuously accrued on the idiosyncracies of purchasing behaviour, 
such as tender scoring where the percentage of marks awarded for quality 
compared to pricing could fluctuate between procurers for identical 
services. Business leaders know this varies, and they use market 
information gathering to learn about price sensitivity. By doing so, and by 
linking to a competitor surveillance routine, firm leaders are better 
positioned to predict when price sensitivity becomes more important in 
particular situations. Firm leaders know the frequency of service purchasing 
cycles in targeted public sector clients. They are clear where tenders were 
advertised and are familiar with a service specification embodied within 
lengthy tender documents. The MD, for example, refers to using knowledge 
of a governmental pledge to reduce obesity through active leisure 
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promotion as market building. The Marketing Manager mentions an internal 
political move in the government to site market responsibility for active 
fitness services in another department. Both of these examples show active 
reflection on market development and future implications for the firm and 
are structural conditions that shape firm understanding of opportunities. 
Firm leaders work as a team to make sense of information acquired from 
formal and informal sources. Informally, the researcher witnessed an 
executive team meeting where members share anecdotal marketplace 
intelligence, including discussion of examples of idiosyncratic behaviour 
that helps them to predict likely changes to tender specifications. In this 
meeting, a respondent had raised a concern that some councils were taking 
active leisure services back in house. A swift firm response to the market 
trend was to develop a new service to accommodate market change:  
“Because we train the trainers we’re still getting work off 
those local authorities because somebody’s got to train the 
trainers and they’re not training providers for actually training 
the trainers.  So on income wise it’s advantageous for us to 
train the trainers rather than deliver the training [MD]. 
 
MIG clearly leveraged valuable social capital that can also shape the 
market. Social capital drew knowledge from sector-based networks to 
informally learn about market contracting. The MD and the Marketing 
Manager are referred to by the Operations Manager advising on tender 
opportunities ‘outside the business looking in’ and having the ‘external bit 
covered’. The MD states:  
“I know what’s going on in the whole of the country of 
significance to us and then I have to think about where I 
want to place the business and what we want to do” [MD]. 
 
This suggests that capability enactment recognises the operating 
environment of the firm as being outside the business as well as within it. 
Informally, the firm has built up significant reputational capital and effective 
professional and social network exploitation skills. FFL is a ‘go to’ active 
fitness services supplier, demonstrated through current service reputation. 
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In this sense, resources are built by the firm that advertise firm capability in 
the marketplace, and subsequently draw in opportunities to respond to 
tenders. Resources are existing contracts and positive marketplace 
relationships with different stakeholder groups. FFL’s MD knows about 
forthcoming tenders ahead of release, and gave one example of being 
asked to offer expert input into tender construction by a local authority. The 
quote below summarises the level of investment and engagement put into 
finding out about tenders: 
We’re obviously on a lot of tender portals so we get an alert 
or we hear about it…“Sometimes we might not see an alert 
..and someone might actually contact us and say, “I’ve seen 
this.  Thought about you.  Do you fancy having a go?” and 
then the third way is similar to that; someone might come to 
us and say, “We’ve expressed an interest in this but we need 
a partner to help us either as a sub-contractor or as lead 
partner. Do you want to have a go?”  [MD] 
 
The firm has registered interest on tender portal sites for electronic 
notification of tender alerts. A set of keywords entered into a portal allows 
staff to automatically receive emails when a relevant new opportunity is 
advertised. In this firm, the business development manager has set up the 
keywords, but an increased resource put in place now includes the 
Managing Director as a second recipient of tender alerts.  As a structural 
property of the firm, the routine of receiving tender alerts operates to 
facilitate internal discussions about opportunities, alongside safeguarding 
against individual failure to notice new tender advertisements. The routine 
was amended after relevant tender opportunities were overlooked, so 
missed opportunities triggered resource investment into this routine.  A 
second adaptation to the MIG routine is a response to marketplace 
idiosyncracy. The firm has begun to conduct a regular review of key search 
terms included in electronic portal searches, introduced after a relevant 
tender contract titles had adopted different terminology and was not 
identified through existing search criteria.  In practice, this means entering 
words and phrases that the firm believe will identify and flag relevant 
tenders that are being advertised. It took the firm a while to get this right; 
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too specific and narrow search terms may overlook some opportunities, 
whereas too wide a search was returning irrelevant contract opportunities.  
 
The MIG routine does not operate in isolation. It is dependent upon its 
cultural routines of tender leadership and team-working to exercise 
collective agency. Entrepreneurial orientation unlocks pro-active market 
search activities to gain priveliged knowledge, and environmental learning 
underlies why FFL believe a MIG routine is necessary to pursue, and 
worthy of scarce resource.  
 
(R2) Competitor surveillance  
 
A competitor surveillance routine discovers how competitors perform in 
contract acquisition and delivery to analyse how to out-compete them. It 
enables FFL to recognise the dynamic competitive environment within 
which it operates and its influence upon contract acquisition and retention. 
It orients resources from within and outside of the firm to build insight into 
competitor actions, so that it can detect threat and build market distinction. 
Respondents feel that the transparent nature of tender advertising and 
access means that the big consultancies want to win smaller (£50,000) 
contracts. This is a structural condition of a shrinking market, under public 
sector austerity measures. Firm interviewees explain how they have 
reacted to the threat by limiting opportunities for competitor imitability. They 
describe themselves as ‘always ahead’ and at the front of the market, 
“Almost what you see on the website is out of date because 
we’re much further ahead at that particular point, but I keep a 
very close eye” [MD] 
 
The Marketing Manager has recently completed a written competitor 
analysis, making competitor analysis a specialist form of information 
gathering. Resources to support the exercise are sourced externally in the 
form of a team of university students at no cost to the firm. The outcome of 
the analysis exercise was that market procurers appear to be awarding 
contracts to bigger firms who exercise unexpected competition: 
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“The bigger players are getting bigger.  So, we are getting 
bigger…It’s really interesting who’s coming in [to the market] 
now” [Marketing Manager] 
Competitor surveillance informs the executive team how to shape a forward 
plan to target key accounts. Supplier questions and answers during a live 
tender are displayed on a portal.  Firm respondents explain one tactic is to 
delay asking questions until the last minute to limit competitor imitation. The 
competitive micro-routine of delaying asking questions has been developed 
as a defense mechanism to limit competitor access to understanding, and 
therefore protect FFL. Competitor performance surveillance in FFL is also 
continually informed through everyday practice. The HR Director recounts 
an experience of colleagues attending a tender panel interview that 
generated a causal effect. A large competitor had fielded ‘three men in 
suits’ at an interview panel. The FFL representative reported this back and 
adapted firm practice, sending four members of the executive team to the 
next panel interview. Competitor behaviour triggers agency response inside 
the firm. Finally, competitor surveillance is a strategic asset to contribute 
into decision-making, where knowledge of competitor practices are 
uncovered through social networks and judgements are made about how 
to out-compete the incumbent: 
“…we knew the present incumbents and we weren’t 
impressed.  We knew it wasn’t great what they were doing.  
So we could easily do the job and do it, well, better” [MD] 
 
Competitor surveillance is a routine created through the presence of 
entrepreneurial orientation (to proactively track competition) and through 
environmental learning, to commit to active market learning. It also acts as 
a dependency for setting criteria for opportunity selection.  
6.3.2 Strategic routines  
 
Three routines are strategic in their orientation and application. They are iii) 
setting criteria for opportunity selection and review; iv) alliancing; and, v) 
safeguarding market pricing.  
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(R3): Setting criteria for opportunity selection 
 
This routine describes firm creation of a formal set of criteria that is codified 
into a written artefact to guide strategic opportunity selection and review. It 
includes tacit rules and flexible application to feed into flexible strategic 
development. FFL has written a tendering strategy to align opportunity 
selection with its written business growth plan. It has done so to assess 
objectively the opportunity value in a strategic performance context. In 
practice this means maintaining existing contracts, growing contracts in 
existing contract areas and looking at productivity and profitability of an 
individual contract and as an overall as a percentage of its public sector 
work.  
 
The MD has completed tenders for eight years without a formalised artefact 
to affect selection and review practices. Her decision to codify what criteria 
should be used to assess tenders is a recent innovation, emergent from a 
clearer strategy on its marketplace positioning. The tendering strategy 
enables multiple executive team members to analyse firm chances for 
contract award and to reject others. FFL respondents agree that they reject 
a lot of tenders on the basis that effort would not produce a commensurate 
return. This point acknowledges the disproportionality of effort in tenders of 
small value, and indicates firm strategy to access better return on 
investment from larger contract opportunities.  The written strategy is a 
codified example of deployed human capital. It defines criteria for minimum 
contract value size, geographical location and existing incumbent provider 
service performance. Finance is described as a joint first consideration with 
how it fits within the business and growth strategy. Interestingly, the 
strategy is a yardstick, but it is not applied with rigidity inside the firm if 
opportunity triage highlights otherwise. Firm intention is driven by a 
strategic focus of entrepreneurial effort to shape or exploit a market in 
specific places, where the firm has a large contract that covers key 
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infrastructure costs. So, the opportunity selection strategy is spatial and 
about creating a concentration of supply that is more cost effective, building 
on an anchor contract.  
 
One respondent commented that whilst a specific type of contract may be 
lower on profitability, once the firm is in an area they can do other 
interventions which are more profitable.  The management team concurs 
that if a contract is over a stated threshold value, it would give them enough 
money to set up an office and become viable. Firm forensic awareness of 
costs and profits contribute towards a capability to know how to evaluate 
contract pricing. It is a form of human capital and a capability (set of 
routines) in itself that supports tendering. Strategic selection of tenders to 
respond to is a mature and adapting routine that is largely absent in the 
literature. However, some reasons given for tendering are interesting and 
distinctive from just winning business: 
“If it’s on our patch and it’s a small tender and we don’t think 
we can make money on it we might still do it because we 
don’t want anyone else encroaching, we don’t want anyone 
playing in our playground basically. “ [Operations Manager]. 
 
Again, mention of having a ‘patch’ is a reminder that opportunity selection 
is spatial. Protecting territory or market blocking has become a more recent 
informal strategy that has suspended the usual tender consideration 
process. The quote demonstrates firm leaders as corporate agency 
adapting its own rules to serve a sophisticated understanding of its own 
interests.  In one interview, a respondent refers to a current tender they are 
considering. Whilst a strategic review revealed that they would probably 
lose money on it, FFL held other framework agreements with the same 
organisation which were profitable, so a bigger picture view suspended rigid 
selection criteria to support relationship building. As a tacit rule, this 
suggests the firm leadership team take a long-term view of both contracts 
and relationships, relying upon short-term resource investment for long-
term gain. The firm’s interplay between its tendering strategy and client 
relationship management is explicit: 
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“We might take on a piece of business and say actually it’s 
three years and the first year we know we’re going to lose 
money, the second year we might make it even and then the 
third year we’re going to make a profit out of it.  So we kind 
of look at it that way.” [MD] 
 
Whilst repeating a tender for a previously contracted service was described 
as familiar territory, respondents noted the magnitude of losing current 
business and the importance of getting it financially and strategically 
positioned to block competitor imitability. Managerial understanding of the 
public sector environment exercises agency over the interpretation of 
market-level behaviour and to evaluate competitive threat. The point is that 
there are both formal and tacit rules for enacting an opportunity selection 
routine, and these are strategically integrated but also applied with flexibility 
and in a way that enables strategic development. This routine only exists 
at all because of entrepreneurial orientation to serve rent seeking, and its 
exercise is critical for further interpretive routines, alliancing and 
safeguarding market pricing.  
 
(R4) Alliancing  
 
Alliancing in FFL is operationalised by selecting a larger firm that will act as 
the bidding vehicle in exchange for including Fit for Life services, but not as 
a weak partner. A strategic alliance with a business partner secured a piece 
of work for FFL that would otherwise have been out of reach because of its 
high financial value and broader set of requirements. Respondents draw 
attention to occasions where they believe tenders are constructed to only 
be won by larger organisations. An example given is where a transport 
company known to the MD was submitting a tender. An exchange of 
knowledge resulted in FFL supplying specialist knowledge into the tender 
response and in return being named as a supplier for a sub-section of 
services procured. Interestingly, alliancing is seized as a learning 
opportunity as well as a business creation exercise and is a specific form 
of knowledge acquisition:  
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“We have done a few collaborations. …I feel like we are 
breaking new ground.” [MD] 
 
FFL used this relationship to build social and human capital. Alliancing 
combines with the first routine, market information gathering. The large 
company had developed highly professional methods to construct visual 
and easy to read tender documents. These practices are imitated by FFL 
and this is now embedded practice. In the alliancing routine, FFL’s 
resources successfully leverage stakeholder and professional network 
based assets to increase the value of their own knowledge and market 
position. Firm level agency draws on its capabilities, and manages to 
change the opportunity window in their immediate environment to their 
advantage. 
 
(R5) Safeguarding market pricing  
Safeguarding market pricing uses reputational capital and specialist 
knowledge to influence unit  pricing in tenders. This is a competitive routine 
that utilises firm service reputation for safety and ethical market leadership 
as a strategy for upholding prices. Firm leaders engage confidently in 
knowing what to charge for their services and knowing the ‘going rate’ for 
units of service delivery. Applying ethics to decision making on tender 
values is a visible practice in the case firm. The executive team are very 
clear on its price points and why they exist: 
 “We never go below [unit price] it makes no sense to 
anybody and we want to be able to deliver a good quality 
service” [MD].  
Pricing services for tenders places quality ahead of winning, and it is a 
viewpoint that became strengthened through observation of competitor 
behaviour that had become destructive to service performance in 
communities. Opportunities are quickly rejected if a contract funding 
envelope could impact safety and quality. The desire to ‘do it properly’ is a 
distinctive quality within the business. One respondent comments that 
company ethics expressed in terms of the MD’s stance to pricing and 
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quality is one of the reasons she came to Fit for Life, suggesting that this 
approach helps to build a professional management team: 
“She wants the company to be a successful company but 
based on the fact that it does what it does really well and I 
love that because that’s what I’m about as well. This 
undercutting, undercutting all the time is not appropriate in 
the business we’re in” [Marketing Manager]. 
In this sense, a commitment to ethical behaviour has become a structural 
property of the firm that supported demonstration of capability, sometimes 
ahead of competitors. Ethical practice has superiority over pressurised 
market pricing and is a key part of the firm’s reputational capital. An 
interesting comment links market shaping to the firm’s ethical stance. They 
stated (unasked) in a recent tender that they did not and are not prepared 
to use ‘zero- hours contracts’, as this did not reflect the intended shape and 
spirit of the market.  In another situation, a respondent explains how the 
firm made their position very clear to a council on a retendering exercise, 
stating that they will only submit a tender if the unit price enables a safe 
and quality service to be delivered: 
“The tender came out and it was weighted 70% price, 20% 
quality and 10% sustainability, which straightaway. We made 
representation about to the Council ..how many parents 
would be pleased to know that their children are being taken 
into situations based on a provider which has been weighted 
at 20% quality?  [Operations Manager] 
As a routine, safeguarding market pricing depends upon environmental 
learning to recognise ‘bad business’. Its exercise requires sufficient market 
positioning and having existing contracts to draw upon and use (R 13). 
Challenging a tender specification is reliant upon sufficient stocks of 
regulatory compliance practices and artefacts (R8), knowledge of 
competitor behaviour (R 2) and market information gathering (R1). 
6.3.3 Interpretive routines  
 
There are four interpretive routines at work inside FFL. They are i) individual 
tender opportunity triage; ii) tender specification and question scrutiny; iii) 
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regulatory compliance practices and artefacts; and, iv) tender specification 
question answering and document presentation.  
 
 (R6) Individual tender opportunity triage  
 
Tender triage is a routine to conduct a detailed reading of a tender 
specification. FFL use a self-created document to develop a response plan, 
and also to decide which tenders to pursue after thorough consideration. It 
is a dimension of capability that is largely absent in the literature but 
emerges through this case. Again, the level of formality to discuss an 
individual tender in detail has increased significantly through repeated use: 
“[with] the main part of the tender we sit down and we have a 
meeting, discussed which of us within the exec team is best 
suited to answer the individual questions. So there are four 
sections within [this] tender and the stuff about delivery and 
operation and stuff on the training, methodology, method 
statements, risk assessments, Health & Safety and all of 
that” [Marketing Manager] 
Prior to discussion at an executive team meeting, a tender is read by the 
Marketing Manager who prepares a summary of how the tender meets the 
firm’s strategic criteria for new (or to renew) public sector business. By this 
point the MD has usually already been alerted to the opportunity and made 
a verbal recommendation. A general observation is made about needing to 
orient firm resources at this stage towards interpreting procurer intentions 
collectively as the executive team. It is described as a frustrating process: 
“Most of the time tenders are badly written and the people 
who have produced it do not really know exactly what it is 
that they want or need.” [HR Director] 
 
Several technical aspects of a tender specification are described as 
important to pay attention to as a collective team exercise. These are the 
scoring framework, how innovation is demanded, and what level of 
research is required. Financial considerations are of the greatest concern 
and tender scoring against price, quality, technical aspects of service 
delivery and other areas are carefully critiqued. Tender scoring 
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percentages between similar contracts are claimed to be highly variable, 
with examples of recent scoring being attributed to 70% quality, 30% price, 
whereas a lot of the time they were usually split 50/50, 60/40. If price is the 
main driver for the local authority, FFL questions whether to respond or not 
because they pride themselves on quality of delivery: 
 
“That’s why we win awards.  That’s why we’ve got quality 
marks and stuff like that” [Marketing Manager] 
 
Secondly, the firm’s triage process of reading a tender focuses on any 
sections where bidders were asked to demonstrate service innovation. 
Respondents state how historically procurers have built in service features 
that FFL, as the incumbent, have developed, and incorporated them as 
mandatory practices in future tenders. This is an imposed structural 
condition that can limit firm innovation to a tender lifespan, after which any 
bidding organisation will hear about the innovation and incorporate them 
into their own tender responses. Thus, the external environment constantly 
demands innovation: 
“A number of the services which were on this tender didn’t 
exist prior to us.  We invented them and then they took them 
on and then the recent contract now includes those elements 
but we created those interventions.  So, the tender was  very 
much influenced by the work we’ve done over the last three 
years.” [Operations Manager] 
 
Thirdly, at triage stage, respondents closely examine contract 
documentation to uncover if TUPE conditions apply. TUPE refers to the 
transfer of protected employees, whereby individuals already working for 
another provider on an existing contract would legally have to be 
transferred to FFL if they won the contract. If TUPE applied, legal advice 
would be taken after employee employment profiles were sought through 
the procurer. A point here is pro-activity again; seeking information that is 
not provided with the tender documentation. The firm does this to 
understand better the risks TUPE may entail upon pricing, profitability and 
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service quality. For example, having to train up TUPE’d staff who are not 
already qualified to external standards: 
“We learned a lot about TUPE, as I say at a huge cost” 
[Operations Director] 
Historically, failure to understand what TUPE meant and to undertake due 
diligence incurred costs in FFL had eroded contract profitability. Fourthly, 
the firm uses tender opportunity triage to understand what research is 
required. Research includes establishing a current knowledge base of the 
end user requirements, the procurer service targets, procurer branding 
needs for services carried out on their behalf and how the service is 
currently being delivered by another firm to identify points of innovation they 
can bring to the contract. Research also includes close investigation of the 
operational challenges and costs involved in service delivery. The 
Operations Manager shared a particular example: 
“I look at what are the potential benefits and pitfalls and how 
easy will it be to manage.  As an example we were looking at 
a tender in Wales and so I did an analysis of the geography, 
the population density and the resultant effect that would 
have on moving equipment and structures around and costs 
and that sort of thing.  So I guess from an operations 
perspective that’s the kind of detail I look at: is it feasible, 
how difficult is it going to be, how difficult is it to manage it, 
do we need a remote management or can we manage it 
from head office, those sorts of things.” [Operations 
Manager] 
The quote emphasises the financial and analytical skills and practice that 
is an important supporting capability. In this firm, collective triage actions 
sit on top of individual areas of responsibility too, illustrating that a 
tendering decision is also about marketing positioning in the future. They 
take a medium term view and an ambidextrous approach to exploring 
profitable capability now and developing new capability for future trading: 
 I don’t only look at it with my Ops hat on, I look at it with my 
exec team member hat on and that obviously is: does it 
benefit the business, is it going to contribute to growth or 
stability or is it strategic.  So, it may be a breakeven but it 
could be that strategically it would be good to have a 
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presence in a particular area or a particular field, in which 
case then it’s worth going for” [Operations Manager]. 
FFL uses close analysis to spot where they can do things better 
operationally than they have done previously. Firm leaders know how to 
make processes effective and use this to competitive advantage, when 
possible. Tender triage is a routine that is dependent upon several other 
routines; setting criteria for opportunity selection (R 3) to unlock a process 
of micro-scrutiny; team-working (R11) for collective opportunity scrutiny; 
environmental learning (R14) to know what to look for, such as TUPE 
implications; and a commitment to entrepreneurial orientation (R15).  
 
(R7) Tender specification and question scrutiny  
Tender question scrutiny is a routine that follows a tender triage discussion, 
for individual sense-making of allocated questions prior to their completion. 
The routine takes place once a decision has been made that the firm will 
submit a tender response. It is about informing the operations of delivery, 
both in terms of resources needed to answer tender questions and to focus 
on sense-making and overall interpretation of contract delivery implications. 
A routine inside the firm is for the Marketing Manager to read each tender 
question in detail, prior to its completion. The routine purpose is to interpret 
the specific and detailed nature and format of responses required at 
question level. Case respondents describe it as an onerous process to 
analyse questions; each question could be a compound question with three 
or four questions built into it:  
“..effectively on first reading it’s one question but actually 
when you read it a couple of times you realise they’re asking 
for four things, compound questions” [Marketing Manager] 
 
FFL has developed a novel method of question examination, one at a time. 
This is as a response to prior experience of tendering where firm 
respondents did not repeat information in questions, assuming, 
erroneously, that if information had been presented once that would 
achieve the desired score. Scoring criteria and weighting are printed off and 
independently scrutinised for marking use. Highlighter pen is used to ‘code’ 
185 
 
the detailed level of response required. For colour coding, green 
highlighting meant it was an important part of the specification. The 
ambiguity observed in some of the tender questions has a causal effect on 
capability demonstration. The effect caused in the firm by ‘poor tender 
questions’ was additional time spent to craft answers: 
“I thought they were very broad questions, not very specific 
and I thought they had made a lot of work for themselves 
because I imagine ourselves and any other organisation 
bidding for it would have to give massive answers, which we 
did.  Some were pages of A4 long just to make sure we’d  
got what they were asking.  So that was a little bit frustrating” 
[MD] 
Case firm interviews told a longitudinal story of changing and intensifying 
resource demands. The same tender opportunity, from one round to the 
next, displayed increased complexity and resource demonstration from its 
questions: 
“There were some new questions; some questions which I 
felt were at a higher level than we’d previously been asked.  
So much more about management structure, company 
structure, how are you going to ensure lines of 
communication within the organisation.  Those sorts of more 
structural strategic questions were a little bit new and a little 
bit at a higher level to what usually gets asked in other 
tenders.” [Marketing Manager]  
 
FFL uses a tender triage process as a routine that follows opportunity 
triage. The firm has invested in formalisation to increase collective 
capability to interpret what answers each tender question is looking for. Its 
discovery is a key finding about how firm tendering capability is heavily 
reliant upon acts of semi-formalised interpretation.  
 
(R8) Regulatory compliance practices and artefacts 
 
The routine is about putting in place resources to meet and exceed 
threshold regulatory demands that FFL respondents believe contribute to 
score higher marks to tender questions. It refers to concessionary 
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behaviours that build adherence to the rules for tender submission. From 
market analysis activities, the firm accepts that tendering is the mandatory 
public sector way of doing business. As such, it is committed to 
demonstrating compliance to procurer methods and structures. Submitting 
a tender requires a potential supplier to share company financial, legal and 
regulatory information, often as part of an eligibility checking process to 
participate. The case firm has demonstrated its intention to gain market 
access to public sector contracts through tendering by intentionally creating 
an infrastructure that is compliant with procurement regulations expressed 
in tender documentation. FFL has invested in building up significant 
artefacts to accompany its description of its service capability; creating firm 
policies that were regularly demanded in tender documents, such as a 
diversity policy, a staff training and development plan and an environmental 
impact tracker; high levels of financial indemnity cover that meet or exceed 
amounts typically requested in tender documentation; on-hand legal advice 
to call upon; building an on-line presence aimed at public sector scrutiny; 
and, recruiting and maintaining staff with knowledge of these formal 
systems and how to build artefacts.  By doing so, it is sufficiently positioned 
to answer multiple technical questions shown below. The questions are 
sourced directly from a tender that FFL had completed (anonymous to 
maintain confidentiality): 
- “Do you have a formal Equality policy/statement or relevant 
documentation to evidence how your organisation deals with issues 
associated with diversity and discrimination?’’ 
- “Please explain how you communicate this policy to people you are 
recruiting, training and promoting….” 
- “How does your organisation monitor equality related issues in terms 
of service provision…?” 
- “How your organisation monitors Equality related issues internally?”  
- “Does your organisation have any systems, processes and practices 
in place that aim to reduce your environmental impacts, meet your 
legal requirements and achieve continual improvement of 
environmental impacts? If yes, please provide evidence of such 
(please see supplier help for further guidance.” 
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Respondent interviews reveal that public sector procurer’s socio-economic 
goals emerge as structural properties that exist within the market institution 
of tendering. Socio-economic goal alignment exercises power over firm-
level capability demonstration. In turn, it influences agential action, for 
example, to abandon decayed information or terms and to build 
replacement policies or descriptions of firm action. Such market forces 
possess properties that are opaque.  Creating and updating firm policies is 
enacted through a member of senior staff with expertise in both HR and the 
public sector. The firm is aware that tender scoring criteria demands 
documented quality processes to be in place. Policies for equality and 
diversity, staff training and development and environmental impacts are 
scrutinised externally and internally and constructed in procurer language 
to address public procurer expectations. Activity involved periodically 
updating policies and adapting them after episodic learning though tender 
submission feedback. Production of extended policy documentation and 
accreditation efforts communicate regulatory awareness and compliance. 
However, whilst standard policies exist, firm practice is clear; to present 
bespoke versions in accordance with procurer requirements:  
“So you can’t go, ‘Here’s all our policies and procedures’ 
because you can then only upload the one particular thing 
that they’re asking and then you’ve got to reference it.  So 
almost every single tender we have to redo all our 
attachments and things like that.” [HR Director] 
Resource investment fluctuates by differences in each procurement 
proposal because it demands an adaptive response rather than simple 
administration of a pre-established set of documents and routines. The 
firm’s commitment to noticing and responding to idiosyncracies reflects its  
capability to mount a detailed response, and as such it deploys knowledge 
resources to fulfil exact customer requirements. Artefacts used within the 
capability routine are developed from prior reflexive interaction with the 
structural properties of the tendering process. This has involved significant 
time investment by a highly skilled worker, the HR Director. By orienting 
firm resources into the demonstration of stakeholder priorities, the firm is 
able to score better results for the ‘non-functional’ aspects of a tender 
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specification. Non-functional aspects refer to threshold statements in 
tenders that are the initial qualifying entry requirements before scoring and 
shortlisting criteria are applied. Statements about firm practices for 
community engagement, employee diversity and green credentials are 
examples of non-functional aspects that serve a compliance purpose: 
“A lot of the policies that we’ve produced have sort of been 
tender driven, that is just being really honest. There was a lot 
of work on getting the policies up to date and in shape of a 
standard and format that would be scored well on the 
tenders. Previously we had complied with the law of course 
but it just didn’t seem to be enough for what the councils 
wanted.  All the stuff on equality and diversity has 
increased.“ [HR Director]  
 
Accreditation acquisition is also how FFL demonstrate its regulatory 
compliance. It invests in human and financial capital to actively pursue 
industry awards, accreditations and business memberships in the belief 
that it raises firm tender scores: 
“We do them [accreditations] to distinguish ourselves from 
our competitors and because that gives us a tick and a 
quality mark in the client tenders” [HR Director] 
Accreditation achievements are displayed on their website and include 
multiple sector awards for being an environmentally responsible business, 
for workforce equality and diversity, for workforce skills investment, 
sustainability and wellbeing. The firm executive team perceive there is 
procurer demand for resource display through external accreditations as a 
validation of competence. There is a connection between procurer 
behaviour, demonstrated through tenders, and firm take up of accreditation 
kite marks:  
 “We are intending to do ISO 9001 because that’s then a tick 
because on all the tenders it says, “Have you got a quality 
accreditation?  So the answer to that, you can’t answer ‘no’ 
because if you answer no then you’re out.  So you have to 
ignore it in a way and then write something about your own 
internal quality procedures.”[Operations Manager]  
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In this case, external accreditations are deemed to be believed more than 
a firm’s explanation. A question in a recently completed tender read, 
‘Please provide details of any relevant trade association or professional 
body that your organisation is a member of. Please include your 
membership number’. Respondents confirm most tenders asked this 
question which has encouraged them to invest in accreditations to achieve 
a higher score to this question. This links back to the market analysis 
capability. As a routine, regulatory compliance requires effective routines in 
place for market information gathering (R1) , competitor surveillance (R2) 
and it creates an opportunity to safeguard market pricing (R5).  It is heavily 
reliant upon environmental learning for regulatory accreditation review and 
refreshment.  
 
(R9) Tender specification question answering and document presentation  
 
Question answering is a routine to apply specialist knowledge to interpret 
and to write an answer that aligns with procurer requirements with visual 
appeal to tender readers. Interviewee comments allude to the structural 
properties within the public tendering system that cause the firm to present 
their capability in a pre-determined way, and this requires commitment and 
effort to understand. A statement in one of FFL’s tender specifications said 
‘Please do not include general marketing or promotional material for your 
organisation, either as answers for any of the questions or for any other 
reason.’ So, case respondents know they have to discard general service 
benefits and contextualise every answer to the specific context of a single 
tender. This demands a high level of professionalism and resource 
investment into personalised explanations of how they can service a 
particular contract at that point in time: 
“I started off modelling the tenders that I produced on the 
best of what I had seen before. I think we’ve potentially 
understated things in the past or emphasised things that are 
not necessarily required in a tender.” [HR Director] 
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Tender responses demand maturity and possibly formality in a firm. Multiple 
interviews revealed a perception that the market construction of tenders 
was itself seen as fallible by interviewees with regulatory 
transparency/efficacy regularly called into question. 
“One of the reasons that we didn’t get [a tendered contract] 
is precisely because it wasn’t structured properly in the first 
place…  They had done their sums wrong actually” [MD] 
Language used by FFL, for example, ‘determined to’ describes both self-
efficacy, sustainable effort and a commitment to deliver on their contract 
promise. A structural property of tendering is the power to demand from 
suppliers an explicit understanding of tender submission and 
methodologies using a form of tendering language and compliance 
requirements (e.g. word counts). This renders market communication a 
core supplier capability through how tenders are completed. Another 
practice highlighted by the Operations Manager is asking people who 
perform specific tasks on a daily basis to think about the best way of 
answering specific tender questions. Drawing in knowledge from the shop 
floor is important, and linked to the firms’ culture of learning. A key learning 
point was firm experience of question complexity and procurer fallibility. 
 
FFL’s Marketing Manager  describes a  process to segment tender for 
allocation and arranges for them to be accompanied by management 
checklists. A tick/double tick system checks for satisfactory completion. 
One tick means it is completed, two ticks indicated it was ready to import 
into tender response after second scrutiny. Overall, this achieves a high 
level of readability. FFL displays tacit knowledge of the tender as a 
procedural process. When answering each tender question the firm adopts 
a routine of restating the question in the first part of the answer. Whilst 
creating an impression of confidence and competence, firm respondents 
also point out that this method accommodates the way tender marking often 
scored questions in isolation from the overall set of responses. The 
application of this logic points towards expert knowledge of tender marking 
systems in use, with knowledge acquired through experiential learning and 
previous expertise of the HD Director as a Council employee.   
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Clear sectioning of completed documentation in a reviewed tender utilises 
the procurer’s numbering framework. Answers are evidence-based and 
follow a consistent pattern of ‘assertion-evidence-impact’. The completed 
tender reveals many ‘rules’ and complexities to question answering; word-
count limits per question, structuring answers to compound questions and 
a requirement to repeat information across questions. Clear examples are 
given from a completed tender review of handling of multiple questions in 
one question; for example, ‘What would you provide in terms of  …function, 
and how do you propose delivery?. How is it adapted for different abilities 
and ages…’  
The firm respondents described how they overcome structuring answers 
where the same information is repeatedly asked for: 
“… every single question had to answer what was laid out in 
that question regardless of whether we had already just said 
that in the previous question. When you read it, there’re 
huge amounts of repetition because you have to say things 
eight times if you’re asked for it eight times” [Operations 
Manager] 
 
Structuring answers is described as ‘the main thing’ as it is the structure 
that enables the firm to communicate their point effectively. In one tender 
completion example discussed, an external consultant was brought in to 
help the internal team to improve structure: 
“So we pretty much put all the information we needed to put 
in but what x showed us was about the effective 
communication of the information. So, making sure it’s 
clearly understandable to someone and about making sure 
there are no assumptions, that just because you’ve been 
delivering it for years that the contractor understands from 
our answers exactly what we’re communicating, not taking 
anything for granted.”[HR Director] 
 
The external consultant helped to embed new learning into the firm 
practices by demonstrating how a tender is objectively scored. It challenged 
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a firm perception that they could to some extent rely on their reputation as 
the incumbent contract holder.  
 
A structural condition of tendering is the rigid question and answer format 
of tenders, which does not provide the co-creative possibility of dialogue:  
“So it’s too rigid, it’s too formal and the thing that annoys me 
about the whole process is there’s never any opportunity to 
discuss, “What are your ideas putting this into place?”  So 
you just have to be very bold. …I think with small businesses 
you don’t realise the formalities of local authority tendering 
and a lot of the tender documents are written for multi-million 
pound buildings or schools and things like that and a lot of 
these contracts, it’s not relevant.  So sometimes we have to 
provide some information that’s just got nothing to do with 
what we’re doing but they have a set template and you can 
understand why they are for buildings, which are millions and 
millions of pounds.” [MD] 
 
An extensive review of a tender completed by FFL showed multiple 
examples of deliberate work, creativity and investment into learning how to 
tender. Whilst policy documents are submitted by all potential suppliers as 
appendixes, Fit for Life quoted sections of documentation in the main body 
of the submission to draw attention to ‘policy in action.’ Service user quotes 
had been incorporated within narrative responses.  A justifier model had 
been used to show how the firm planned to score extra marks. It centred 
on how the company will help the procurer to do their job and enhance their 
reputation, a dimension that was not explicit in the tender questions. Policy 
statement extracts were highlighted in the main body of response, as 
respondents felt that just attaching them as supporting documentation may 
not be read and therefore the quality of content could be overlooked. These 
included: promotion of procurer brand – make explicit what we will do free; 
knowledge /research – customer survey and propensity for service use; 
reputation – how the company can champion the contract as exemplar; 
quality improvement - benchmark with other areas; and, disclosure of other 
contracts to support reputation. 
 
193 
 
FFL used a creative process of using visual media to draw attention to firm 
capability. The case firm believed there was a demand for resource display 
through external accreditations, and that a connection between procurer 
scoring of tenders and visual affirmation of firm take-up of accreditation kite-
marks was applied. It routinely displayed its accreditation kite-marks on 
every page as a visual footer so that the policies had become a structural 
property of the firm. External accreditations were perceived to be believed 
by procurers more than a firm’s self-explanation. Policies carried creation 
and review dates. Overall, this presents a high level of readability. Answers 
are made visually easy to read and digest through use of bullet points and 
colour, flow charts explain operational processes and photographs 
illustrated service performance in action. The routine has emerged as a 
result of partnering a large firm in a tender and examining their practices, 
demonstrating imitation:  
“The glossy standard of what they produce is far beyond 
what we’ve always produced.  So we’ve really copied a lot of 
that, upped our game quite a bit and just learned little tricks 
like where some tenders, which is quite good really, have a 
maximum word count, so 300 words for this side, 1000 
words for that side, etc,. I suppose what we never really 
thought about or realised was you can add graphics and 
tables and diagrams and things and that’s outside the word 
count and that immediately anyway gives you a much better 
tender.  So you don’t have to absolutely follow the rules as 
they are stated, if you know what I mean. So part of what I 
also did for this tender, very consciously, was before I even 
sat down, did any writing, I did a series of tables and 
diagrams that we could use.” [Marketing Manager]  
This defies the idea that small firms cannot learn from large firms – they 
can, but they need to adapt ideas to their resources, as part of absorptive 
capacity. 
A review of the firm’s most recently completed tender shows that it is a 
visual document compared to previous one described.  Colour blocks draw 
attention to company strengths in each section response and the design 
background of a senior manager enables the firm to present the 
documentation more ‘professionally’ than in the past. The Marketing 
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Manager describes how s/he had created a series of tables and diagrams 
for use within a tender to illustrate what the firm did: 
“I think that’s important. Although that doesn’t get marked the 
more readable it is, the more easier it is to go through it the 
more obvious it is where the important content is.  I think 
that’s an important aspect of the process.” [Marketing 
Manager] 
6.3.4 Cultural routines  
 
Cultural routines in FFL ‘oil the wheels’ of other routines, upon which they 
have a dependency. They (R10 and R11) are hard to imitate as they 
operate inside a firm and remain invisible to competitors. 
R (10) Tender leadership and co-ordination  
Tender leadership and co-ordination refers to active senior manager 
leadership of tender responses, ensuring a full display of firm competence, 
innovation and competitiveness in its contextual environment. It is 
emphasised to highlight the investment made into professional leadership 
and management. It made the case firm effective at compliance, quality 
assurance and ideas generation, including servicing tender demands for 
innovation. The routine was enabled by team working in a performance-
oriented environment. There was a separation of leading the tendering 
process and writing the tender response. A case respondent sums up this 
distinction: 
“So yeah, we divide the work up between us and I coordinate 
it.  So I make sure that they do the bits they’re supposed to 
be doing and I make sure that they understand the questions 
that they’re being asked” [Marketing Manager]. 
The Operations Manager describes how his role is to contribute bid content, 
whilst others tend to advise on tender completion from an outside 
perspective of the business looking in. Tender leadership operates to 
accrue and mobilise resources that the firm does not already have, so 
improvisation. One recent opportunity triage identified a resource gap that 
required the financial value of indemnity cover to be increased from existing 
cover levels so immediate action was taken to raise the cover.  In another 
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example, respondents expressed anxiety at the thought of losing a current 
contract to another supplier. An improvised leadership response brought in 
additional resources that do not reside within the firm to decrease risk: 
“We arranged for an external person to help us with giving us 
feedback on the tender process when we produced the first 
draft. We gave her the spec, we said, “This is what we’ve got 
to produce.”  She went away, spent a day reading it all, then 
came back when we’d produced the first draft and sat with 
each person and went through just what their section looked 
like and from her point of view as somebody who had 
procured services herself as a public sector senior manager, 
talked through the value and how the scoring really was 
likely to work, which you’d think we’d know about but it was 
very interesting.” [HR Director].  
The process of responding to recent tenders has also caused the firm to 
think more efficiently about fitting its operating practices around dynamic 
contract requirements: 
“So we’re quite lean in what we do now, or more lean.  So 
we’ve [now] got people on different contracts.  We’ve got 
people on term time only contracts or annualised contracts 
which suits [some of the contracts]” [Operations Manager] 
The investment made in professional leadership and management 
described in this section is significant. This routine could partly explain 
performance variances between similar firms. It relies upon teamwork 
(R11) to be enacted and environmental learning (R14) as a routine to 
invest in accessing external knowledge.   
 (R11) Team working  
Team working is a cultural firm dimension where individual roles were 
supplanted by a higher order sense of motivation to take collective action. 
It flows from information and ideas, feeding into other routines. It is 
embedded in FFL, and this applies to conducting tendering activity. The 
word ‘teamwork’ is mentioned in interview transcripts fifty-four times, 
without a direct question being asked about team working. The distributed 
tender completion process is considered quite effective because it allows 
individuals to be able to answer from their areas of direct specialism and 
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makes good use of the team’s expert knowledge silos. The division of 
labour through teamwork between the leaders links to company culture and 
motivation:  
“It wasn’t all on one person, we each had responsibility, and 
we work well as a team.  So we took responsibility and were 
accountable for what we had to do; there was no worry that 
somebody was not going to do a good job or anything like 
that, we trust each other.  So it was effective” [Operations 
Manager] 
Motivation arises from teamwork. It links to perception of effort and 
resource orientation and to tender leadership capability: 
 “Actually no, we’ve still got to win it.  We have still got to put 
the effort in.  We can’t be complacent and assume that they’ll 
just give it back to us because they have to go through the 
due diligence; they’ve got to go through the whole process to 
prove that they’ve been fair “[Marketing Manager] 
Anxiety or emotion about potential of contract loss unlock further resource 
investment in this firm, creating defensive behaviour to guard against job 
losses. No other study has offered insights into team-working aspects of 
tendering, and yet FFL rely upon it to mobilise a quality tender response. 
 6.3.5 Data mining routines 
 
Two data mining routines refer to creative ways in which FFL exploits its 
existing knowledge to increase tender productivity and access to examples 
that can demonstrate competence. They are i) systematising tender 
information retrieval (R12); and, ii) exploitation of existing contract 
performance (R13). 
     
    R (12) Systematising tender information retrieval  
  
This routine is about good data management. It describes effective 
systematic processes used to store, retrieve and develop performance data 
to evidence in a tender including use of specialist contract management 
software. Through experience, FFL has developed systems for organising 
frequently requested information from tenders. Whilst completing a tender, 
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firm staff save their respective completed answers in a dedicated electronic 
folder to review each other’s sections. A micro-routine of uploading and 
sharing completed tender sections in a shared folder has evolved, again 
though experience. Team working extends to a shared sense of ownership 
of the firm’s tender response. It also stores completed tenders as a bank of 
resources, but does not rely on a cut and paste approach. The firm leaders 
know from experience how to organise and display contract performance 
data, using project planning tools and methodologies. Descriptive 
performance words such as ‘outcome’ and ‘output’ are tacitly understood 
and used to justify past and predicted performance. In a reviewed tender, 
the firm had included of evaluation report from another service to illustrate 
third party assessment of their own quality. Disclosure of other contracts to 
support reputation harnessed existing customer feedback as an intangible 
resource to put towards another opportunity. Much data are drawn from 
existing contract performance, illustrating interplay between servicing 
existing contracts and demonstrating performance levels a procurer can 
anticipate from future contracts.  
“We can output management reports and have a clear audit 
trail.” [Operations Manager] 
For example, a recent tender completed by FFL stated that the supplier 
must be able to provide a ‘comprehensive performance management 
package, specifically monthly data reporting on progress.  Also to include 
project monitoring, review and evaluation reports to Partners as and when 
required and as necessary for other projects (to be agreed with partners at 
start of each project). Specific reporting and format information will be 
confirmed with project managers.’ A response demanded specialist IT and 
project management knowledge. FFL has built up such a resource through 
investment into a senior Operations Manager function. Effective data 
display is also made possible through firm investment into contract 
performance software. The types of data they collect, such as staff retention 
or the number of trained learners supporting effective contract evaluation, 
can help to answer bespoke questions asked within tender specifications. 
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It allows firm-level progress reporting, and this has become an embedded 
routine in firm culture and processes.  
 
R (13) Exploitation of existing contract performance  
This routine harnesses a firm’s existing contract performance as both 
marketing collateral in new tenders and as a defence strategy. FFL uses its 
own experiences of existing contract service delivery alongside market 
analysis practices to attract and retain public sector clients. In a reviewed 
tender, the firm included an evaluation report from another service to 
illustrate third party assessment of their own quality. Disclosure of other 
contracts to support reputation harnessed existing customer feedback as 
an intangible resource to put towards another opportunity. As a structural 
condition, this routine can only be enacted because FFL has already won 
public sector contracts, supporting the literature in how success begets 
success. Incumbency positioning created firm confidence. Competitive 
performance practice that drew on existing contract performance as an 
intangible asset is evident in the firm’s approach to defending incumbency: 
“..We’re re-tendering, so we’re a known entity and we knew 
that we’d performed very well within the contract so we were 
confident that they weren’t eager to get rid of us because 
taking on another supplier would cause… it’s a nightmare 
something that size.  We were fairly well entrenched.” 
[Operations Manager] 
6.3.6 Transformational routines 
 
FFL has a clear set of practices to ‘get things done.’ However, interview 
transcripts tell a vivid story beyond routine enactment to a continual process 
of routine adjustment. FFL interview transcripts reveal two dynamic 
routines. Firstly, a capability for active learning through firm level interface 
with all levels of the tendering environment, and, secondly, an 
entrepreneurial orientation to adopt innovation and to take calculated risks. 
Dynamism is demanded for every tender because they are all different. A 
repertoire of approaches and capabilities has been built, and accelerated 
where the case firm has experienced challenges in understanding and 
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adapting to a dynamic set of rules and regulations in a complex social 
context. 
 R (14) Environmental Learning  
Environmental learning is defined as the firm’s ability to reposition itself in 
the market through active engagement in learning, cognitive reflection and 
transformation of firm routines and operational capabilities. Fit for Life 
continually demonstrated co-ordinated reconfiguration of its structural 
assets. An environmental learning capability drove action to change 
resource combinations into routines by formalising firm systems, building 
firm-level absorptive capacity, seeking and applying procurer feedback  and 
challenging procurer decision making. Firm learning takes place at a 
collective level of cognition. The executive management team clearly 
display a learning culture towards successful tendering. As one senior 
respondent member stated: 
 “I feel like we are breaking new ground all the time.” [HR 
Director] 
There is an explicit intention to learn through reflection on firm tendering 
practice through imitation, effective use of third party feedback and raised 
levels of absorptive capacity in executive team members to process and 
respond to new information: 
 “We’ve just learned so much about tendering. We have 
been good at is getting feedback, talking to people about it, 
learning about it, asking people about it, about their 
tendering, and within the market” [Marketing Manager]. 
Coping with heterogeneous tendering practices between local authorities is  
a structural condition that demands case firm capability to interpret local 
expectations, and that is itself a learning experience. Formalisation of 
routines occurs through firm level counterfactual thinking, that is, learning 
from the past by deconstructing it to facilitate future sense making, and 
therefore capability building through human agency. FFL respondents 
display team-based counterfactual thinking. Table 6.1 below shows 
examples of findings from individual study respondents. 
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Table 6.1 Examples of counterfactuals by study respondents  
Counterfactual 
expression  used in 
respondent interview  
Condition under which 
it was expressed  
Dynamic  effect of 
learning and reflection 
upon practice  
I never realised you could 
add graphics and visuals 
into a tender submission  
Observing a large firm 
completing a tender  
FFL invested resources 
into creative information 
display 
We realised we needed to 
change to accommodate 
how the market is moving  
Losing a tender  FFL increased its 
financial indemnity 
levels so that future 
tenders with higher 
levels required would be 
in their scope to apply 
for, and it  implemented 
a question scrutiny 
routine to avoid losing 
scored points that a lack 
of detailed scrutiny may 
cause  
If we hadn’t won, it would 
have been difficult 
emotionally. One third of 
our workforce would have 
been lost to TUPE 
Anxiety over losing 
incumbent position  
FFL took a strategic 
decision to block 
competition from taking 
over firm contracts by 
making their staff terms 
and conditions 
unfavourable for 
another firm to inherit  
We should have 
structured our timeframes 
better and started 
planning earlier  
Exhaustion after working 
‘all Christmas’ on a 
tender to get it completed  
Appointment of 
Operations Manager to 
formalise a project plan 
for tender completions  
We never realised that 
the people who read the 
tender have never seen 
the information in our pre-
qualification questionnaire  
Getting feedback that 
sections of a tender 
response had scored low 
marks 
A new routine of re-
stating the question in 
each answer and 
repeating information  
 In the past, we have 
understated the firm’s 
competencies or 
emphasised things that 
aren’t in the tender  
Reflection on action and 
using an external 
consultant to provide 
objective feedback  
A decision to invest 
more heavily in 
accreditations and 
better contextualisation 
of answers within each 
tender  
 
Case respondents employed counterfactual thinking as a preparative 
function that was strongly tied to environmental learning. Mechanisms 
existed within counterfactual thoughts that individuals used to make sense 
of the future. Examples of procedural shock observed in Fit for Life (such 
as not realising that tender markers did not have access to all supplied 
information) triggered both positive and negative learning attempts. A 
respondent discussed an example of when one  contract was awarded to 
another supplier on the basis of added value cited that was not sought in 
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the tender specification. The fairness and the transparency of the 
processes by which procurement decisions were made, and trusted by all 
parties, was challenged. On this occasion, procurer behaviour elicited a 
frustrated response: 
”There was nothing in the spec asking for that, nothing.” 
[Operations Manager] 
Negative emotion was directed towards the procurer’s opportunity 
handling. This is not an issue of capability limitations, it is an issue of 
inaccurate statements of capability award criteria. In terms of cause and 
effect, a sense of unfairness in procedure disrupted commitment to tender 
leadership. It revealed how important optimism and trust are in the 
tendering process (even if it is imperfect) as underlying conditions to 
commitment and leadership of tendering. It fails to achieve the principle of 
ensuring distributive justice expected from the procurer in this social 
exchange, which relates to the perceptions of fairness associated with the 
exchange. Investment into information-seeking about procurer needs was 
seen as worthwhile, and respondents saw this as a strength. Environmental 
learning had enabled the team to adapt how they approached tender 
completion by considering what was seen as most valuable from a procurer 
perspective: 
“Basically the procurement people and the managers are not 
interested in any of that.  They just want a company that’s 
not going to cause them any trouble and there’ll be no 
accidents, they won’t go broke in the process or ask for more 
money, those sorts of things.  So what we call the quality of 
the whole experience they’re not interested in. That’s what 
we had to learn.  So that’s why we have to respond straight 
down the middle.”  [MD] 
 
FFL employees had adapted their tender engagement model to reflect 
what they described as ‘dis-engaged procurer behaviour’, both in terms of 
attitude towards bidders and their knowledge of actual tender 
specifications and bidders:  
“The contract manager said at the interview that she hadn’t 
had any involvement in the scoring, which really freaked us 
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out actually, so that will have been delegated to more junior 
people.”[HR Director] 
It was this recognition that existing firm performance in a contract is 
discounted that triggered the firm’s routines for question scrutiny and 
question answering techniques. It led to firm routines for tender completion 
to become developed from informal tacit actions into team-based routines, 
but routines that remained open to change and adaptation through a 
learning culture. Formalisation emerged through repeated use doing 
something informally. It did not suggest rigidity in this firm, rather, effective 
teamwork and a recognition that they had come a long way from their early 
attempts at submitting tenders: 
“When we look back at our first tenders you just get a bit 
embarrassed about them.  It’s a bit like looking back at your 
essays from doing your O levels or something like that, but 
at the time we thought we were fantastic.” [HR Director] 
  
R (15) Entrepreneurial Orientation (EO)  
 
EO is a dynamic routine for improvised resource construction to sense and 
seize opportunities that may appear potentially out of reach (e.g. because 
of firm size). Organisational learning is enabled through entrepreneurial 
orientation. Tendering experiences recounted in the firm show evidence of 
entrepreneurial orientation by the executive team, and particularly by the 
firm’s MD. They exercised entrepreneurial orientation through rapid 
resource configuration to improve outcomes and to create scale of 
opportunity. This was distinctive - it tested the rules and propelled value-
creating behaviours.  Collective managerial capability in the firm displayed 
ambidexterity in its approach to managing current and prospective 
business relationships. This was demonstrated best by having a routine to 
build new routines inside the firm such as alliancing and tender leadership 
and co-ordination. Repeated exercise of a routine could lead to stagnation, 
but FFL exercised agency to renew how it presented itself to the public 
sector marketplace. Entrepreneurial culture led to modes of innovation, 
both in how tenders were answered and constructed but also through firm 
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strategies for limiting imitation by competitors and protecting contract 
values. The following activities observed in Fit for Life were attributable to 
the firm’s entrepreneurial orientation: 
  
The introduction of new routines: Over time, knowledge acquisition and 
display capabilities are renewed and others expired. A structural property 
characteristic of tendering is the power to set and change award criteria 
without agent awareness. Competencies required change significantly over 
time, observed in the specialist skills and knowledge applied to tender 
question scrutiny and answering and in how the firm challenged procurer 
decision-making. Respondents describe tender completion co-ordination 
as a nascent competency to ensure accurate and comprehensive tender 
fulfilment, having experienced solo attempts by individual firm leaders.  
Methods to explore and exploit tender opportunities: Firm-level 
entrepreneurial orientation modified how the case firm views marketplace 
opportunities and generate new ideas for business development. For 
example, explorative activities include accruing knowledge from expanded 
professional networks such as sector standards, council group meetings 
and using existing social networks to collaborate on tenders. 
A rapid adoption of existing or new practices: FFL is agile in rapidly 
changing systems that do not work, or lack the professionalism they wanted 
to convey. A firm culture of empowerment and team working supported 
individual agency activities to improvise or try new ways of doing things, 
such as how to display firm credentials more effectively. Self-efficacy 
enables firm leaders to believe in themselves and own a capability to apply 
knowledge and skills in uncertain situations. It challenges procurer 
decision-making where procurer behaviour is deemed procedurally unjust 
or fallible. They also place resources to challenge decisions about tender 
scores by procurers. They understand how to challenge decisions and did 
it: 
“We made representation about it [award of contract 
elsewhere with proof of lack of transparent practice].  Of 
course we’ve let [the] Council know, “You’re in breach of 
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National Standard, you’re in breach of government 
guidelines” [Operations Manager] 
Anticipation of opportunities that do not yet exist: In the market 
positioning routine, leaders of this firm say they re-combine their resources 
to offer a service they sensed would be required, due to the Council 
bringing services in house. They demonstrate innovation by being first to 
market to create a new service to train trainers to keep Council business 
where services were being brought back in house.  
Scaling to win bigger contracts: The firm is able to create opportunities 
using prediction that is based on market information gathering. An example 
of confidence or self-efficacy was evident from firm experience of winning 
an out of area contract: 
“I saw the opportunity and said why don’t we go for it? The 
MD said, ‘We can’t operate it in [city], we’re in [city] without 
opening an office. But it is worth a significant amount of 
money. Okay, we’ll do it.’” [HR Director] 
 
That experience leveraged a new opportunity flow to repeat the pattern 
again, and a further office was opened in another city. It demonstrated risk-
taking behaviour: 
“So we just threw everything at it, big, big tender process, 
and we won it.  It was like, “Right, wow!” [HR Director]. 
Regulation itself creates different performance effects, and context is 
always key, but FFL is an example of a firm that is sustainably successful 
as a result of marketplace agility and first mover advantage position in their 
sector. Entrepreneurial orientation operates across firm routines and in 
tandem with environmental learning to exploit its effects. The next section 
connects routines to capability domains.  
 
6.4 Routine clusters that build tendering capability  
 
Fifteen firm routines have been identified, explained and classified by 
routine type. This section connects routines to domains of capability. Case 
205 
 
data suggests that tendering capability can be explained through six 
operational and two dynamic capability domains, each with interlocking 
dependencies for routine enactment. The scope and function of each 
capability form is critiqued next, using FFL case data. 
6.4.1 A market analysis capability  
 
Figure 6.1 shows four interlocking routines comprise this capability; market 
information gathering and competitor positioning; environmental learning 
and entrepreneurial orientation. 
 
Figure 6.1: Routines that comprise a market analysis capability  
 
 
 
 
 
R (1) Market information gathering    R (14) Environmental 
learning 
R (2) Competitor surveillance    R (15) Entrepreneurial     
orientation 
 
Several practices inside the firm comprise the routines to gather market 
intelligence and then interpret it: travelling, being part of formal groups, 
sustaining an informal network, sharing and discussion of information at 
management meetings and possibly also throughout the business, writing 
formal documents like market analysis, drawing in resources from external 
contacts and students semi-formally. FFL places management time and 
effort into maintaining specialist and current market knowledge. It  
recognises the dynamic social environment within which it operates and 
orients resources from within and outside of the firm towards understanding 
market supplier movement and threat. Operational investment into market 
analysis resides in the human capital of the firm, but it is firm capability to 
build new routines on the basis of market analysis that has created 
successful tendering outcomes. Market analysis is a capability domain that 
feeds into market positioning.  
Market analysis 
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6.4.2 A market positioning capability 
 
Whereas market analysis is concerned with information that is ‘out there’, 
market positioning is a capability that uses market analysis to position a 
business strategically within opportunity flows. It relies on three strategic 
routines: i) setting criteria for opportunity selection; ii) alliancing; and iii) 
safeguarding market pricing, also both dynamic routines: environmental 
learning and entrepreneurial orientation.  
Figure 6.2 Routines that comprise a market positioning capability  
 
 
 
 
R (3) Setting criteria for opportunity         R (14) Environmental learning  
   selection                                         
R (4) Safeguarding market pricing           R (15)Entrepreneurial orientation 
R (5) Alliancing  
 
Combined, these routines serve to manage opportunity selection in 
harmony with business growth ambition and enable agile access to 
resources. All three operational routines were created through specialist 
forms of human capital; in particular, how to analyse a business 
opportunity, collaborative decision-making, negotiation and intra-firm 
communication. FFL relies upon past successful experience and teamwork 
to behave confidently and collegiately in knowing how to evaluate and act 
upon company self-interest. Market positioning has the power to shape 
buying expectations; if quality providers will not operate in the market, then 
the supply market becomes diminished. Alliancing is dependent upon FFL 
exercising an effective reputation building capability. Market pricing is used 
as a form of agency. If FFL holds a contract that is being retendered and it 
is not making sufficient profit on it but would like to keep the business, the 
MD puts in a higher price to see if the procurer is prepared to accept that in 
order to keep them as the contractor. The MD refers to this as a strategic 
decision-making. She is able to do so because she has information to hand 
about profitability down to a finite number of decimal places. This approach 
Market positioning  
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relies upon self-efficacy, financial planning skills and a high reserve of 
customer loyalty in the bank. It begs the question of whether this is an 
approach only for a mature firm. 
6.4.3 Reputation building capability 
 
Reputation building describes how Fit for Life invests in ways to present 
itself to the public market as credible, relevant and superior through reliable 
service delivery, and a commitment to ethical practice and innovation. It 
encompasses two routines shown in Figure 6.3; i) regulatory compliance 
and artefacts; and, iii) exploitation of existing contract performance. 
 
Figure 6.3 Routines that comprise a reputation building capability   
 
 
R (8) Regulatory compliance artefacts    R (14) Environmental learning  
and practices     R (15) Entrepreneurial orientation 
R (13) Exploitation of contract  
performance 
  
As a capability, reputation-building is reliant on market positioning and 
resource mobilisation capabilities, and it requires constant renewal through 
entrepreneurial orientation and environmental learning routines. 
Reputational resources require constant acquisition and renewal for market 
competitiveness. Significant HR knowledge is required to research and 
augment regulatory practices. Specialist knowledge of typical tender 
threshold demands is also required for targeted resource investment. 
Finally, FFL uses existing contract performance as a vehicle to build and 
demonstrate competitive practices that is showcased in new tenders. 
6.4.4. Capability to read a tender specification  
 
This capability relies on experience accumulation to interpret exactly what 
and how to construct high scoring answers to scored questions. Two 
routines have been built in FFL to conduct review activity; i) tender triage; 
and, ii) individual question scrutiny (Figure 6.4).  
 
Reputation building  
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Figure 6.4 Routines that comprise a capability for reading a tender specification   
 
 
 
R (6) Individual tender opportunity triage      R (14) Environmental learning  
R (7) Tender specification and question  
scrutiny                
 
The act of reading a tender specification in detail follows an internal 
decision of its strategic fit with FFL’s tendering strategy. It describes an 
account of the actions taken in FFL to review, in detail, one set of tender 
documentation criteria. A detailed review exercise reveals what 
opportunities and threats the specification of services to be delivered pose 
to the firm. Both routines R (6) and R (7) have become established routines 
through environmental learning.   
6.4.5 Creative resource mobilisation capability  
 
Resource mobilisation describes a set of dynamic assembly activities that 
operate throughout a single tender completion cycle inside Fit for Life. 
Figure 6.5 shows the three routines were visible in the case firm that had 
recently completed a tender; i) tender leadership and co-ordination; ii) 
teamwork; and, iii) systematising tender information retrieval. 
 
Figure 6.5 Routines that comprise a creative resource mobilisation capability   
 
 
 
 
R (10) Tender leadership and co-ordination        R (14) Environmental 
Learning  
R (11) Teamwork            R (15) Entrepreneurial 
orientation 
R (12) Systematising tender information  
retrieval  
 
FFL’s routines that enable effective resource mobilisation have arisen from 
a cultural motivation to apply cognitive efficiency and to ‘get the job done.’ 
Reading a tender specification 
Resource mobilisation 
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Tender instructions act as a generative mechanisms to enact collective 
problem solving and tender assembly activities.  Resources released are 
primarily staff time and trigger expertise, but in this firm, there is a porous 
boundary to harnessing external resources such as consultants and 
lawyers. 
6.4.6 Capability to complete the technical components of a tender  
 
Figure 6.6 Routines that comprise a capability for completion of technical tender 
components  
 
 
R (9) Tender specification question  
answering   and                   (R14) Environmental learning 
document presentation 
R (7) Tender specification and  
question scrutiny 
 
Routines R9 and R7 address how the firm presents its credentials as 
distinct from what they said. Agential capacity for learning and adapting 
routines is distributed across firm executives and enabled through a culture 
of working as a team. The team appears to stay alert to improving technical 
aspects of how to produce a high-scoring tender. 
The technical aspect of tender completion is a capability to explain how the 
firm interprets the depth, detail and precise nature of questions and 
responses required to fulfil procurer requirements. Creative display of 
interpreted competency aims to achieve a full or high score to each 
question, so determining the firm’s tendering performance outcome.  
6.4.7 The role of transformational routines as dynamic capabilities  
 
Both dynamic routines, environmental learning and entrepreneurial 
orientation, are also capabilities in their own right and they are mutually 
dependent on making each other work. Environmental learning operates 
across every operational capability. Routines for learning drove action to 
change resource combinations and underpin firm capability to adapt. 
Learning and high levels of absorptive capacity are a pre-condition for 
capability reconfiguration. 
Technical tender components 
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6.4.8 Summary of tendering capability framework in Fit for Life  
 
FFL is clearly very successful in its tendering activities. Each capability has 
been  defined, followed by a detailed description of how it work in practice, 
as routines and knowledge assets combine to create capability domains. 
General characterisations of each capability are summarised by case 
respondents using their own words drawn from interview transcripts.  
Routines that exist to enable that particular capability are explained. One 
routine is shown to support more than one capability. Knowledge assets 
includes skills, and resource demands employed within each routine in the 
case firm are elicited through illustrations from respondent data and 
researcher observation. They include the same skills and resources may 
assist multiple capabilities. Table 6.2 lists firm routines, their relationship to 
other routines upon which they depend, and to overall capability formation. 
It is a summary of the fifteen routines discussed in chapters six and seven, 
and it is constructed as a sensitising framework for other firms to create 
their own capability framework. 
Table 6.2 Descriptions of FFL tendering routines and capabilities they serve  
Firm 
routine  
Description Other 
routine 
dependency  
Capability it 
serves 
Market 
information 
gathering  
Gathering information on evolving 
market tendering practices  and 
opportunities using multiple 
external sources 
Tendering 
leadership and 
co-ordination  
Market 
analysis 
Competitor 
surveillanc
e 
Finding out how competitors 
perform in contract acquisition and 
delivery 
Market 
information 
gathering 
Market 
analysis 
Setting 
criteria for 
opportunity 
selection  
A formal set of criteria that is 
codified into a written artefact to 
guide strategic opportunity review 
and selection. Also tacit rules, and 
flexible application feeding into 
strategic development 
Market 
information 
gathering 
Competitor 
surveillance  
Market 
positioning 
Alliancing  Selecting a larger bidding partner 
to act as the bidding vehicle to sell 
firm services; by doing so, building 
financial, social and human capital  
Tender 
leadership and 
co-ordination  
Market 
information 
gathering 
Competitor 
surveillance 
Market 
positioning 
Safeguardin
g market 
pricing 
Using reputational capital and 
specialist knowledge to influence 
unit pricing in tenders 
Exploitation of 
contract 
performance 
Market 
positioning 
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Firm routine  Description Other routine 
dependency  
Capability it 
serves 
Exploitation 
of contract 
performance  
Using existing contract 
performance as both marketing 
collateral in new tenders and as 
a defence strategy  
Regulatory 
compliance 
practices and 
artefacts 
Reputation 
building 
Individual 
tender triage  
Conducting a detailed reading of 
a tender specification and 
accompanying documents to 
develop a response plan, and 
also to decide which ones to 
pursue after thorough 
consideration 
Tender 
leadership and 
co-ordination  
Teamwork  
Reading a 
tender 
specification  
Tender 
question 
scrutiny 
A routine that follows tender 
triage discussion r individual 
sense-making of allocated 
questions PRIOR to their 
completion  
Individual 
tender triage  
Reading a 
tender 
specification 
 
 
Tender 
leadership 
and co-
ordination 
Active senior manager 
leadership of tender responses 
ensuring a full display of firm 
competence, innovation and 
competitiveness in its contextual 
environment   
Opportunity 
selection and 
review  
Creative 
resource 
mobilisation  
Team work  A cultural firm dimension where 
individual roles are supplanted 
by a higher order sense of 
motivation to take collective 
action. It follows from information 
and ideas, feeding into other 
routines  
Tender 
leadership and 
co-ordination 
 
Creative 
resource 
mobilisation 
Systematising 
tender 
information 
retrieval  
Systematic processes to store, 
retrieve and develop 
performance data to evidence in 
a tender  
Tender 
leadership and 
co-ordination 
Teamwork  
Creative 
resource 
mobilisation 
Question 
answering 
and 
document 
presentation  
Applying specialist knowledge to 
interpret and write an answer 
that aligns with procurer 
requirements. It  includes the 
display of firm credentials 
Tender 
leadership and 
co-ordination 
Market 
information 
gathering  
Competitor 
surveillance  
Accreditation 
acquisition 
Exploitation of 
contract 
performance 
 
Technical 
tender 
aspects  
 
 
 
 
 
212 
 
Figure 6.7: A capability framework for public sector tendering   
 
Structural capabilities    Everyday tendering capabilities  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.7 summarises FFL’s agential framework to interact with market 
conditions to create capability. It is the firm’s generative mechanism to 
respond to structural conditions. Market analysis, market positioning and 
reputation building are three types of capability that situate the business in 
targeted tendering environments. In each case, resources are deployed 
through routines. Reading a tender specification, creative resource 
mobilisation and technical tender components are capabilities for tender 
production. Environmental learning and entrepreneurial orientation are 
active routines that act as dynamic capabilities to cause competitive 
adaptation; this also shows the exercise of agency in routine enactment 
and refresh. 
6.5 Structural conditions in pre-existence and the exercise of 
agency  
 
A critical realist approach to analysing firm routines exposes multiple layers 
of structural conditions that create conditions for action on FFL. Structural 
conditions inside the firm can be described as roles and responsibilities, 
processes, resources and culture. A key structural condition in this firm is 
forming a tender production team for efficient knowledge assembly and 
Market analysis Market positioning  Reputation building  
Reading a tender 
specification  
 
Creative resource 
mobilisation 
Technical tender 
components  
Environmental Learning  
Entrepreneurial Orientation 
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quality assurance, a condition that has arisen from experience 
accumulation, routine development and strategic recruitment.  
 
The structure of tendering regulation creates complexity of tendering 
documentation, codified in specialist language, idiosyncratic tender scoring 
systems and high market entry barriers set through resource demands. 
Public procurer tendering behaviour creates procedural shock: respondent 
comments portray it as idiosyncratic, open to fallibility and reliant on small 
firms employing formalisation to exchange information about their 
competency to deliver a public contract. Competitive behaviour shapes 
access to privileged knowledge, and markets become more competitive 
when large firms encroach upon localised contracts that were traditionally 
in the domain of small enterprises. However, what this case has shown is 
that FFL can produce a productive tendering performance.  It has a causal 
history that binds staff together to produce a “combined productive activity” 
(Archer, 2001, p.467). FFL has its own set of routines that exercise agency 
to attempt to neutralise, challenge or harness social effects and create 
productivity and competitive positioning.  
 
6.6 Chapter summary 
 
Chapter Six has delivered a rich description of FFL’s routines to enact 
successful tendering. It details activities that specifically improve current 
levels of performance and serve firm-level strategic rent-seeking from 
public sources. The incremental development of routines is resource 
intensive, requiring time, specialist knowledge, strong leadership and high 
levels of entrepreneurial orientation and absorptive capacity to continuously 
learn. FFL has clear intentions as a team and a long-term goal to be 
successful at tendering. Knowledge exchange on tendering processes 
inside the company is an agential property that is both tacit and explicit. It 
has acted reflexively over ten years to overcome potential points of failure. 
An intensive examination of firm tendering practices has distilled practice 
into fifteen routines, and routines act as both task accomplishers and 
change agents. Routines cluster into six firm-level operational capabilities 
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with two dynamic capabilities acting as routines to adapt all the other 
routines.   
 
Whilst the content of capabilities or routines may vary between firms, they 
are more likely than not to need these capabilities and routines to succeed. 
Findings presented in this chapter are a framework for practice and 
represent a dynamic framework to engage with the question of how routines 
and capabilities identified in one firm relate to other small firms. In FFL, they 
can be considered rules of success to explore uncertainty and to build novel 
organisational artefacts.  
 
Findings show that FFL respondents have the capacity for innovative 
responses to tender situations in the face of contextual constraints. 
Knowledge comes from individual and firm level tendering practice at the 
interface with procurers. Knowledge becomes codified into firm-level 
routines and then often into artefacts such as tender completion checklists 
and a written tendering strategy. Some routines arise and change as a 
direct result of external demand, others through firm learning: doing, 
imitating, experimenting and strategic reflexivity. Routines are created, 
deployed, reproduced and adapted through environmental learning and 
entrepreneurial orientation, created by firm-level agency as a response to 
dynamic context. Dynamic capabilities in the firm co-evolve in harmony with 
the case firm’s operating environment. Finally, agency is significantly 
endowed in firm culture as well as in its routines, particularly with regard to 
resource mobilisation. 
 
Case analysis of public procurement as a laminated institution illustrates 
the consequent need to build specialist forms of capability and resources 
to respond. Case findings offer illustration of what the capabilities can look 
like and how firm employees as organisational agents can modify routines 
and improvise to accomplish self-interest. In particular, case findings raise 
the importance of firm reflexivity, acknowledging that the firm embodies 
forms of capital that can exert market influence. Structural properties shape 
firm behaviour and lead to the structural conditions of a context. Tender 
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pursuit capability is significantly shaped by erratic and unstable procurer 
behaviour observed by case respondents, yet it is apparent that higher- 
order capabilities built through routines and exercised by agency can 
mitigate structural constraints. This reconceptualises tendering by small 
firms away from being passive towards structural constraints, and to 
possessing capabilities that not only raise competitiveness but also affect 
the future of sector tendering practices. The next chapter compares the 
presence of the fifteen routines to a second firm that is very successful at 
tendering, Software4U, to expert informant opinion and to a further three 
firms from the pilot study.   
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Chapter Seven: A comparative case review of tendering 
routines  
 
7.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter compares the fifteen tendering routines and capabilities 
identified in the Fit for Life case to other case firms. A comparison is sought 
through identification of their presence, with a case-by-case critique of 
different contextual enablers and constraints in play. The purpose of 
comparison is to build on the FFL capability framework to explore how 
routines may be different or not selected for good strategic reasons. In 
addition, to explore conditions under which routines are created, and to 
show that capabilities can be enacted under different routines and resource 
bases.  
 
The chapter begins with a brief introduction to comparative cases. 
Software4U is comparable to FFL, in so far that it is successful at tendering. 
Further comparative secondary case firms are those from the study pilot: 
The Big Carer, Domiciliary Ltd and The Local Care Company, where 
original datasets were re-analysed from a pilot study through the theoretical 
lens constructed for this thesis. Finally, comparative practices in small firms 
are triangulated by interviewing an expert informant, who drew upon 
experience of assisting multiple small firms to build tendering capability. 
Referring back to chapter five on methodology, different data collection 
methods were used with pilot firms: interview transcripts from informants 
are from pilot firms interviewed from one boundaried tender case where all 
the small firms had been unsuccessful. Their utility lies in demonstrating 
the particularity of market context and it may help to explain why FFL do 
what they do. Chapter findings from additional case data, comparatively 
summarised to the primary case, highlight differences in how firms design 
responses to tendering situations and use agency as a form of capability. 
The chapter is organised into sections in the same way as chapter six, to 
aid cross-case comparison.  
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7.2 Secondary case firms  
 
7.2.1 Software4U  
Software4U (S4U) has broadly comparability to FFL. It is a profitable, 
owner-managed small firm located in the North of England, with significant 
successful tendering experience and a strategy on place to grow its 
revenue and services. A point of difference is that its tendering success has 
been with lower value tenders that appear to demand less formalised 
processes.  It was established in 2002 and employs 42 staff. S4U is owner 
managed by the Managing Director and the Operations Director. It has a 
flat structure with three key teams; technical development, sales and 
customer support. The company offered a single product until 2014 that 
was aimed at educational providers to offer licences use of learner tracking 
software for vocational training and assessment of qualifications. In 2014, 
it introduced secondary software product aimed at similar learner groups. 
Since trading began, it has won multiple awards for its product and earned 
firm kite-marks of good practice for people, processes and the environment 
(IIP, ISO 9001, an environmental pledge). The Operations Director had 
recently attended a business growth programme and as an outcome of this, 
the firm has a clear growth strategy and resource plan in place, which is to 
develop new software products, expand its current software customer base 
and to recruit new talent. Continuing to win public sector work is key. 
S4U holds business relationships with multiple education providers as their 
main customer base. Additionally, it provides secure software solutions to 
several councils, police and fire services and with the armed services.  The 
company’s first tender was seven years’ ago, when the owners had no 
personal prior experience or staff with practice experience of tendering. 
Less than 30% of new business has been won through tenders, but 
respondents felt that a change in the marketplace to lower the threshold 
value of tenders was starting to impact on traditional ‘show and tell’ sales 
processes, to become formal tendering exercises. This was exerting 
pressure on the firm to produce time consuming and lengthy documents, 
with no guarantees of winning at the end.  
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7.2.1 Re-analysis of data-sets from pilot case firms 
 
The Big Carer, The Local Care Company and Domiciliary Ltd are case firms 
used to develop pilot data. Transcripts of interviews have been re-analysed 
against primary case data to draw out comparative and conflicting data on 
competitive routines. Unlike FFL and S4U, pilot firms were selected 
because they were all associated with the same procurement case and not 
necessarily on demonstration of competitive practice.  
 
The Big Carer  
The Big Carer is a national organisation with 200 employees and the 
interviewee was with a regional Director. The company is usually 
successful at winning tenders. It delivers a broad portfolio of community 
care services utilising public funding contracts to support people in 
disadvantaged communities. As an organisation that is reliant upon public 
funding it had an infrastructure in place to meet public body requirements 
for receipt of, and accountability for, public monies. 
 
The Local Care Company  
The Local Care Company is an owner-led firm established 13 years ago, 
with 11 staff to provide community care services under contract to local 
authorities. The interviewee was with the Managing Director (MD). Almost 
100% of its work is funded through public grants and contracts. It is in the 
process of adjusting from a grant-receiving organisation to one where open 
and competitive tendering replaced local service delivery arrangements. 
 
Domiciliary Ltd  
It is an owner- managed domiciliary care company with 45 employees. The 
firm was set up 25 years’ ago. Two years ago, it had over 90 staff. Two lost 
tenders, where the firm held incumbent position, meant that staff were 
transferred across to the winning contract holder. The Managing Director 
has not adapted well from transitioning the business from a public grant 
culture to one that relies upon competitive tendering. Company experience 
of tendering described by the MD is located within several unsuccessful 
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attempts to hang on to existing contracts that were awarded under a 
previous commissioning regime, so they have never won a competitive 
tender. 
7.2.2 The expert informant on small firm tendering 
 
An expert informant is a business consultant who has engaged with over 
500 small companies from commercial organisations, social enterprises 
and charities. She provides two forms of services to firms to improve their 
tendering performance. Firstly, she designs and delivers training sessions 
to help business owners to understand what public procurement practices 
exist and what they need to do to get themselves tender ready and how to 
actually respond to the common questions in the documentation. Secondly, 
she has provided bespoke support to individual organisations for specific 
tenders, acting as a writer, an editor and a researcher.  Her experience is 
also drawn from participation in Cabinet Office strategy discussions on the 
experiences of small businesses in tendering for public sector contracts and 
with the Local Government Association in their round table looking at 
barriers and best practice in procurement. The interview drew out first hand 
opinion of practice of small firm tendering behaviours. 
7.3 Comparative analysis of routine enactment to FFL  
 
The fifteen routines described in chapter six are repeated in this section. 
Each routine begins with a reminder of what FFL does to aid comparison. 
Examples of comparative case use or absence of each routine is critiqued 
by each routine heading.  
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7.3.1 Comparison of information seeking routines  
 
 (R1) Market information gathering  
 
What Fit for Life Does 
The senior team invests high levels of specialist resources into 
ensuring a high quality flow of market intelligence into the business. A 
proactive and engaged approach enables better market prediction. 
Human capital in the form of expert sector knowledge is exerted to 
influence market standards and public sector investment into their 
services. This shapes technical demands within some tenders that then 
sets barriers to entry from competitors. Firm leaders collectively 
engage in active reflection on market development informally and 
formally in team meetings. Senior leaders have made a strategic 
commitment to resourcing efforts that assist opportunity interpretation 
from multiple sources. Firm networks provide market access to 
privileged information to upcoming market opportunities. They 
recognise the dynamic nature of idiosyncratic tender requirements, 
including how tender specifications are titled. The firm is registered on 
multiple tender portal information sites and search terms are adapted 
to ensure comprehensive alerts to new opportunities. Two firm leaders 
review incoming tender alerts to manage the risk of opportunity 
oversight.  There is evidence of service innovation to adapt to 
intelligence of changing market requirements from procurers. 
 
Contextually, S4U operates in a smaller niche marketplace than FFL with a 
single flagship product. Tendered contracts operate at a much lower value 
(typically, £30-50,000) to deliver an IT product into similar educational 
environments. Purchasing habits by public procurers are expressed as 
stable and repetitive by the Operations Director but she discussed 
government-funded market expansion as a catalyst for exponential market 
growth in the next three to five years. The firm can demonstrate expertise 
within a narrow field of education administration by interaction with 
purchasers at trade fairs. Consideration of product application into wider 
markets has an informal plan to customise marketing messages to suit 
additional likely purchasers in aligned sectors. The Operations Director 
recognises market changes that are being made to tendering, noting that 
public body threshold values for tendering are significantly decreasing. This 
is having a causal impact on ‘doing business’ as more sales now need to 
be channelled through a competitive tendering process.   
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S4U has historically put less effort into deliberately placing themselves in 
the opportunity flow for tender alert. Word of mouth has been an effective 
method for new opportunity alerts, but the sales team commented upon a 
dramatic increase of enquiries in tender format in the previous year, so they 
know they need to adapt and register their interest using more formalised 
methods, such as tender portal registration. This firm has a more limited 
routine than FFL, bypassing comprehensive tender portal registration and 
spending its resources to accrue sales using face-to-face selling methods. 
This is possible because they are able to still sell small numbers of software 
licences that are below tender thresholds, often as a pilot. Their market 
access primarily relies upon firm and product reputational capital with the 
majority of the enquiries coming through word of mouth. Respondents 
believe that public sector procurers want tried and tested products in similar 
environments; a strategic decision has been made to focus resources on 
winning business through face to face selling than through tender portal 
registration efforts.  
 
The most effective method for getting on to tender lists is performing 
software demonstrations at trade fairs, on-line and by appointment to 
potential customers. A competitive practice is to offer a small number of 
software licences for pilot use at low cost, so that when an institution is 
required to tender, S4U‘s product is already known as a technical solution 
to meet market needs. The owners feel that recruiting staff with rapport 
building skills is sufficient to uncover opportunities. Market information 
gathering has less formalisation of routines in this firm but it is a firm 
capability that is executed with good results. Tender opportunities are not 
generally missed or overlooked as reputational capital compensates for 
lack of active search and registration efforts. It shows that capabilities may 
be achieved via different routines. In terms of routines, this firm is 
uncomfortable with procurers that rely solely on a paper based decision-
making procurement process.  Respondents expressed greater confidence 
in dealing with a public body that was already familiar with firm software, as 
they believe rapport and engagement with firm sales staff and the product 
gave them a hidden market advantage. Again, this indicates that a different 
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MIG approach that is still strategic. Networking with senior managers is 
invested in as the best form of market positioning. 
Expert informant opinion sees marketplace information gathering as an 
institutional weakness in small firms, believing that many small firm owners 
didn’t look as regularly for potential tenders as they could do.  Search 
routines were not considered to be visibly routinised or proactively 
considered, and where they did exist, they are not consistently applied as 
a deliberate activity, so they were not necessarily seeing them. The expert 
informant also alluded to the poor use of professional networks for 
knowledge exchange.  
 
The Big Carer orients significant resources into interpreting changes 
occurring within the external sector environment and treats this as a regular 
business practice and part of their strategic orientation. The other pilot firms 
do not appear to operate at market level; they present as more reactive 
than anticipatory, disengaged and operating with a belief that they have no 
market influence. There was a lack of evidence of search routines in 
Domiciliary Ltd and The Local Care Company. The MD of the Local Care 
Company said: 
 “Things like those portals are not designed for us because 
it’s a full time job looking at them and there’s so many of 
them and so many different authorities and ways of 
advertising and things we miss because we don’t have 
somebody who can spend five days a week searching for 
things.” [MD, The Big Carer] 
 
The Big Carer did utilise a market information gathering routine, using its 
extensive market links to search out emerging opportunities and keep 
abreast of using tender portals to stay visible to procurers. This is effective 
practice and acts as a cause of their levels of success overall in winning 
public sector contracts.  
 
As a routine, MIG is contextually dependent upon sectoral utility of 
tendering and the maket-value of its tenders. Firms like FFL is required to 
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orient more resources in the form of social capital and behave more 
entrepreneurially than S4U that has less competition for its product. The 
Big Carer has a national business infrastructure than FFL to draw in MIG 
resources.  
 
(R2) Competitor surveillance 
What Fit for Life Does 
Firm leaders deploy human and social capital to stay alert to a dynamic 
competition base. They commissioned a formal review of their existing and 
emerging competitors, looking at competitor service features and their client 
base to deploy as a strategic asset for making decisions about enacting a 
tender response to opportunities. Environmental learning through 
experience accumulation saw firm leaders expending additional resources 
to imitate large firm behaviour in tender presentation panels. Competitor 
tender clarification requests on an open system are observed but firm level 
questions are submitted within a short notice period to limit competitor time 
to learn about procurer explanations of service need.  
 
 
Within S4U’s industry, there are only five to six other firms who have 
developed software solutions into their nascent and niche market, 
demonstrating a different operating context. With changes in the market to 
using tender processes for lower value contracts, the firm is acutely aware 
that it cannot continue to rely as much on direct sales. In contrast to FFL, 
competitor surveillance is conducted effectively yet without the same 
degree of formalisation: 
“We know who are competitors are and roughly what they 
quote, know our strengths against competitors to highlight in 
tender.”[Operations Director]  
The competitor base is small, with no known incomers in the last two to 
three years. The Operations Director knew that they had only lost 8% of 
opportunities to competitors on software features. The firm kept a list of 
competitors to whom opportunities are lost, with regular update reports 
generated on the percentage of revenue potentially lost and reasons why.  
 
The Big Carer draws substantial value from continual external horizon 
scanning and discusses looking to the field for best practice to read about 
similar services offered by competitors elsewhere. The firm maintains loose 
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ties outside the area with firms who are not direct competitors.  This is 
effective and successful practice. Domiciliary Ltd does not appear to think 
about competitor features to adjust their service offer until they are 
completing a tender where there is another incumbent firm. The MD of The 
Local Care Company feels threatened by placing a tender submission 
alongside much bigger firms. He believes that size is primarily what makes 
the firm appear less competitive, stating: 
“The big boys are coming in and swallowing all of us up.” 
[MD] 
This MD appears to reside in ‘victim mode’, and ongoing tender rejections 
serve as proof to the MD’s sense making that they are penalised on 
grounds of size. 
 
Expert informant experience draws attention back to the importance of 
competitor surveillance as an opportunity to create differentiation. A 
criticism from the expert informant is that firm leaders do not think about 
who the competition is and, therefore, do not think about what the 
differentiators might between firms.  Small organisations have stated to the 
informant that they not going to bid for a particular tender because they 
think a national organisation will tender and win it, without first analysing if 
they can win the tender themselves.  Her advice was forthcoming: 
“If it’s a local contract within your capability, play to your 
localism and show your local knowledge.” [Expert informant] 
So, agency is under-exercised, rendering some small firm resources, such 
as local knowledge, unproductive. What can be drawn from this comparison 
is that small firms in different sectors operate in a context where national 
players threaten SME competitiveness. 
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7.3.2 Comparison of strategic routines  
 
R (3) Setting criteria for opportunity selection  
What Fit for Life Does 
FFL has a written tendering strategy; a formalised artefact developed to 
make objective assessments aligned to business growth intentions. There is 
strategic focus of entrepreneurial effort to shape or exploit a market in 
specific places where the firm has a large contract that covers infrastructure 
costs. Opportunity selection strategy is spatial to create a concentration of 
supply that is more cost effective, including building on an anchor contract. 
 
FFL has incorporated a written tendering strategy into its strategic business 
planning and review activities. S4U has not, but does not appear to need 
one to be successful at winning public contracts. Selectivity of tender 
selection is instinctive over procedural, with a clear intention to avoid 
tenders that will not benefit the firm but without clear explication of these 
conditions.  The first considerations to select a tender are its potential value 
and if the service being procured, can specifically be met through S4U’s 
software product. A lack of formality has exposed a degree of fallibility in 
firm decision-making. For example, a fifty-question tender did not state an 
indicative contract value. Rather than clarify the contract size, a response 
was mobilised. Upon winning it, the contract value of £3.5k offered little 
reward other than gaining an additional customer.  
 
S4U treats tender opportunities as a sales activity rather than as a strategic 
marketplace manoeuvre. In terms of a process, both sales team members 
receive tender documentation and produce a regular board report to 
summarise all pipelines of opportunities, including tenders and direct sales 
leads.  Tenders are treated as a live opportunity and listed on the firm’s 
customer management database. Sales and tenders are not differentiated 
as separate modes of opportunity in sales reports. 
 
Tendering in S4U is coined a ‘no guarantees’ activity that calls upon a 
completely different set of skills from demonstrating software face-to-face. 
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The concept of risk of unproductive time investment weighs heavily on 
decision-making in S4U. It is a less trusted route to securing a sale, with 
more effort is required to calculate opportunity costs. A tender process 
renders sales team verbal rapport skills redundant. The Operations Director 
describes two kinds of tenders he identifies with: those that he believes that 
don’t really fit the firm’s product and others where the tender has been 
created to match their software product.  The firm exercises selectivity and 
like FFL is not afraid to say no to tender invitations. Interview respondents 
are clear that they would not tweak their software product to win a tender.  
Proportionality of effort was raised; for example, answering fifty questions 
for a £3.5k contract, yet it was recognised that it could lead to something 
more. Nevertheless, a long-term view is clearly not present here. 
 
The Big Carer relies upon senior team knowledge to qualify a tender as in 
or out. Their approach is to start with a review of the service specification 
and then decide if that fits with a) what they currently do and b) the firm’ 
strategic direction set by senior manager annual planning goals. Then, on 
a more practical level, it considers the amount of work responding to a 
tender entails and the resource availability for that. There is an established 
routine to analyse if it is cost effective to go for a tendered service: 
“Staff here are very good at it and they learned over the 
years as they have gone along so they can say off the top of 
their head if that is something we could go for and whether 
we can do it in the timescales.” [Business Development 
Manager]  
The Big Carer maps tender opportunities to its strategic goals with a 
focused “triage” process used for risk analysis on “going for it”. Procurer 
requirements were explored at a higher level by a deeper analysis of 
current service delivery conditions that could be raised through a new 
contract. There was clear leadership of the tender decision making process.  
 
No processes to conduct a strategic review of opportunities can be found 
from interview transcripts with Domiciliary Ltd and the Local Care 
Company. The expert informant says that opportunity focus and selection 
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within market positioning is predominantly a larger firm practice where small 
firms fail to pay attention to the ‘detail’, although this is not the case in FFL. 
The informant believes that small firms do not in general read through 
contract documentation, especially the contract, which they don’t realise is 
legally binding if they win it. Mention of intellectual property and payment 
scheduling are two areas flagged as ‘trip up’ areas. The informant interview 
did not refer to use of an incumbency position, alliancing or cues for how to 
adopt a strategic and selective tendering approach beyond this. Data  from 
FFL, S4U and The Big Carer dispute this, and a conclusion could be made 
that they represent growth-oriented small firms that have put the liability of 
smallness to one side and have developed capability as a strategic decision 
to invest and specialise in tendering. They have the confidence and skills 
to do so. Opportunity selection, therefore, is structurally affected at sectoral 
level by whether new public business can be won without having to tender 
and by tender size. 
 
 (R4) Alliancing  
 
What Fit for Life Does 
Firm leaders employ firm reputational capital for knowledge exchange 
purposes with at least one larger firm that had derived benefit from including 
FFL specialist services within a much broader contract opportunity that the 
large firm wanted to win. Collaboration on a joint tender is actively used by 
FFL leaders as an opportunity to learn from a bigger company. 
Entrepreneurial orientation enables rapid imitation of information display 
routines, representing innovation in how FFL conduct tender construction.  
 
S4U has no experience of tendering in a joint or consortia arrangement but 
they are just about to do so, and recognise its tactical use as a competitive 
routine they will benefit from. The Big Carer, despite its narrative on social 
networking, did not pursue collaborative activity in tendering opportunities: 
“You tend to close ranks and don’t speak to anybody 
because you could be giving away your potential future 
business.” [Business Development Manager] 
Instead, internal social capital acts as a knowledge lever, and as a larger 
firm they referred to other arms of the business to turn to. The expert 
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informant, Domiciliary Ltd and The Local Care Company do not refer to 
alliancing practices. This shows that alliancing is contextually dependent 
upon marketplace trust and access to wider internal social capital. Not 
every firm needs this routine to be successful. 
 
(R5) Safeguarding Market Pricing  
What Fit for Life Does 
Firm reputational capital is invested into marketplace relationships to 
communicate what constitutes safe and ethical service, not cheap provision. 
Tenders that offer a lower market rate than is considered ethical and safe are 
rejected. Ethical capital is a structural property of the firm that demonstrates 
a quality of service capability. Financial planning skills are put to work to 
understand fair and competitive market rates for units of service delivery. 
Pricing is used as a form of agency when re-tendering for less profitable 
contracts held. Confidence in firm reputation is high to offer an existing 
customer a higher service price to increase firm profitability.  
 
Like FFL, tenders that S4U considered were ethically or financially 
unreasonable or unsustainable are rejected.  In one case, the firm was 
asked to tender and enable unlimited software licences. Financial quotes 
were decided by considering competitor pricing, and this gave confidence 
to reject the proposal. Safeguarding market pricing did not arise through 
data as a competitive routine in other case firms and the expert informant 
interview. 
7.3.3 Comparison of interpretive routines  
 
R (6) Individual tender opportunity triage  
 
 
What Fit for Life Does 
FFL conducts a detailed reading of a tender prior to starting to respond to it 
through the lens of the firms’ pre-set opportunity selection criteria. Tender 
triage is treated as a collective activity, which has increased in formality 
through repeated efforts. There is a close examination of the technical 
aspects of service, especially pricing and TUPE.  The routine builds 
understanding of resources required to conduct further research, drawing on 
financial and analytical skills.  
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A very informal triage process exists in S4U. No formal triage criteria for 
selection is in place and the Operations Director admits that they don’t 
scrutinise all of the tender paperwork sent out with the tender specification.  
Respondents agree that the first task is to check for the potential contract 
value and the target date for project deliverables, primarily software 
implementation and training completion dates. After this, respondents 
would read the specification requirements in some detail. The Operations 
Director reads every tender. The team start with a simple question, ‘Are we 
capable of winning the business?’ Decision making is somewhat devolved 
away from the senior team to the sales team but is backed up by focused 
opportunity triage linked to delivery of contract to calculate how much 
revenue the firm can generate from a tender. Interpretation of tender 
scoring criteria is equally important to triage as the questions asked within 
the specification. There is evidence that learning what to do in a tendering 
context comes from experience accumulation but also through deliberate 
learning to balance decision making on multiple criteria.  
 
In The Big Carer, respondents look at all the dynamics within the tender to 
cost it up, plan how they could staff it, and use a whiteboard to produce a 
visual plan before bringing a team of the right people together. Like FFL, 
dedicated time and processes have emerged through experience to 
become efficient and effective at tender review and collegiate decision-
making:  
“If it’s something new we will sit together and discuss is it 
something we really can do and we look at all the dynamics 
in it like what do they want.” [Business Development 
Manager]  
 
The Big Carer tendering team verbalise their own checklist of questions, 
such as i) Have we got the expertise?, ii) What do they want? iii) Is there 
anything in it that is new to us or is there anything in there that we don’t 
want to do or we don’t currently provide? It then considers round the table 
what staff resource is available to start work on it, who can start putting 
some draft text together, the documents required to substantiate evidence 
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and then work backwards from the deadline to decide if it is possible to 
complete a quality submission in the timeframe. 
 
Expert informant opinion was that many business owners make contact for 
help from an external consultant, stating that they do not understand the 
specific services procurers are looking for and they do not want to waste 
their time.  Sometimes, firm leaders choose not to submit tenders because 
documentation is not specific enough about the types of services being 
procured. In general, small business tender triage skills were considered 
poor by the informant:  
“A lot of the disappointment comes because they will spend 
their time actually applying for tenders that they stand 
absolutely no chance of winning.”  [Expert Informant] 
The Local Care Company does not have a triage process; they refer to 
doing ‘a quick flick through’ then submitting a tender without first evaluating 
their chances of success. The owner fails to apply experiential learning 
because of negative emotion towards the process and this prevents 
adaptation occurring. Lack of self-confidence blocks this routine. A 
comparative review indicates that having a competitive routine for tender 
triage is contextually dependent upon both experience accumulation and 
team-based decision-making.  
  
R (7) Tender Question Scrutiny  
 
What Fit for Life Does 
The Marketing Manager initially completes a detailed reading of each tender 
question. The purpose of this is to interpret the specific nature of each 
questions and organise allocation of specific question to specific senior team 
members. Firm leaders use a method of examining the demands each question 
in isolation, having learnt through experience that many questions are 
compound in nature. FFL involve wider workforce staff to gain their perceptions 
of how to answer specific questions about operational practices or service 
delivery. A document scrutiny routine decodes compound question 
requirements.  
 
S4U respondents note quite a few different questions arising between 
comparable tender specifications. This finding chimes with FFL and 
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confirms that a structural condition of tendering is a lack of uniformity 
between public service purchasers. S4U places less effort into 
consideration of individual questions and start with existing text to fit into 
the questions asked. This approach may be sufficient for a software 
purchasing tender because tenders ask more simplistic questions and they 
tend to be yes/no answers to product features. This approach would be 
inadequate in FFL because the tenders they receive usually demand 
answers that can demonstrate service mutability. It is usual practice in S4U 
for both members of the sales team to read the same tender and verbally 
discuss the answers that will be constructed. Specialist technical questions 
are referred to the technical team and legal questions to the MD. However, 
there is evidence of firm-level environmental learning though repeated 
experience. Environmental learning has affected the routine because it has 
semi-formalised it:  
 “We learnt that it is important to read the whole firm before 
you even start. There’s no point doing a little bit today, a bit 
more tomorrow …then run out of time at question 48 /50 
when you need clarification.” [Operations Director, 
Software4U] 
 
Similar to FFL, the software firm experienced frustration at the lack of 
clarity. One example is discussed in some detail where ‘every other 
question’ had to be clarified through the official process with the procurer. 
Firm respondents feel that the people who had written the tender are not 
sure themselves. Question clarification is delayed or non-existent. Exercise 
of agency to walk away from a tender “if it’s unclear at the start” is 
expressed and embedded into ongoing tender triage activities. The Big 
Carer respondent highlighted a structural condition, saying that tender 
questions are complex: 
“..They are not a simple question, they will ask you five 
questions in one and then you think what are you really 
asking me here and I have drafted a response and then 
passed it to a colleague to proof and they will say, “You’ve 
not answered that,” and I am convinced that I have, but they 
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don’t just ask a straight forward question.” [Business 
Development Manager]  
 
The researcher found an example of a question in a tender document 
shared by S4U that asked the bidding firm to ‘propose how the service will 
be structured and staffed and will work with other agencies’. This indeed 
can be analysed as three questions; how it will be structured, how it will be 
staffed, how the firm will work with other agencies. This process demands 
specialist knowledge. The Director commented that if they were new to 
reading tenders they would definitely struggle because the tender refers to: 
“A lot of government documents you’d have to be familiar 
with and some of them I am talking 200 pages.” [Operations 
Director]  
Knowledge of government legislation places high resource demands, and 
as such it is a market entry barrier. This company ‘knew the field’ and had 
learnt how to analyse questions through a public sector lens. By contrast, 
expert informant commentary is vocal upon a lack of capability to unpack 
tender questions and refers to ‘unwritten rules’ that go around public sector. 
For example: 
“Nobody tells you what constitutes a financially stable 
organisation for that tender. It is learnt from experience or 
from learning the tricks of the trade, having spent years 
doing it with commissioners.” [Expert Informant] 
 
The inference is that firms that have never actually held a contract before 
and so don’t have the track record, making the public market a closed shop. 
Typically, tenders may seek three references for contract awards held with 
public sector organisations. The informant believes small firm owners lack 
confidence to persuade public bodies that equivalent private sector 
contracts act as evidence of competence. Tender complexity and 
experience accumulation contextually affect utilisation of a tender question 
scrutiny routine. However, a consistent context for all firms appears to be 
opaque procurer behaviour.  
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R (8) Regulatory compliance practices and artefacts  
What Fit for Life Does 
Firm leaders have created an infrastructure of policies, accreditations and 
procedures for business and service management that are compliant with 
public sector regulatory requirements and adaptive to changing demands. 
Artefacts (firm policies on employee diversity, green credentials) have been 
developed from prior reflexive interaction with structural properties that exist 
in a tendering process (i.e. demand for these capability displays). 
Information decay is recognised as a risk, so resources are customised and 
renewal to match supplier scoring criteria in tender specifications. Firm 
accreditation kite-marks, awards and professional body memberships are 
actively pursued to communicate specialist forms of capability, such as 
workforce investment. 
 
The S4U Operations Director describes initial experiences of firm tendering 
as exposing a resource gap that has now been filled. She refers to current 
policies as “very formalised”’ and explains that many policies and 
procedures had not existed prior to tendering beyond the legal minimum 
requirement. Whilst they are actively put to use, there is no reference to 
policy updating or renewal over time. A pattern was emerging with S4U’s 
current suppliers or prospective suppliers to tell tendering supply 
organisations that software supplier and tendering is a way to rationalise 
their existing supplier base. Regulatory compliance preparation has 
manifested itself inside the business through investment into a published 
set of policies are described as making life easier for future tendering. 
Elements of surprise demand additional work on an ongoing basis. For 
example, in addition to requesting an equal opportunities policy, the firm 
was on one occasion asked to submit evidence of how they knew their staff 
were trustworthy. On another occasion, it was asked to disclose details of 
LGBTQ staff numbers. This data that was not held by the firm, so it was 
resource-intensive to evidence. Overall, a review of a recent tender cued 
up typical sets of resource demands: staff turnover, revenue, who else the 
firm supplied to, references, internal procedures and policies and data 
protection.  
 
The Big Carer employs specialist staff to support tendering and, like FFL, 
they have created internal artefacts to ensure regulatory compliance. They 
have oriented their whole business proposition to meet public sector service 
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demand, specifically using public sector language. The policies they have 
in place are utilised as part of daily business. Conversely, The Local Care 
Company has a set of policies, that the MD admits are purely for show: 
“There’s a certain handful of documents that are absolutely 
no use to us whatsoever but we do tend to write them purely 
for tenders.” [MD] 
 
The quote illustrates that the firm has been subject to mimetic coercion and 
that it has demonstrated concessionary behaviour towards marketplace 
‘norms’. However, it has not helped the firm. There is a perception that 
tendering demands resource investment to formalise firm practices that 
may or may not exist inside the firm at an informal level. But at least they 
do see it as a set of documents; each is not re-invented each time. 
Informality is seen as a more comfortable domain.  
The expert informant raised a different concern about small firm 
understanding of financial compliance in relation to tender opportunities, 
referring to unwritten rules about existing company turnover in relation to 
the size of an opportunity in sight: 
“So you may look at a contract and think, ‘Oh, it’s £100,000.  
I can easily do that’ but if your turnover is only currently 
£50,000, £75,000 or £100,000 you’re not going to get it 
because they’re going to be looking for someone that will 
typically have a turnover of at least £300,000 a year.” [Expert 
Informant] 
Failure to apply environmental learning about market expectations, despite 
repeated interactions or a lack of experience, accounts for wasted 
resources to pursue unreachable tenders. This renders firm turnover 
another gateway to market entry as a structural condition. 
 
Accreditation acquisition as part of regulatory compliance is interesting by 
comparison. S4U had recently been awarded Investors in People and were 
working towards ISO 9001.  The Operations Director felt that accreditations 
were becoming a much more important artefact to demonstrate 
competency to public sector procurers, again reinforcing mimetic 
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isomorphism. She recognised them as strategic competitive artefacts. The 
Sales Managers held a different view, believing that evidence of robust 
software security is more important than generic forms of business 
accreditation. 
 
Like FFL, accreditation pursuit is another outcome of a causal effect of how 
procurers evaluated firm competence. However, the firm deliberately 
targets potential customers to engage in a product demonstration, either 
on-line or at a trade fair. The expert informant questioned whether 
procurers really know how to mark firms fairly that show they can handle 
complaints extremely well but have not formalised their behaviours into 
process in place that looks something like an ISO 9001 complaints process, 
suggesting it is formalisation that demonstrates capability. The Local Care 
Company MD confirms the firm “has all the quality marks in place” but he 
is unsure of how to utilise these as a resource for tendering, seeing 
accreditation gain as necessary marketplace catch-up. It did not appear to 
render an improvement in firm capability display or confidence. The 
difference between FFL and this company is that FFL use accreditations to 
appear market leaders and The Local Care Company treat it as a structural 
condition that places them in market ‘catch up’ mode. Regulatory 
compliance then is shaped differently in firms by their degree of orientation 
towards public-sector contracts as a specialist field. Different firms show 
different levels of commitment to put it to use as an asset for tender 
completion. 
 
R (9) Tender question answering and document preparation 
 
What Fit for Life Does 
Firm leaders do not rely on a cut and paste approach from previous answers to 
questions in other tenders; every answer is contextualised. Management 
checklists are developed for large tenders to cross-reference answers to the 
tender scoring criteria and overall service specification, as well as to address 
specific question needs. They understand how to structure answers and know 
how information may have to be repeated in a tender across multiple question 
to score high or full marks. The senior team sets themselves a standard of 
achieving high levels of readability for the procurer, and that includes using 
public sector language to describe their business operations to procurers. 
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S4U is training up its sales team how to answer tender questions to build 
more capacity in the firm. Like FFL, they mention that information needs to 
be repeated between one question and another. In contrast, the expert 
informant does not see much adaptation capability in relation to firm 
reflexivity through learning, and appears to describe a state of arrested 
development in many small firms: 
“The thing that I do see that is linked to that is complacency.  
So if they’ve found, for example, a form of words that 
worked, they’ll keep regurgitating them without thinking 
about tailoring it to what’s needed.”[Expert Informant] 
Regulatory compliance is often absent in reviewed tender responses; for 
example, writing ‘not applicable’ to Yes or No answers results in a tender 
being excluded. Expert informant impressions are that many firms are not 
thinking about answering each question from the perspective of the 
evaluator: 
“So they’re still trying to almost turn the contract into what 
they want it to be rather than what it is or they don’t 
understand the terminology of the question and that seems 
to happen a lot.” [Expert Informant] 
This comment leads on to a wider observation about a general absence of 
capability to understand tender terminology and its meaning. Perceptual 
positioning to answer questions from the procurer perspective was 
generally flawed through misunderstanding or lost in translation. For 
example, ‘How do you retain your staff?’ is a standard question posed in 
tenders. Typically, firms will state what staff retention levels are in their 
answer. The informant believes from experience that the public sector seek 
reassurance of a line management structure, regular performance 
appraisals and documented development plans. The informant then cued 
up what capability looks like: attention to detail, a concise writing style and 
evidence based answers. 
In The Big Carer, question answering is compared to doing an essay; 
answer the question and, where you are allowed, give your supporting 
information within a word count. Information display is perceived differently 
in case firms. An S4U respondent explains that their tender answers are 
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very text based, but they have already identified through attending a 
procurement workshop that tey can improve information display.  The 
Operations Director refers to making a tender response look more 
personable by including examples from other contracts, with testimony 
data. Current practice does not utilise an information display routine: 
 “Unless they’ve asked for diagrams or screenshots then we 
haven’t done anything visual.” [Operations Director] 
  
The Big Carer does not display endorsing information in a visual way, but 
recognises its value to procurers and to how tenders are scored. 
Domiciliary Ltd and The Local Care Company both have credentials they 
could display, but do not do so. The expert informant refers to the fact that 
small business leaders either forget or are unaware that tenders are read 
‘blind’, meaning that the readers are not given the firm name to refer to 
when scoring them. Tacit knowledge exists, but it is not deployed through 
firm processes. Contextual differences between firms in employing a 
question-answering routine links to levels of document complexity and 
experience accumulation to recognise where mistakes in answering can 
occur. Employment of this routine is also associated with higher levels of 
environmental learning at play inside the firm. 
7.3.4 Comparison of cultural routines  
 
(R10) Tender leadership and co-ordination 
What Fit for Life Does 
The tender completion process is professionally-led, and tender leadership is 
distinctive from tender question answering; it identifies risks, quality assures 
individual question responses against the scoring criteria including, when 
deemed necessary by the MD, mobilising external consultancy support. 
Tender leadership demonstrates mature knowledge of resource investments 
required that might involve research activities in order to contribute bespoke 
content into tender questions. The MD leads tenders with an infectious 
confidence in firm capability to win, yet recognised that continual engagement 
in environmental learning to accrue relevant knowledge and discard ‘old 
ways’ of doing things is required.  
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S4U respondents explain that they don’t have a defined process of how 
they get tenders completed but they are starting to put together checklists. 
Tendering activity resides with the sales team rather than with senior 
management. The Operations Director relies on internal knowledge 
transfer to build capacity:  
“We’ve never resourced external support for tenders.  
Maybe, again, it’s something we need to do in future but it’s 
not something that we’ve ever considered doing.  As they 
become more popular it might be something that we need to 
do.” [Operations Director] 
The Operations Director trains the sales team to interpret public sector 
demands. She has attempted to ensure consistency of answers between 
tenders by encouraging the sales team to refer back to and re-purpose 
sections from previously completed tenders. A key difference between S4U 
and FFL tenders is the size and scale of tenders received. The largest 
tender in the software firm is under £50,000, a figure that is below the 
bottom end of FFL’s lowest value tenders. A comparative review of 
specifications by the researcher implied that lower value tender 
specifications sometimes are less complex and demanding.  
 
The Big Carer uses an effective model for tender leadership. A director 
leads on asking people for information, distributing the drafting of particular 
sections, looking at the finances and then she pulls it together as well as 
doing some of the work. Typically, this includes looking where the gaps are 
overall within the tender and how answers to questions are evidence-
based. A tender is treated as a discrete project that draws upon wider 
research: 
“You look to the field for the best practice. I might read 
documents that tell me a service is similar in London so I 
might have to contact them and say I have read this article in 
the journal and you do this, how much does that cost, is that 
feasible, have you had any problems, just to see what the 
best practice is there.” [Operations Director] 
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The Local Care Company displays a lack of leadership, starting with a 
decision to submit a tender response or not. The MD expressed frustration 
of procurement processes and demands. Frustration affects the quality and 
breadth of resources invested into tender response efforts. In this case, the 
MD delegates tender completion to one person and described tender 
completion as a ‘form filling’ exercise. The approach to resource enactment 
was influenced by fear of failure and negative emotion. This interview was 
very emotional. The firm was at severe risk because of their failure to 
breakthrough into tendering and they felt helpless, exploited and angry. 
This gives insight into the tender demands and their inability to apply 
entrepreneurial capital or, indeed, sufficient human or social capital, to 
writing a tender. The liability of scale seems to be very strong. Negative 
emotion blocks the application of capital, especially entrepreneurial capital 
that mobilises human and social capital. 
 
The expert informant observes, with notable exceptions, an absence of 
organised attention to planning and applying learning to problem solving. 
The point is illustrated by reactions such as “I don’t understand what they 
are looking for”, poor data management or even complacency to 
thoughtlessly re-use pre-existing answers from previous tenders. The 
informant refers to tricks of the trade and the need  for tacit understanding 
that she believes are undermined by a complacent attitude or a failure to 
focus on and invest in time, thoughtful exploitation of human and social 
capital and other resources to get the job done. Expert informant opinion is 
that most small firms do not have any recognisable routine for leading 
tender completion, with some advice given to small firms: 
“A good firm owner would sit down and work out their win 
themes. They set aside the correct amount of time and think 
about who’s going to answer which question. Certainly the 
very good ones do that because they’ve learned by 
experience. The more common one is the one where one 
person, usually the owner of the business, leaves it ‘til the 
last minute and has a go and it’s very hit and miss.” [Expert 
Informant] 
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The informant further observed that the best completed tenders in small 
firms are usually led by the owner with clear allocation of specific questions 
to specific people. However, an absence of commitment to resource in 
many small firms leads to tender completion being ‘passed down’ to 
employees who answer questions without an appreciation of context. 
Mistakes are frequently made; for example, the registered address is not 
always the trading address, or cut and paste text from other tenders lack 
specificity to answer a question.  
Domiciliary Ltd uses an external consultancy firm to write tenders on its 
behalf. Despite a portfolio of contracts gained under a past commissioning 
regime, the MD feels personally ill equipped to compete through a formal 
procurement process and brought in external human capital in the form of 
a bid-writing consultant: 
 “We are not trained as tender writers…” [MD, Domiciliary 
Ltd] 
Domiciliary Ltd’s MD associates internal resource enactment for tender 
construction as riskier than bringing in an external bid writer to “talk the 
language” for them. This is interesting – a person he commissioned in a 
recent tender was not a specialist in the technical area but “understood how 
councils think”. The MD refers to his lack of a formal higher education 
qualification to validate his lack of confidence in tender writing. He does not 
involve other members of staff in tender submissions apart from for financial 
calculations. There is a fear about interpreting jargon and how to answer 
questions such as ‘value for money’ and ‘sustainability’; terms that are 
common to bids but not directly used in the company’s day-to-day business 
operations. Leadership of tenders is contextually dependent on firm levels 
of human capital, which varies between firms. Also, lower-value tenders 
require less leadership effort. 
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R (11) Teamwork 
What Fit for Life Does 
Teamwork is a strong routine applied to tender fulfilment. The division of 
labour through teamwork links to company culture and motivation. Teamwork 
is mobilised through effective tender leadership. Anxiety about risks of 
resource effort versus return are reduced through open channels of 
communication between the MD and senior team.  
 
 
S4U is similar to FFL in its capacity to have built a high performing team for 
tendering. The firm culture encourages and rewards shared task and 
responsibility. Whilst tender completion is described as a “last minute 
dash”, the lack of structure around formal planning is overcome by effective 
team working and informal communication exchange mechanisms between 
sales team members to fit tender completion around other tasks. The firm 
is considering future recruitment of sales staff with practical experience of 
tendering because it is becoming a more frequent activity and condition of 
winning work from existing clients. 
Teamwork in The Big Carer is also an established routine for tender 
completion. For each tendering episode, the tender leader brings together 
a mix of staff from the frontline, managers, and administrators to capture 
multiple perspectives from which to construct answers and propose 
solutions. The wider team do not consider the technicalities of the tendering 
process; rather, the focus is upon addressing how to interpret and meet 
procurer and customer needs.  
 
The expert informant discusses teamwork in the context of tender 
presentations, emphasising that it is critical for whichever individuals attend 
to appear to be a team, rather than a collection of individuals who don’t 
really gel together.  However, what was more typical, and the most common 
reason why firms fail to win tenders in her opinion, is a poor choice of team 
for the presentation.  Typically, the firm is not represented by somebody 
senior enough “so it doesn’t look like they’re that interested” or a senior 
leader “hasn’t bothered to read the bid and starts to answers questions that 
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don’t actually match what’s in the proposal”. This behaviour shows a 
business doesn’t have a team culture, and implies they’re not enthusiastic: 
“That’s the bit; it’s the only bit where you get to bring your 
personality and your passion into the picture” [Expert 
Informant] 
A teamwork culture was not detectable in The Local Care Company or in 
Domiciliary Ltd. So, case firms differ in using teamwork as a routine. This 
could be attributed to firm size, culture or both. 
7.3.5 Comparison of data mining routines  
 
R (12) Systematising tender information retrieval  
What Fit for Life Does 
The firm has systematic processes in place to store, retrieve and develop 
performance data to apply to tender writing. It uses specialist contract 
management to service data for existing contract performance and the system 
is used to generate example of data presentation in tenders as part of capability 
display. 
 
 
S4U stores and repurposes completed tenders to assist with future 
performance attempts. They also manage data on reasons why tenders 
and other sales activities are won and lost. S4U shows evidence of adaptive 
practices, and have started to apply using their tendering experiences to 
other forms of selling their capabilities in the market-place which is an 
expression of environmental learning. They have begun to build a template 
of the answers they receive about what potential customers look for and 
have converted it into a question and answer sheet. By doing so, they have 
created an expanded data-set about firm and product strengths.  
 
The Big Carer also maintains a library of past tenders. Firm leaders take a 
wider perspective on storing data that can be used to showcase 
reputational capital, not just answers to tender questions. For example, 
details about a recent kitemark, Investors in Volunteers, were stored for 
incorporation into future tenders, recognising that data management is a 
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dynamic process. The Local Care Company and Domiciliary Ltd do not 
systematically store and retrieve data for tenders. Systematisation of data 
between case firms is variable by its strategic commitment to win public 
contracts that unlocks resource commitment. This routine does not require 
specialist knowledge.  
 
R (13) Exploitation of existing contract performance 
 
What Fit for Life Does 
Firm leaders use existing contract performance as a reputational resource 
to deploy into competing for more business through tendering. For example, 
service user quotes and third party evaluation report extracts feature in 
tender response questions to validate aspects of service quality and 
reliability.  
 
S4U has experienced an increased demand from tender questions to 
communicate through tenders other public bodies with which they hold a 
contract. The firm is aware that its current portfolio can be leveraged as 
reputational capital and commented that word of mouth ‘spread’ interest 
between software purchasers. However, it does not go beyond mentioning 
current contracts in the way FFL does through user quotes or third-party 
evaluation reports. Like FFL, the firm has been approached to assist with 
creating a tender specification on the basis of its current contract portfolio. 
The Big Carer demonstrated a sophisticated approach to leveraging 
existing contract performance to employ as a reputational asset. The 
respondent describes high standards it uses for pro-active relationship 
management in tender answers. Domiciliary Care Ltd and The Local Carer 
do have reputational resources they could deploy, but they don’t recognise 
them as assets. Exploitation of assets is lower in firms that possess lower 
entrepreneurial orientation and environmental learning levels. 
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7.3.6 Comparison of transformational routines  
 
(R 14) Environmental Learning  
What Fit or Life Does 
FFL executive team members display team-level cognition to continually apply 
new learning to adapt routines. Environmental learning is enabled by a team 
culture and entrepreneurial orientation. Learning draws in external knowledge 
and creates internal knowledge through use of reflective practice. Learning is put 
to use after assimilation by active transfer into routines. It has led to new 
routines being created, such as tender question answering and documentation 
scrutiny. Other routines have been adapted through environmental learning, 
such as the formalisation of tender triage and tender question scrutiny.  
 
S4U’s team culture creates opportunities for wider assimilation of learning 
and, to some extent, adaptation of routines. It displays forensic curiosity in 
its limited market competitors and has adapted sales force activity to 
accommodate tender writing as a business building strategy. In particular, 
application of environmental learning has led to increased resource 
investment into accreditations as strategic competitive artefacts, 
suggesting formalisation is an outcome of environmental learning. 
However, learning is instinctive over proceduralised. It is a routine that is 
applied with limited scope, partly explained through context; the 
competition base and sector is more nascent and less innovation is 
required to win business through tenders than in FFL. Tendering is an 
increasing firm activity where formal staff development (to go on tendering 
courses) is beginning to emerge. S4U has not yet experienced procedural 
shock of losing an existing contract through a retender exercise, and they 
do not face staff losses through TUPE if that situation occurred because 
they offer a product not a service. 
 
The Big Carer has learnt that market-place learning is resource intensive, 
and it invests significantly in building and exploiting its social capital for 
discovering innovation practices and market gaps. It has learnt that tender 
completion is a collective activity, and that productivity and quality increase 
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through investment into routines that serve comprehensive tender triage 
and question answering. Tender leadership and co-ordination is a routine 
formed and adapted through environmental learning. The Local Care 
Company appears to be closed to environmental learning, blocked by 
negative emotion and a general mistrust of tendering as a contract award 
process.  Domiciliary Ltd use an external consultant to write their tender 
response, yet fail to learn from that expertise, which resides outside the 
business. The expert informant alluded to knowledge atrophy, where firms 
would repeat previous tendering performances without stopping to think 
about applying new knowledge. 
 
(R 15) Entrepreneurial Orientation (EO)  
What Fit for Life Does 
FFL displays a collective capability to access privileged knowledge and 
opportunities through its extensive appetite towards innovation, risk taking 
and self-efficacy (the three dimensions of EO).  Firm leaders apply 
extensive human and social capital to shape market opportunities to their 
advantage, wherever possible. Firm leaders are not intimidated by larger 
competitors; they use them as strategic alliance partners and as a source 
of learning. EO is dependent upon environmental learning and vice-versa.  
 
EO, like environmental learning, is a routine that changes routines, using 
innovation, risk taking and self-efficacy. S4U displays innovation in its route 
towards being invited for tender submissions. It has learnt that persuading 
a public institution to pilot their software leads to a direct invitation to tender, 
by which time the procurer has direct experience of S4U software. A team 
culture and team-working support self-efficacy, where firm members are 
not afraid to risk turn down invitations to tender that are considered less 
worthwhile.  
 
The Big Carer behaves more bureaucratically in its approach to opportunity 
discovery. Unlike all the other cases, it employs specialist business 
development personnel who have job descriptions with opportunity 
discovery as an embedded responsibility. This means they rely less on self-
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efficacy and create capability through a strategic national infrastructure. 
The expert informant believes that most small firms lack proactivity to 
search for tender advertisements and also to think innovately about how to 
respond. 
 
EO is endowed within a firm’s human capital, usually in its leader, as in FFL 
and S4U. It is mobilised in FFL across all routines to offer agile creation 
and adaptation of firm practices, observable in practices such as alliancing. 
In other cases, its lack of application to tendering does not mean that the 
firm lacks EO – it is simply not deployed in tendering. S4U has EO, but it is  
used much less in acts of tendering and much more in other forms of 
business building.  
7.3.7 Summary of routine presence and utilisation in comparative cases  
 
Chapter seven has employed a comparative case framework to routines 
within FFL. Table 7.1 below offers a comparison as to where routines exist 
and where they do not. No comparative firm demonstrates fifteen routines 
like FFL. The larger and highly experienced firm The Big Carer possess 
fourteen similar processes and no additional ones, with S4U exhibiting 
thirteen of the same routines but no additional ones. Results show most 
firms orient resources into tender completion but some neglect investment 
into situating capabilities that aid the ability to tender at all. Table 7.1 
examines to what extent comparative cases engage with the routines used 
within FFL. Comparative case study analysis is particularly useful to 
understand and explain how context variation influences the mechanisms 
that are triggered inside a firm and the outcomes this generates, whether 
successful or otherwise. This presents a challenge about how better to 
tailor the design of a capability framework intervention when dealing with 
different firms that operate in different markets. 
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Table 7.1 A summary of routine presence in comparative firms 
Routines types present in 
Fit for Life  
  
S4U The Big 
Carer 
 Domiciliary 
Ltd 
The 
Local 
Care Co 
 Expert 
opinion  
Information seeking  
Information Gathering  
 
Competitor Surveillance 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
N 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
N 
 
N 
 
N 
Strategic  
Criteria for opportunity 
selection and review 
 
Alliancing  
 
Safeguarding Market 
pricing  
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
 
N 
 
N 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
N 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
N 
Interpretive 
Individual tender 
opportunity triage 
 
Tender specification 
and question scrutiny  
 
Tender specification 
question answering and 
document presentation  
 
Y` 
 
 
Y 
 
 
Y 
 
Y` 
 
 
Y 
 
 
Y 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
Cultural  
Tender leadership and 
co-ordination  
 
Team work 
N 
 
 
 
Y 
Y 
 
 
 
Y 
N 
 
 
 
N 
N 
 
 
 
N 
N 
 
 
 
N 
Data Mining  
 
Systematising tender 
information retrieval  
 
Exploitation of Contract 
performance  
 
 
Y 
 
 
Y 
 
 
Y 
 
 
Y 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
Transformational   
Environmental Learning  
 
Entrepreneurial 
orientation  
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
N 
 
N 
 
N 
 
N 
 
N 
 
N 
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7.4 Comparison of capability expression in comparative cases  
 
In FFL, capability is critiqued as a framework, shown again below in 
Figure 7.1. This section compares FFL’s capability components (which 
are themselves generative mechanisms) to other cases. 
 
Figure 7.1: FFL’s capability framework for public sector tendering   
 
Structural capabilities    Everyday tendering capabilities  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.4.1 Market analysis capability  
 
Table 7.2 Comparative routine use in market analysis  
 
Routine  FFL S4U The 
Big 
Carer 
Domiciliary 
Ltd 
Local 
Care 
Co. 
Expert 
opinion  
Market 
information 
gathering  
Y Y Y N N N 
Competitor 
surveillance  
Y Y Y N N N 
Environmental 
learning  
Y Y Y N N N 
Entrepreneurial 
orientation  
Y Y N N N N 
 
FFL and S4U both display entrepreneurial orientation, but in different ways.  
FFL has an enhanced market analysis capability through high levels of 
absorptive capacity that enable environmental learning. This is in contrast 
to S4U which relies more upon its EO to find public business. Whereas FFL 
anticipate opportunities that do not yet exist, S4U sell IT pilot licences to 
find a way in to new customers, pre-tender. Both are successful. The Big 
Market analysis Market positioning  Reputation building  
Reading a tender 
specification  
 
Creative resource 
mobilisation 
Technical tender 
components  
Environmental Learning  
Entrepreneurial Orientation 
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Carer has a comprehensive infrastructure to collect market and competitor 
intelligence, but its approach appears to be more procedural than reflexive 
as it relies upon having people in post with job descriptions rather than 
individual self-efficacy. This indicates continual resource investment for  
market analysis over spiked resource assembly at times of tendering like in 
Domiciliary Ltd and The Local Care company. Whilst FFL seem to heed 
expert informant advice, mechanisms such as learning from competitors 
and market intelligence to assimilate useful ideas are often not triggered to 
act. The difference may be explained through several contextual factors: a 
track record of failing, a different sector, dissimilar leadership and a self-
fulfilling prophecy that they don’t stand a chance.  
 
Whilst all firms claim to want to maintain current business and seek 
profitable new business through tendering, specialist knowledge of market 
funding and future trends is present in S4U and The Big Carer but lacking 
in The Local Care Company and Domiciliary Ltd. S4U can analyse where 
market opportunities arise; however, in their sectoral context, the 
Operations Director does not use a micro-routine to register the firm on 
tender portals. Their market is niche and operates on a more informal word 
of mouth basis. Competitor surveillance is strong in S4U and The Big Carer 
where staff react to threats of unexpected competition entering the market, 
but non-existent in Domiciliary Ltd and The Local Care Company. This 
difference can be explained through a lack of contrivance and motivation to 
learn. 
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7.4.2 Market positioning capability  
 
7.3 Comparative routine use in market positioning 
Routine  FFL S4U The Big 
Carer 
Domiciliary 
Ltd 
The 
Local 
Care Co. 
Expert 
opinion 
Setting 
criteria for 
opportunity 
selection  
Y N Y N N N 
Safeguarding 
market 
pricing 
Y N N N N N 
Alliancing  Y N N N N N 
Environment
al learning  
Y Y N N N N 
Entrepreneuri
al orientation  
Y Y N N N N 
 
A comparative analysis shows that specialist forms of human capital 
(strategic tender selection and sense-making) are rare and not easily open 
to imitation between firms.  It also illustrates the role of firm reputation in 
being able to safeguard market prices and to secure joint partnerships for 
tendering. The Big Carer, a much bigger firm with 200 employees, uses 
collective agency to critique firm position in relation to advertised tenders. 
S4U does not, but does not need to, as it operates in a smaller and more 
bounded market for its software. The routines in use in FFL emerge as a 
result of learning how to do things better and in The Big Carer out of having 
better resources and scale. They may not be applicable for many small 
companies.  
Certainly, FFL and The Big Carer leaders identify with a market, which 
requires specialising in tendering; the other firms lean towards identification 
with discrete opportunities. This makes a marketing positioning capability a 
distinctive attribute in a small firm like FFL, driven by high levels of social 
capital invested into marketplace relationships. In FFL, market positioning  
is demonstrated through an alliancing routine, and in S4U it emerges partly 
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through a contextual marketplace advantage of being one of only several 
software suppliers, so less competition. Small firm market positioning is 
however irreducible to its individual members and needs to take account of 
context too. S4U operates in a moderately conducive marketspace, with 
few competitors and a growing market. All the other case firms operate in 
a crowded marketspace, and on occasion in hostile environments with 
pricing pressures. FFL applies boundary spanning, defined as connecting 
external knowledge of market opportunities and developments to firm 
participation (and collaboration) in tender competitions. It is also contingent 
upon firm having high levels of social capital, human capital and 
assimilation of absorptive capacity.  So, market positioning could be a 
capability form related to scale that medium but typically not small-sized 
firms have confidence to develop. 
7.4.3 Reputation building capability  
 
7.4 Comparative routine use in reputation building  
Routine  FFL S4U The Big 
Carer 
Domiciliary 
Ltd 
The 
Local 
Care 
Co. 
Expert 
informant  
Regulatory 
compliance 
artefacts and 
practices  
Y Y Y Y N Y 
Exploitation 
of contract 
performance  
Y Y Y N N N 
Environment
al learning 
Y Y Y N N N 
Entrepreneuri
al orientation 
Y Y N N Y N 
 
Variance of routine use linked to firm reputation building is explained in part 
through whether the two transformational routines are enacted inside a firm. 
It is interesting that all case firms prioritise concessionary behaviour 
towards regulatory compliance by earning kite-marks and creating written 
policies. Performance variation occurs when there is a lack of 
environmental learning and entrepreneurial orientation to put those 
resources to productive use. Reputation building is an exercise that needs 
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to attract stakeholder attention to hold or increase a firm’s market value. 
Simply having the resources inside the firm is insufficient; they require 
market display.  The Local Care Company does show entrepreneurial 
orientation towards reputation building in that it has offered to pilot new 
ways of working for local councils, demonstrating innovation and pro-
activity. However, when the service is tendered for, lack of other 
capabilities, particularly creative resource mobilisation and environmental 
learning, render the firm uncompetitive. 
7.4.4 Capability to read a tender specification  
 
7.5 Comparative routine use to read a tender specification 
Routine  FFL S4U The 
Big 
Carer 
Domiciliary 
Ltd 
The Local 
Care Co 
Expert 
opinion 
Individual 
tender 
opportunity 
triage 
Y Y Y N N N 
Tender 
specification 
and question 
scrutiny 
Y Y Y N N N 
Environmental 
learning 
Y   N N N 
Entrepreneuri
al orientation 
Y Y Y N N N 
 
This study leaves us in no doubt that reading and understanding a tender 
specification calls upon highly specialist knowledge. Tenders are written in 
codified language with complex contractual and legal data, and 
understanding procurement ‘terms’ is knowledge typically built through 
experience accumulation. Even successful firms like S4U admit to not 
reading through all of a tender specification before they start to respond to 
it. Capability to read a tender operates ‘hand in glove’ with a capability for 
market positioning. It is also inextricably linked to environmental learning. 
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7.4.5 Creative resource mobilisation capability  
 
 Table 7.6 Comparative routine use in creative resource mobilisation  
Routine  FFL S4U The 
Big 
Carer 
Domiciliary 
Ltd 
The 
Local 
Care Co. 
Expert  
opinion 
Tender leadership 
and co-ordination  
Y Y Y N N N 
Teamwork  Y Y Y N N N 
Systematising 
tender information 
retrieval  
Y Y Y N N N 
Environmental 
learning  
Y Y Y N N N 
Entrepreneurial 
orientation 
Y Y Y N N N 
 
Resource poverty is generally attributed to small firms in a tendering 
context. Yet what we see through this study is how successful firms (FFL, 
S4U and The Big Carer) use routines to increase productivity. They also 
adopt an end-to-end processual perspective to resource assembly that is 
made possible through cultural routines, tender leadership and teamwork. 
Systematising tender information retrieval is an outcome of environmental 
learning through experience accumulation. Yet FFL does not solely rely on 
stocks of information to answer tender questions. It employs 
entrepreneurial capital to introduce innovation via further research and 
bespoke contextualisation of each answer. FFL requires higher levels of 
absorptive capacity to acquire, assimilate and apply market knowledge 
than is needed in S4U. Lack of success in creative resource mobilisation in 
Domiciliary Ltd and The Local Care company is partly attributable to 
operating in a sector with high knowledge levels that require learning 
routines to be in position. 
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7.4.6 Capability to complete the technical aspects of a tender specification  
 
Table 7.7 Comparative routine use in technical tender components 
 
Routine  FFL S4U    The 
Big 
Carer 
Domiciliary 
Ltd 
 The 
Local 
Care 
Co. 
Expert 
opinion 
Market 
information 
gathering  
Y Y Y N N N 
Tender 
specification 
question 
answering 
Y Y Y N N N 
Environment
al learning 
Y Y Y N N N 
Entrepreneuri
al orientation 
Y Y Y N N N 
 
It is in this capability where firm competitive practice is most diverse. 
Domiciliary Ltd’s MD outsources tender writing and does not believe the 
firm has sufficient capability to learn and adapt to tender requirements. 
There is a direct link between creative resource assembly and completing 
the technical aspects of a tender. Successful firms like FFL asks for 
feedback on how their questions were scored to apply the learning into 
future tender submissions. Formalisation and a procedural approach to 
question answering is enacted through tender leadership and teamwork. 
Exercise of agency overcomes structural effects of regulation for FFL, S4U 
and The Big Carer that all invest in formalisation to learn the rules and 
effectively using a market orientation capability to exploit their assets. 
Unsuccessful firms may be entrepreneurial but fail to apply environmental 
learning to know how to encase their service offer in market terms and 
language. So, lack of success at technical tender components is 
contextually dependent upon a firm’s environmental learning.  
7.4.7 The role of dynamic capabilities as routines  
 
Each dynamic capability affects the execution and transformation of other 
routines. The following routines are observed to be most adapted through 
entrepreneurial orientation, which is defined in this study as a competency 
for improvised resource construction to sense and seize opportunities, 
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including opportunities that may appear potentially out of reach (e.g. 
because of firm size).  
 Market information gathering  
 Competitor surveillance  
 Strategic opportunity selection and review  
 Alliancing  
 Safeguarding market pricing 
 Tender leadership and co-ordination  
 Teamwork  
 
Organisational improvisation is enabled through entrepreneurial 
orientation. FFL is an exemplar case of application of entrepreneurial 
orientation to tendering practice, demonstrating the known attributes of risk 
taking, deliberate practice self-efficacy (Wiklund and Shepherd, 2003; 
Rauch et al, 2009). Rapid resource configuration is repeatedly observed. 
For example, it is able to create opportunities using prediction that it bases 
upon market information gathering. An example of confidence or self-
efficacy was evident from firm experience of winning an out of area 
contract: 
“I saw the opportunity and said, “Why don’t we go for it?”  
She said, “We can’t operate it in [ city] , we’re in [ city].  
You’d have to open an office” and it was worth a significant 
amount of money so we said okay, we’ll do it.” [HR Director] 
That experience leveraged a new opportunity flow, and FFL used the 
experience to repeat the pattern again and a further office was opened up 
in another city. It demonstrated deliberate action and risk-taking behaviour: 
So we just threw everything at it, big, big tender process, and 
we won it.  It was like, “Right, wow!” [HR Director]. 
S4U, like FFL, displays entrepreneurial orientation in how they promote 
their software, which has led to effective routines associated with market 
positioning. Tenders operate on a much smaller scale in this business and 
without the presence of TUPE, so in this sense they do not operate as a 
strategic influence upon overall business operations. By contrast, 
Domiciliary Ltd and The Local Care Company do not display any of these 
routines associated with entrepreneurial orientation. Expert informant 
256 
 
opinion that offered a generalised perception of small firm behaviour also 
did not indicate these associated routines as commonly present in SMEs.  
 
Similarly, the following routines are observed to be adapted through 
environmental learning, which is defined as the firm’s ability to reposition 
itself in the market through active engagement in learning, cognitive 
reflection and transformation of firm routines and operational capabilities.  
 Regulatory compliance and artefacts  
 Accreditation acquisition 
 Exploitation of existing contract performance 
 Tender question scrutiny 
 Tender triage 
 Data management  
 Question answering and document presentation 
 Display of firm credentials   
 
FFL continually demonstrates co-ordinated reconfiguration of its structural 
assets. An environmental learning capability drove action to change 
resource combinations into routines by formalising firm systems, building 
firm-level absorptive capacity, seeking and applying procurer feedback, 
and challenging procurer decision making. Expectations differ between 
firms: FFL and S4U are purposive cases selected on the basis of being 
successful in their field at tendering. From pilot case firms and the expert 
informant, only The Big Carer has set itself an internal some quality 
threshold to meet for tender responses, so enacting all of the routines that 
are seen to relate to environmental learning. No data suggests that 
comparative firms use imitation as a form of experiential learning like FFL. 
Low resilience levels prevent small firm leaders persevering, with a 
tendency to give up if they do not secure early success in tenders, making 
cumulative capability building impossible. Instead, capability building 
becomes constrained through cognitive inertia, avoidance of formal and 
informal learning opportunities, failure to exploit networks for knowledge 
and lack of engagement of the right people.  
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7.5 Chapter summary 
 
This chapter has compared fifteen routines and a capability framework FFL 
employs to other cases. The fifteen tendering routines discovered in the 
primary successful case, FFL, and compared in this chapter, are 
categorised in Table 7.8 under six types; i) information seeking; ii) strategic; 
iii) interpretive; iv) cultural; v) data mining; and, vi) transformational 
(otherwise known as dynamic capabilities).  
Table 7.8: A typology of competitive tendering routines that drive patterns of behaviour  
 
Information seeking routines  
Market information gathering  
Competitor surveillance  
 
Strategic routines  
Safeguarding market pricing 
Setting criteria for opportunity selection  
Alliancing  
Interpretive routines  
Individual tender opportunity triage 
Tender specification and question 
scrutiny  
Regulatory compliance practices and 
artefacts 
Tender specification question 
answering and document 
presentation   
 
Data mining routines   
Systematising tender information retrieval  
Exploitation of existing contract 
performance  
 
Transformational routines   
Environmental learning 
Entrepreneurial orientation  
Cultural routines  
Tender leadership and co-ordination  
Team-working  
 
A crucial point is that capabilities and routines are often absent. This is 
because some contexts make some capabilities and routines more 
important than others. Emergence of capabilities and routines relates both 
to structural conditions of context and firm agency and resources, of which 
comparative findings show that learning and entrepreneurial orientation are 
critical.  
 
The structural conditions of context are both omnibus and discrete. This 
study identifies discrete contextual factors of each case, below, as well as 
acknowledging and describing more generalised conditions, referred to as 
omnibus contexts. Case study findings and extant literature portray public 
sector tendering environments as a transparent but changing regulatory 
and policy environment with limited time allowance for assimilation of 
knowledge, rendering existing knowledge stocks and practices soon 
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obsolete or incomplete. There are also high entry barriers to understanding 
tendering processes and evidence demands in responses to questions.  
That said, different sectors will experience different levels of competition 
turbulence. S4U respond to tenders that do not appear to be as complex in 
nature as tenders submitted by FFL. This could be because of S4U submits 
lower value tenders (which may not be as complex) or it could be a sectoral 
issue where less technical question answering is used in tender appraisal.  
There also appears to be discrete conditions between these two firms for 
the competitive intensity and size/shape of each firm’s competitor base. 
FFL occupies a discrete context as the incumbent supplier to one contract 
discussed, which offers them information privileges. Case findings show 
that operating contexts have a positive, a neutralising or a negative effect 
upon firm competitivity. The criteria for competitiveness or capability 
depends very much on the nature of the market institution in terms of 
competition and procurer behaviour. This study has opened up the black 
box to look inside small firms and connect their actions with the broader 
social mechanisms at work in society.  
Structural constraints of complexity can successfully dampen active agency 
attempts where entrepreneurial orientation is not demonstrated. The expert 
informant on tendering believes that many small firm owners fail to learn 
about operating in tendering environments and a lack willingness to invest 
in doing so. In FFL and The Big Carer, sector tenders are by nature much 
larger in scope and scale, so entry barriers are higher through demands for 
increased financial indemnity levels and evidence of existing turnover 
threshold levels. Case observation reveals that larger value tenders can 
show increased complexity in structure and response demands. For 
example, extended use of compound questions with word counts and 
repetition of information across different questions is distinctive in larger 
tenders.  
Discrete contexts exist inside firms too. Case firms exhibit different growth 
intentions and commitment from leaders towards the company and to their 
own tendering performances. Every case firm has its own unique 
259 
 
experience of tendering but that can result in unequal levels of knowledge 
accumulation. The Local Carer owner is used to failure, conditioned to 
expect it, and this is reflected in the low resource stocks oriented towards 
tender fulfilment. Larger tenders completed frequently involve TUPE, 
whereby staff associated with service delivery can be retained, lost or 
acquired from another company upon successful tender award. TUPE is a 
structural condition that is applied to public sector tendering but not to every 
type of tender; not for example to software purchase.  A conclusion that can 
be drawn from an examination of context then is that by looking beyond 
institutional contextual constraints and enablers, small firm capability can 
only really be understood in temporal and episodic contexts. Discrete 
contextual factors apply to each firm when they consider a tender response: 
historical performance, sectoral competition, tender complexity demands, 
procurer socio-economic goals. Different forms of market ‘legitimacy’ exist 
within any particular tender situation (for example, formal accreditations, 
turnover, financial indemnity cover) and this creates flaws in ‘like for like’ 
firm comparisons. 
Comparative findings confirm that tendering demands specific resources 
and forms of capital to fulfil operational capabilities, and this requires 
considerable exercise of agency.  FFL, S4U and The Big Carer use 
knowledge of how to discover appropriate procurement advertisements. 
FFL and The Big Carer invest significant time into reading and interpreting 
specification data, award criteria and legal clauses in tender documents in 
order to make decisions on their viability. This is a routine that S4U has 
identified it lacks, but it is not a barrier to their success as the tenders are 
more straightforward.  
 
All case firms have previously won public contracts, so have a basic ability 
to comply with rigid procurement rules encased within the offer. However, 
Domiciliary Ltd and The Local Care company are more challenged by 
intermittent mobilisation of resources inside alongside ‘business as usua’ 
than the other firms, but they significantly lack competence to express their 
company offer through the written word in standardised response formats. 
260 
 
This has a negative impact upon their success. Conversely, FFL excels at 
positioning itself in public governance conditions, displaying specialist 
technical skills outside of the core product or service offer that articulate 
sustainability, innovation and equal opportunities. Capability to use 
reflection advantages firms like FFL which applies learning from their 
tendering experiences to harness market knowledge and expectations.  
Exercise of agency varies between firms under different social conditions, 
as firm-level learning is self-regulated. Mechanisms to acquire and absorb 
knowledge into firms are variable between cases.  
 
 All firms appear to face a similar social condition of increasing technical 
demands of tendering. To some extent, they all adopt a degree of 
formalisation by introducing policy statements and seeking accreditations. 
FFL goes a step further by codifiying their decisions and rules into artefacts 
such as a tendering strategy. So, degrees of formalisation can build or 
maintain efficient and effective technical practices, but this alone does not 
create capability. For example, The Local Care Company has invested 
resources into policy writing but it does not sufficiently mobilise them as an 
organisational asset in tender submissions. FFL describes a social 
condition they faced as being an incumbent provider under threat from a 
retendering exercise. Fearful of losing a tender, it employed defensive and 
opportunistic modes by using TUPE as a form of protection to deter 
competitors from their incumbent contracts. Defensive behaviour was used 
less constructively in The Big Carer who rejected partnership invitations to 
tender (for fear of knowledge exchange) and in The Local Care Company  
that limited its resources and time to certain tender completions, predicated 
on a belief that  the tendering system would disadvantage them against 
bigger firms.  
 
Case observation reveals that larger value tenders can show increased 
complexity in structure and response demands. For example, extended use 
of compound questions with word counts and repetition of information 
across different questions is distinctive in larger tenders. This does mean 
that tender demands are always proportionate to the scale of the contract. 
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Discrete contexts exist inside firms too. Case firms exhibit different growth 
intentions and commitment from leaders towards the company and to their 
own tendering performances. Every case firm had its own unique 
experience of tendering but that has still resulted in unequal levels of 
knowledge accumulation. This asks the question of whether experience 
accumulation equates to knowledge acquisition, and case observation 
indicates that it is not. Deliberate practice is required to learn. 
 
Case findings show multiple forms of acting across tendering episodes. 
Resource assembly, defined as a mechanism to connect the regulatory 
social conditions of tendering to firm action that can locate and arrange firm 
resources. It is contingent upon firm-level knowledge command of 
tendering requirements, which relies on a firm having high levels of social 
capital, human capital and absorptive capacity. Resource assembly 
connects the regulatory social conditions of tendering to firm action that can 
locate and arrange firm resources. It is contingent upon firm-level 
knowledge command of tendering requirements, which relies on a firm 
having high levels of social capital, human capital and absorptive capacity.  
 
In summary, tendering needs more than a commitment of resources or a set 
of routines to be competitive. A capability is built from resources and 
combinations of routines plus agency, expressed through firm culture. This 
leads to consideration of what this means for understanding causes. The 
next chapter discusses case findings at a theoretical level that can 
contingently serve to explain firm heterogeneity in tendering performances.  
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Chapter Eight: Discussion and conclusions 
 
8.1 Introduction  
 
In this thesis, the researcher has conducted an empirical exploration of 
successful tendering routines within one small firm, and a comparative case 
investigation of these same routines and capabilities in other firms. Findings 
have delivered a conceptualisation of small firm capability to competitively 
tender for public sector contracts, meeting the aim to develop a core set of 
ideas of what this capability can comprise. This chapter discusses the 
implications of case findings. It also offers a higher level of contribution 
through an interpretation of tendering as a laminated social structure, where 
structure and agency interact in contextually contingent ways.  
This chapter is in twelve sections. Section two is a summary statement of 
the contribution made to date in the thesis through chapters one to seven. 
It harmonises the state of existing knowledge with construction of a novel 
conceptual framework used in this thesis to identify firm resources, routines 
and capabilities in case firms. Section three critiques the theoretical 
framework utility. Institutional theory interprets firm tendering as contingent 
upon context, whilst capability and absorptive capacity theories account for 
capability building and renewal challenges. Section four offers a structural 
analysis of context. Tendering regulations and rules enforce or prohibit firm 
action. Firms need to adapt their behaviour to localised structural 
conditions, and this thesis shows how a capability framework is a 
generative mechanism to do so. Section five discusses why, within any 
given set of structural conditions, the exercise of firm-level agency 
interaction produces different performance effects. Section six reflects 
upon the extended use of a critical realist ontology to conceptualise 
tendering as a morphogenetic cycle that operates within a laminated 
context. Section seven posits a generative mechanisms-based account of 
tendering capability before section eight summarises the successful 
tendering routines that encase capability and section nine considers the 
implications of research on theory, practice and policy. Section ten 
suggests implications for the direction of future study. Section eleven 
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highlights the limitations of findings and section twelve is a set of concluding 
remarks.  
8.2 Statement of contribution from this thesis 
 
Chapter one of this thesis set out the operating context for small firms to 
win public sector work, and how tendering operates as a complex, 
regulatory and competitive market mechanism. As EU tendering law and 
governmental policies fluctuate, lessons learned about how small firms 
struggle to keep up to date with core competencies needed to develop 
superior responses for tendering remain obscure. This renders a focus on 
tendering resources worthwhile, and yet it also begs the question if 
competitive tendering can pushed down to a matter of resource ownership. 
Firm tendering capability is not an accident, a static process or even a 
single capability; it is a creative and purposeful endeavour built upon an 
interplay between business routines, building up knowledge of tendering 
inside a firm and the contextual environments where activity takes place.  
A review of empirical studies to date in chapter two between 1989 and 2017 
shows the limitations of knowledge from a capability-led approach to 
tendering, or explorations of the relationship between a firm’s tendering 
behaviour and its external operating environment. Existing literature cannot 
explain tendering capability at micro-foundational level, in terms of 
everyday routines that firms put to work. Prior studies are also generally 
locked into presenting a deterministic view of tendering (Freshminds, 2008; 
Loader, 2013). Several recent studies attempt partial conceptualisations of 
elements of capability, but without considering tendering as an end-to-end 
process (Woldesenbet et al, 2011; Reijonen et al, Tammi et al, 2014; Flynn 
and Davis, 2016). This study goes further. It headlines the function of firm 
agential power, and shows how capability is contingent on mobilising 
certain resources, like a manager skilled in networking.  It is under particular 
conditions, and with particular management, that smaller firms can develop 
capability. 
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The few inductive studies published are inconclusive on the micro-
foundations of what tendering capability is, or how it is built and maintained. 
Literature generally agrees that tendering is both resource intensive and 
demands specialist forms of knowledge and skills, but stops short of 
explaining a relationship between resources, resource mobilisation to 
configure routines, and the role of routines to underpin capability. This is 
because a lack of clarity exists between the relationship between the 
capacity or potential for firm actions (agency) to unlock resources and the 
discrete contextual conditions that remain unique to every firm and indeed 
to every tendering episode. Chapter two, then, shows that the current state 
of knowledge on small firm tendering lacks a solid theoretical foundation. 
The constructed theoretical framework in chapter three re-conceptualises 
tendering capability. It enables us to study emergence, simplified as what 
changes when firm agency interacts with public sector tendering as a social 
institution, its recursive relationship with knowledge acquisition and how it 
can reconfigure its tendering assets for competitive acts.  
Chapter three examines three theoretical perspectives that serve to answer 
three research questions, as set out in Figure 8.1 below: 
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Figure 8.1 Theoretical framework to study small firm tendering capability in relation to 
research questions (restated from chapter three)  
 
 
To learn about the                  To review forms of  To observe knowledge  
social nature of                   capability to contribute    acquisition & mobilisation 
tendering    to practice   
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Theoretical framework to study small firm tendering capability  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Capability Theory  Institutional theory  Absorptive Capacity  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.1 illustrates the alignment of research objectives to identified 
research questions that were identified in chapter three. The research 
framework has examined firm leaders as situated learners (Cope, 2003). 
The application of this novel theoretical framework to evaluate empirical 
findings is itself a contribution to knowledge. Research findings make bold 
claims in relation to existing literature. They outline a theoretical model that 
can explain the role of agency in developing capability to craft capability, 
whilst acknowledging the complexity of the tendering environment with its 
set of structural conditions. More specifically, it is capability to respond to 
that context and set of conditions.  
Literature review  
To understand the 
nature of the public 
sector tendering  
environment, and how it 
impacts upon  
small firms 
 
To explore what 
different forms of 
capability exist and the 
nature of routines and 
resources that support 
them 
 
To examine how 
small firms acquire 
and assimilate 
knowledge into the 
firm through forms of 
learning 
Dynamic capabilities built inside a firm to compete 
in an external environment.  
 
 
RQ1: What are the 
practices, expressed 
as routines, that 
generate capability to 
successfully tender in 
the case firm?  
 
RQ2: What causal 
powers exist within the 
tendering environment 
to constrain and enable 
small firm tendering 
performance? 
 
RQ3: To what extent, 
and how, do small firms 
learn to improve their 
tendering capability 
through repeated 
tendering experience? 
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Chapter four re-conceptualises tendering as a social institution. The 
implications of studying firm capability as institutional inhabitants of a 
complex, laminated system, where firm performance attempts are 
continuously calibrated through resource reconfiguration and renewal 
through firm-level learning, is discussed in section 8.2.1.  
Chapter five demonstrates the utility of a qualitative research strategy to 
adopt a micro-foundational approach to a comparative case method. It 
explores how and why a critical realist research design is suitable to explore 
the interaction of structures, events, human agency and contexts. A 
retroductive methodology, explained in chapter four, is applied to case data. 
Chapters six and seven portray case findings about firm resources and 
routines as a codified knowledge system. They illustrate how routines, as 
building blocks of capability (Dosi et al, 2000), can combine into a dynamic 
framework of capability domains. The capability framework contributes to a 
processual understanding of tendering capability. The contribution of the 
theoretical components of the framework are discussed next in terms of its 
utility to highlight firm tendering capability, starting with institutional theory. 
 
8.3 Utility of the theoretical framework  
8.3.1 Tendering capability from an institutional theory perspective  
 
This thesis has attempted to highlight both the structural and agential 
relationships that exist within one particular social system for small firms, 
public tendering. Causal powers or demi regularities (Lawson, 1997) are 
explained as potential or actualised processes that become embedded 
within public sector tendering structures through time. Institutional theory 
has contributed to a structural analysis of context to study tendering 
capability. It has been applied to regulation (Kitching et al, 2015) but not 
previously to tendering. Its application in this thesis has been to interpret 
small firms as inhabitants of a much wider social institution that has a 
laminated power structure with downward causal effects. From this 
standpoint, a micro-foundational analysis of case firm actions offered a rich 
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study of the conditions and contexts within which firm leaders exercise 
agency.   
Tendering is a context-specific performance, and the application of a 
stratified ontology enables tendering to be presented as a laminated 
structure, as shown in Figure 8.2 below. Laminated structures make up the 
tendering environment. The presentation of tendering as a laminated 
context in chapter four emphasises the stratified nature of reality and the 
two-way nature of interaction, whereby entities shape and become modified 
themselves by other forms of agential and structural power. What is 
important is recognising the need to understand institutional context to be 
in a position to respond and develop routines and capabilities that can 
match tender complexity. Institutional structures govern resource 
availability, and firms must make their resources appear relevant to the 
public market to gain legitimacy. Firms have different access to resources 
through their social positioning.  
Figure 8.2: A laminated structure of public sector tendering( restated from chapter four)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Application of institutional theory to explore the environmental pressures 
that exist within the social structure of tendering enables an observation of 
the inter-connectivity between structure, agency and emergence, forming a 
morphogenetic cycle (Archer, 1995). Agency effects reproduce, neutralise 
or challenge social effects over time as a morphogenetic cycle. The 
morphogenetic cycle can be applied at the level of society Archer (2003) 
UK government  
The market economy 
European law 
Public procurement units  
Competitive supplier base   
Individual firm  
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and applying the it to the tendering environment affords an examination the 
roles of the different entities within the overall public procurement system. 
It has temporarily separated what happens in a morphogenetic cycle of 
tendering. Table 8.1 offers three illustrative examples from case data. 
Table 8.1 FFL case data illustration of the morphogenetic cycle of tendering  
Social conditions 
(structure) observed in 
case firms 
T2 –T3 actions 
observed in case 
firms 
 
T4 elaborative structural 
changes observed in 
societal conditions  
Increasing and dynamic 
societal technical 
demands of tendering 
Coercive and mimetic 
market pressures are 
exerted upon supply 
chain firms  to 
homogenise their 
capability display  
Agential focus on 
building  or 
maintaining efficient 
and effective and 
competitive technical 
practices 
Agential focus on 
gaining accreditations 
to display legitimacy  
Resource stocks are raised 
in FFL to ‘keep up’ with 
tender scoring criteria; 
accreditation hallmark value 
of quality is diluted as a 
competitive edge  
Contract sizes under 
tender are increased or 
aggregated in size in line 
with public efficiency/ 
austerity measures  
 FFL grow their resources 
(and size) to compete; “The 
bigger players are getting 
bigger.  So, we are getting 
bigger” [Marketing Manager 
 
The stratified nature of the social interaction observed is such that the 
public institutions shape the context for action for opportunistic firms in the 
supply chain. Yet agency within firms can, and does, create problems that 
public institutions do not expect. Structure and agency play a significant 
role in public tendering systems, and adopting a  morphogenetic approach 
to understand structure and agency interaction has helped to understand 
how small firms might affect, and be affected by, tendering interactions. 
Small firm competitive tendering practices become conditioned through 
ubiquitous and discrete contexts that have a temporal effect. The study 
moves tendering literature on from a static description of performance 
attempts towards an analysis of a spatio-temporal process with generative 
mechanisms. It is evidence that tendering can be captured in a causal 
model as an emergent process from context.  
 8.3.2 Tendering from a capability theory perspective 
 
Capability theory extends understanding of the forms capability can take. 
The thesis draws upon prior work in strategic management literature. It 
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assimilates components of the RBV (Penrose, 1959; Barney, 2001) by 
highlighting firm investments into and control of human, social, financial, 
operational and entrepreneurial resources. One FFL routine, safeguarding 
market pricing, is an example of a routine that is considered rare and 
inimitable in the VRIN framework (Barney, 1991). The KBV (Grant, 1991) 
places knowledge as the primary productive firm resource, and its utility 
resides in helping to identify where knowledge resides in tacit and codified 
forms. It theoretically distinguishes between routines (Miner, 1991; 
Makadok, 2001; Feldman and Pentland, 2003), ordinary capabilities 
(Barney, 1991; Winter, 2000; Helfat and Peteraf, 2003) and dynamic 
capabilities (Teece et al, 1997; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000). Generic 
literature on routines broadly defines them as ‘patterns’ (Becker, 2004). 
Literature also identifies them as assets to (re) configure opportunities 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) formed through experience (Woldesenbat et 
al, 2011) have an intended purpose (Amit and Schoemaker,1993) and can 
be operational or dynamic (Helfat et al, 2007).  However, there have been 
few empirical attempts to study processes through which routines are 
created.  
 
Dynamic capability theory (Teece et al, 1997; Teece, 2007) has been put 
to work in this study to explain resource renewal and forms of agential 
behaviour. Dynamic capabilities operate through specific mechanisms 
(Teece, 2000) and optimise small firm tendering capability in study findings. 
They create firm-level competitive advantage. Helfat et al (2007) refer to 
them as calibrating capabilities, meaning a firm’s technical fitness to get a 
job done and evolutionary fitness to shape the environment in which the 
task is performed. This study has isolated two dynamic capabilities that add 
clarity and knowledge to what can specifically influence capability in small 
firms. It is the dynamic capabilities link the conceptual framework and 
empirical data. Environmental learning builds capacity for social cognitive 
skills to understand the viewpoint of others. For example, environmental 
learning in FFL prevents information decay and builds defences to 
competition. 
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Findings show routines are temporal and require re-investment. Whilst 
procurement practice is itself amenable in part to rationalisation, operational 
routines in themselves do not create sustainable competitiveness. It is 
dynamic capabilities that lead to the composition, configuration and renewal 
of competitive routines. In this way, firms can acquire the distinguishing 
characteristics of expert performers though being a collective cognitive actor 
(Peteraf and Shanley, 1997). This involves adapting to unstable contexts 
and goes beyond displaying cognitive efficiency; self-reflective and other-
reflective behaviour is also necessary (Feldmand and Pentland, 2003). 
Findings suggest that capabilities may not always be composed of routines 
(Dosi et al, 2000) and that an action can be both a routine and a capability. 
Field data shows that not every routine deployed towards tendering 
increases capability. For example, case firms S4U and Domiciliary Ltd earn 
accreditations to build their reputational capital, with public procurers but fail 
to capitalise on doing so in tender responses. Tendering knowledge 
accumulation is by its episodic nature incremental, but even so, not all 
capabilities can improve with experience. The successful case firms use 
interacting routines that include critical and self-reflective behaviour. For 
example, FFL invests time into peer to peer review of how each other have 
answered tender questions, suggesting team-working is a cultural attribute 
that drives quality and learning. Knowledge deposited only in individuals can 
remain in a tacit state until it is socialised. This requires a firm to have 
adequate ability to codify knowledge inside the firm. What is apparent using 
capability theory is that routines can emerge in many different ways and 
from diverse sources.  
 
8.3.3 Absorptive capacity as a theoretical explanation for capability 
renewal  
 
The impact of absorptive capacity on the effectiveness of tendering 
capability offers a theoretical explanation for knowledge acquisition, 
assimilation and codification inside the primary case firm. Absorptive 
capacity, defined as the “firm’s ability to identify, assimilate and exploit 
knowledge from the environment” (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989, p.569-570) 
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is a theoretical construct that has served to investigate how a firm locates 
competitive ideas and learns to apply them. There is a direct link between 
absorptive capacity and the dynamic capability for environmental learning. 
Few studies have examined the internal processes of absorptive capacity 
(Jansen et al, 2005), yet adaptability is contingent on the ability to learn 
effectively. This study has been able to identify examples of internal and 
external practices for absorptive capacity. FFL, S4U and The Big Carer 
demonstrate multiple modes of internal learning practices, with several 
techniques in common: team-based discussions about tenders, tender co-
ordination, appointing a tender production team with episodic learning 
outputs and building a database to store knowledge for tendering episodes. 
FFL employs some specialist methods not seen in other cases, such as 
developing internal artefacts to store procedural memory. The Big Carer 
and FFL both accelerated firm learning about tendering through 
intentionally recruiting staff with experience and investing specialist 
resources into detailed reading and interpretation of tender specifications. 
Findings show some case firms are effective at putting agency to work 
inside the firm to increase firm learning to tender. How behaviours like this 
emerge is encased in context. FFL drew upon seeking procurer feedback 
after a tender has been won or lost, conducting a competitor analysis, 
networking, imitation of market practices and learning from an expert as 
ways to harness external absorptive capacity. S4U did, nor do not need to 
use all these mechanisms, but they did attend a training course on 
tendering. External absorptive capacity methods like these were not visible 
in unsuccessful case firms Domicilary Ltd and The Local Care company.   
 
This study presents evidence that firm learning about tendering cannot only 
be explained by experience accumulation. Existing literature makes claims 
to learning through experience (Erridge et al, 1999; Blackburn and 
Smallbone, 2008) and it also states that unsuccessful performance 
attempts reduce learning capacity (Smallbone, 2009), yet it is not able to 
articulate what is encased within the black box of internal firm tendering 
performance attempts. Existing empirical studies show that prior 
experience is valuable as an initial form of human capital (Blackburn and 
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Smalbone, 2008) but does not offer an explanation of its utility. Similarly, 
social capital through network belonging is alluded to but not explored. This 
thesis contributes a novel application of absorptive capacity (AC) to explore 
small firm tendering capability.  
 
A key contribution  has been to apply specific components of a firm’s stocks 
of AC and to show how they are deliberately acquired and amenable to 
change. The conditions under which AC can provide value can also be 
explained. Previously, the utility of AC has been described as a capacity to 
learn and solve problems (Kim, 1998). This study has located routines 
within which stocks of AC can reside and be increased or constrained within 
a firm as a result of environmental and internal structural conditions which 
places AC into a potential or realised state. To date, no studies can be 
found that explain a process for assimilating and modifying imported 
knowledge into firm tendering routines. It supports the argument that small 
firm tendering capability can be agentially developed through firm level 
ability to value, assimilate and apply new knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal, 
1990).  
 
The study has highlighted how it is possible to empirically evaluate the role 
absorptive capacity plays in small firm tendering capability, even if case 
firms do not recognise tendering episodes as a learning environment. It is 
shown that the same routines in different firms have different dimensions 
of capability, whether it is just to get the job done or to do so more 
competitively than others. Absorptive capacity per se demonstrates 
complex ways how routines can be learnt, imitated, adapted or made 
redundant. A fundamental difference between cases is the innate ability to 
create new ideas to improve tendering performances and put them into 
practice; in other words, the firm level of absorptive capacity to acquire 
knowledge from internal and external environments. Whilst Domiciliary 
Care Ltd and The Local Carer stay in transmission mode, similarities exist 
between The Big Carer, S4U and FFL in regarding tendering performances 
as a series of staged processes of interpretation, execution and review with 
a set of learning outcomes. Each of these firms deliberately build and then 
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exploit reputational capital. Co-ordination capabilities are known to 
enhance a firm’ potential absorptive capacity (Jansen et al, 2005), whereas 
systems capabilities such as formalization strengthens realised absorptive 
capacity. Figure 8.3 is a conceptual model for the assimilation of small firm 
tendering episodes. It illustrates the way knowledge enters a firm and the 
stages inside the firm post acquisition that convert it into use. 
 
Absorptive capacity exists as a potential or a realised force (Zahra and 
George, 2002).  It can exist potentially through knowledge acquisition and 
assimilation processes but it remains unrealised until it is put to work inside 
the firm by transforming practices in such way that can deliver new results. 
Absorptive capacity is variable between case firms. A low modality 
indicates a firm that cannot assimilate knowledge and does not invest much 
effort into learning processes. A medium modality describes moderate 
internal learning. High modality shows strong connections to external forms 
of knowledge and understands how to draw it in and exploit it.  
Figure 8.3 Conceptual model for the assimilation of small firm tendering learning episodes. 
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acquisition, assimilation and codification. FFL changes existing practices 
into better ones for themselves, initiating endogenous change often without 
the effects of external stimuli to demand a process change, which can be 
attributed to entrepreneurial orientation. Equally, firms must be innovative 
to put forward the amount of resources into tendering. To do this 
competitively, they must be able to spot and interpret signals from the 
environment to support decision-making about resource investment, and 
this function relies upon environmental learning.  
  
8.4 A structural analysis of context 
 
Emergence of tendering capability is constrained or facilitated for different 
firms in different contexts by causal mechanisms operating at a number of 
inter-dependent levels. Every firm has its own way of approaching 
tendering, and there is not one right model which could describe capability 
in such a way that it would be right for every company or context. This is 
because every firm will occupy a discrete set of contextual conditions. 
Starting with an appreciation of context, all case firms operate under 
different conditions, and it is under different conditions that varying routines 
can emerge and change. Procurement capability is therefore a combination 
of context and firm response to these conditions. Context carries different 
structural conditions; sometimes structural conditions can be similar but still 
deliver different agency responses. No one tendering episode observed is 
the same as the next and firm perception of an event is always partial and 
fallible. This makes it necessary to know the social and cultural conditions 
necessary for change mechanisms to operate. 
 
The context of organisations requires knowledge of both omnibus and 
discrete contexts (Nielsen and Miraglia, 2017). In existing literature, 
findings generally only refer to context at a ubiquitous level, without 
examination of individual tender and firm situation. Examples of ubiquitous 
context include, for example, high entry barriers, formal language and 
regulation complexity or the liability of smallness compared to large firms.  
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Structure is created by institutions that express rules (either implicitly or 
explicitly) that qualify tendering practices as legitimate or illegitimate, 
desirable or undesirable, allowed or prohibited, etc. Therefore, participant 
roles in different entities become more or less defined behaviourally and 
though process participation. The structural conditions of tendering, that is, 
the everyday contextual conditions that interact with a small firm have not 
previously been subject to empirical study using a micro-foundational 
approach to identify resources and routines that underpin capability. The 
selection of two successful firms as primary and secondary purposive 
cases affords an examination of the role of learning as a capability at firm 
level: what triggers it to emerge and how it is sustained is novel. 
 
Given the emphasis in literature upon macro-micro effects of tendering, 
there is scant evidence that the institution of public sector tendering is agent 
sensitive in its approach to suppliers (Hodgkinson, 2006). Formalised policy 
development in FFL and S4U, for example, is predicted on pleasing public 
sector procurement processes rather than firm need for formalisation, 
although the software company does shape its opportunities through 
product demonstrations. Therefore, at micro-level formalisation, there is a 
clear ubiquitous effect on small firms. Whilst it can make claims to enabling 
knowledge transformation (Justin et al, 2005), there is also an argument 
that it can constrain exploration efforts and restricts a full view of the 
contextual environment (Weick, 2015).  
 
Lack of formalisation of firm processes is not an inhibitor to firm 
competitivity – perhaps this is contextually dependent. Tendering in Fit for 
Life and The Big Carer is a mid-term strategic activity, whilst in S4U, equally 
as successful in its own market, it is performed as a short-term product 
sale. Superficially, tendering interaction my look like activity follows a 
trodden trail of path dependency (Ebbinghaus, 2000) with an undesired 
effect where there is an institutionally defined pattern of behaviour. In some 
cases like Domiciliary Ltd, this may apply, but in the primary case of FFL, 
deliberate practice places the firm more squarely in a path creation context. 
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FFL exemplifies a path-creation approach to its emergent knowledge 
routines, to achieve superior performance levels, as illustrated in the figure 
below. 
Figure 8.4 A path creation approach to designing firm capability to tender  
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Deliberate learning can be construed as path creation and is evidence of 
the effects of agency as well as broader social mechanisms that operate 
through every case. The notion of generative mechanisms as routines 
offers a better explanation of the social phenomena of tendering. They 
exercise power but cannot always be directly observed – they are 
detectable through reductive discovery of empirical observation and 
describe agency.  
 
8.5 What case firms exercise through agency 
 
Agency best describes the capacity for people to transform things. This 
study has compared findings across multiple organisational settings. It is 
challenging, as actors take decisions and mount performance attempts 
under different contexts. The units of tender production in each case differ, 
and not all participants in firms will share the same understanding of the 
tendering process. Active agency in firms is continually responding to 
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contextual factors and dynamic external and internal conditions. Agency 
effects can explain routine emergence, change and obsolescence. 
Internally for example, a firm may have greater or lesser confidence in their 
ability to tender. Low toleration thresholds for uncertainty suggest a lack of 
entrepreneurial orientation to solve problems associated with tendering 
practice in The Local Carer and Domiciliary Ltd. FFL enacts multiple micro-
level effects, especially formalisation of routines and their adaptation 
through a combination of repeated use plus application of new knowledge. 
Applying knowledge to sense-making processes is tacit, not explicit (Weick 
1995).  
 
Existing literature has, more or less, a one sided view of tendering as a 
disadvantaging sales mechanism for small firms. This is not disputed in the 
thesis. What is highlighted in the study is that firms are socially-positioned, 
and resource assembly is an historical process that is assisted through 
experience accumulation, deliberate learning and improvisation. What a 
comparative case study shows is that knowledge combines with tangible 
resources (such as financial means, premises or technical equipment) and 
slack manager development time to create dynamic capabilities (McKelvie 
and Davidsson, 2009). It appears to be a good practice for all firms to create 
a tendering strategy, or certainly those that have enough reputation to pick 
up the bigger contracts.  The fact that FFL has criteria for opportunity 
selection at all is a new discovery, and that having this process avoids 
wasted resources when jumping in and pulling out of tender writing. 
It is clear that firms do use resources to compete, but in practice fieldwork 
has shown that firm leaders are not skilled at identifying what resources 
exist and how they can contribute towards capability. Some resources like 
knowledge can only earn temporary profits unless they are continually 
replenished. FFL is a good example of a firm that has a mature resource 
base that is hard to imitate. For example, its exercise of agency to create 
economic deterrence from other firms is achieved by paying its staff above 
market rate, making FFL under TUPE an expensive undertaking for another 
firm to acquire. Many routines, such as the assembly of existing contracts 
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as a sales asset is hidden or must be built cumulatively. Therefore, routine 
imitability is not straightforward and adding or upgrading firm resources for 
tendering is in addition to a firm’s focus on its product or service 
development. Fieldwork is also a reminder that opportunity selection is 
spatial. The transferability of data from tender to tender is useful but limited. 
Adaptation of resources is resource-dependent upon firm learning, whether 
it is just from experience accumulation or from other forms of absorptive 
capacity driven by agency such as competitor surveillance, imitation, 
blocking or by a firm culture that invests in and values reflection on and 
commitment to practice development. Dynamic capabilities, however, 
create direct costs in explorative and exploitative learning and build new 
routines that often have high capability levels, representing ‘sunk’ 
investments in order to survive (Helfat and Winter, 2011).  
 
8.6 Extended use of a critical realist ontology to explore 
tendering capability  
 
The current state of theory building in the field of small firm tendering 
capability does not address how to understand causal relationships 
between the structural components of the tendering environment and the 
exercise of resources and agency within a firm. To understand tendering 
capability is to recognise that relationships exists in an open, complex and 
dynamic environment. This study offers innovation in being the first 
empirical study of firm tendering to use a critical realist ontology.  
It is a framework to dissect causal powers to abduct a novel theory to aid a 
better explanation of broader social mechanisms overlooked in extant 
literature. As a result, hidden data information has been uncovered that can 
inform a set of general requirements for tendering capability. It has 
separated observable events described in empirical data from the role of 
social structures that are embedded, culturally and politically, within public 
sector tendering. It has enabled theoretical arguments to make sense of 
empirical data. The use of mechanisms-based research has demonstrated 
its potential to assist with theory-building about tendering capability, and it 
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also carries potential to assist with theory-building in a broader sense 
about, for example, the effects of other forms of regulation and capability 
building in small firms. Discussion in this chapter shows primary importance 
to structural conditions that shape the capabilities small firms can accrue. 
Context cannot be treated as a static concept, and a firm’s tendering 
capability cannot be fully observed in isolation from its temporal 
environment. 
 
A critical realist methodology described in chapter four has enabled equal 
prominence to be given to forms of structure and agency. It has helped to 
explore a number of issues that challenge the way society thinks about 
tendering as a public institution. Critical realism is a theory that engages 
with an explanation of the social world as a structured, open system with 
embedded actors who can behave reflexively. Existing empirical studies do 
not engage in this way to understand and explain relationship construction, 
emergence and constraints between actors at different levels within the 
laminated structure of society. The role of agency is under-explored in 
existing studies; a realist analysis has enabled a fuller conceptualisation of 
the social processes that operate under the visibility radar in everyday 
tendering exchanges. Using the realist concepts of embeddedness, context 
and mechanisms, and the acceptance of a stratified ontology to conduct a 
stratified examination of cases, hidden data information has been 
uncovered that can inform a set of general requirements for tendering 
capability. 
 
Critical realist theory develops and tests reality in three domains; the real, 
actual, and empirical (Bhaskar, 2008). The real domain includes generative 
mechanisms. Generative mechanisms identified in this thesis explicitly link 
empirical data to causal reality, creating generative causation. Through a 
structural analysis of firm context, the study has located how routines are 
the generative mechanisms that activate firm capability. Kitching et al 
(2015) uses a critical realist approach to explain regulation as a dynamic 
force with enabling and constraining effects on firm performance through 
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institutional operation of regulatory powers. Such effects arise as firms 
adapt through interactive experiences. This study offers a micro-
foundational scale, with the structural conditions of tendering seen as one 
such form of regulation and its causal power. Theoretical understanding of 
small firm tendering capability has emerged through the processes of 
abduction and retroduction. This has achieved a novel explanation about 
tendering capability emergence in a small firm and how it is constrained or 
facilitated for different firms in different contexts by causal mechanisms 
operating at a number of inter-dependent levels. A principal aim of this 
thesis has been to develop a theoretical representation of a tendering. 
Critical realism as a meta-theory places context centre stage to consider 
what works for whom and under what circumstances (Tilly, 2015). As 
tendering is part of an open and complex social system it relies upon 
interpretation through context, making standard advice difficult to give to 
small firms. However, the identification of generative mechanisms as demi-
regularities provide a platform of sensitising concepts upon which to build 
experimental practice and monitor effects in small firms. 
8.7 A generative mechanisms-based account of tendering 
capability  
 
Chapter four introduced the concept of generative mechanisms as mid- 
range theory (Merton, 1957) to account for an explanation of tendering 
capability. Case studies in this study provide empirical instances in which 
generative mechanisms can be partially isolated; looked for in the attitudes 
of interviewees, in their actions and by their interaction with the social 
system of tendering. This gives a way in to analyse structure as they draw 
out human reflexivity. An abductive approach offers a GM based account 
to conceptualise capability as a configuration of mechanisms (Smith and 
Seward, 2005). By doing so, the thesis can propose that different 
combinations of the mechanisms can contingently account for competitive 
performance variation between case firms. Generative mechanisms 
located in firm-level agency carry high levels of explanatory power for 
interpretation of what causes empirical events. It shows the ability to 
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connect multiple tender demands to an end-to-end set of routines that 
increases the compliance, quality and level of innovation demonstrated in 
a tender response. It is contingent upon a firm having a focused and expert 
tender leadership capability, a teamwork culture and application of 
absorptive capacity. Understanding the nature of causality is a core part of 
this research thesis.  GMs are powers that are possessed, exercised or 
simply remain as potential. What is clear is that service skills alone cannot 
create contract growth.  
 
The documentation of capabilities and routines and their effects is important 
for improving the ongoing design and modification of public sector 
tendering. Additionally, as findings indicate that separate cases can share 
a common mechanism, it increases the generalisability and external validity 
of findings. Knowledge of GMs and conditions that stimulate or constrain 
competitive effects can also help to ensure (or avoid) their reproduction. 
Case firms like The Local Care Company that does not exercise  market 
positioning routines tend to have weaker relations with their tendering 
environment. This limits market information and market positioning 
capabilities. Domiciliary Ltd uses a resource assembly mechanism for 
tender completion  by hiring an external consultant, but its execution is 
unusual and with limited effects; a lack of market positioning and 
productivity mechanisms block firm capacity to acquire knowledge that is 
necessary to create and reconfigure tender routines, seen in other cases.  
Generative mechanisms are sensitive to different contexts, where many 
social factors exist; existing tendering experience and contract knowledge 
of an arising opportunity, the firm relationship to the tendered contract, such 
as being the incumbent provider, procurer behaviour or competitor 
behaviour. So, the outcome of a mechanism is always contextual. It is also 
dependent on other mechanisms, meaning that it has contingent causality 
(Edwards et al, 2014). Mechanisms can explain better what is happening 
in the real world, but not necessarily to predict it.  To explains what happens 
inside a firm to tender, we cannot merely rely on observation. 
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8.8 Successful tendering routines that encase capability  
 
Firm tendering knowledge is encased inside routines that are constructed 
from resources and experience. Some firms however have unexercised 
causal powers, where resource profits fail to reach a firm’s tendering 
capability. This is seen in the findings where some firms possess 
accreditations and public sector experience but it is not exploited as a form 
of knowledge or social capital to win more public sector business. 
Tendering capability is costly as it also a continuum, and resources, 
especially knowledge, can quickly depreciate.  Tendering is understood as 
an inter-dependent flow of processes, where routines interlock into recipes 
for creating forms of capability. Further, by studying routines, it has been 
possible to offer a fuller explanation of thematic forms of capabilities, as 
shown in Figure 8. 5 below. 
Figure 8.5 A dynamic capability framework for public sector tendering  
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relate to other cases: Can they be considered rules of success, best 
practice, ways of exploring uncertainty and building novel organisational 
artefacts etc.? Are they likely to succeed if transferred to other (inevitably 
different) situations? What are dangers of them being hardened as 
rules/heuristics even within the historic development of this firm?   
Cross-case analysis shows that not all firms recognise a need to have a set 
of capabilities underpinned by routines to become or stay successful at 
tendering. There are different interpretations of a routine across firms and 
similar routines operate with different resource endowments, so different 
results are achieved. With regard to existing literature and capabilities, 
entrepreneurial and dynamic capability theory has previously been used to 
explore capability for strategic choice, product market, competition and 
perceived capabilities, all from the small firm perspective. Four capability 
themes are known about that facilitate capability to sell to large 
organisations, but not necessarily to public procurers (Woldesenbat et al, 
2011). These are (1) entrepreneurial capability to identify and act upon 
opportunities;(2) networking and bridging capability to influence resource 
configuration and relationship building through effective communication (3) 
resource integrating capability to build minimum stock resource levels and 
to re-assess resource acquisition, and development; and (4) strategic 
service delivery capabilities; unique processes and routines to deliver and 
to differentiate firm position in the marketplace. Aside from that, literature 
endorses experience accumulation as a general mechanism to generate 
capability (Blackburn and Smallbone, 2008).  
 
The capabilities identified in this study are complex, shaped through firm 
routines, inter-related and contextually shaped. Tendering creates a 
specialist market and small firms who choose to become expert in it can 
survive in it, dependent upon their resources and routines. It demands 
forms of capital quite detached from the service they are tendering for. 
Findings show that across-firm structural conditioning capabilities and 
tender completion capabilities routines possess both operational and 
dynamic properties. It had capacity for innovative responses to tender 
284 
 
situations in the face of contextual constraints. Knowledge comes from 
individual and firm level tendering practice at the interface with procurers. 
Knowledge is then codified into firm level routines and then often into 
artefacts such as tender completion checklists and a written tendering 
strategy. Some routines arise and change as a direct result of external 
demand, others through firm learning; doing, imitating, experimenting and 
strategic reflexivity. Routines are created, deployed, reproduced and 
adapted through environmental learning and entrepreneurial orientation, 
created by firm-level agency as a response to dynamic context. Dynamic 
capabilities in the firm co-evolve in harmony with the case firm’s operating 
environment. With regard to agency, it is significantly endowed in firm 
culture as well as in its routines, particularly with regard to resource 
mobilisation. 
As designers of competitive practices, small firm leaders in case data have 
produced unexpected solutions to tendering instances. They have been 
seen to fulfil tender requirements with incomplete information and to 
tolerate uncertainty in dynamic external conditions. The knowledge they 
display in developing a set of routines is emergent, not expert, and requires 
knowledge of processes that are complex, contextual and continually 
changing. This does not mean that any case is necessarily perfect or that 
FFL is more competitive than S4U; what can be induced is that a design 
process exists for each firm,  where tendering renders firms more or less 
capable to respond to a given public procurement context, through the 
effects of agency and resources.  
 
  8.9 Implications of the research for theory, policy and practice   
 
This thesis is significant and highly relevant, both practically and 
academically, and it represents an important contribution to small firm and to 
capability literatures. 
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8.9.1 Implications for small firms tendering practice  
 
Small firms can learn to build and renew their tendering capability using three 
ideas from this thesis. The ideas are: i) to introduce or formalise routines for 
different stages of a tendering process; ii) to use the notion of context as core 
to their tendering approach; and, iii) to investigate where and when firm-level 
learning about tendering  can occur and be put to work.  
 
First, thesis findings show that capability building goes beyond experience. 
Knowledge accumulated inside a firm can be codified into routines. Routines 
act as ‘knowledge deposit boxes’ that can achieve distributed memory and 
improve informed decision-taking inside a firm. Successful firms use specific 
routines for specific purposes; for example, to investigate markets and 
competitors, or to understand what is required from a tender specification by 
interpreting difficult questions. This finding is a major step forward in helping 
SMEs to understand the rules of participation. The isolation of fifteen routines 
adds clarity and knowledge to what can specifically influence capability in small 
firms. Not all firms need all routines, and it is possible to see routines in a 
hierarchical order, with basic operational routines at the bottom such as 
searching for tenders, and more sophisticated ones at the top aimed at 
inimitability, including market blocking for competitors. Some routines for 
tendering are more important than others. Firms need processes to adhere to, 
and keep abreast of, regulatory protocols. They require access to, if not 
ownership of, specialist resources to meet legal and regulatory requirements 
that then require intelligent mobilisation. Barriers to entry can be high, so 
specialist knowledge of how to build competitive routines that capture 
knowledge requirements is a novel idea for tendering.  
 
Even so, this thesis shows that competitive routines are by nature temporal 
and require re-investment. Whilst procurement practice is itself amenable in 
part to rationalisation, operational routines in themselves do not create 
sustainable competitiveness. Two routines, termed dynamic capabilities, 
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enable firms to change their routines to stay competitive. Thesis findings show  
that a dynamic capability for environmental learning enables a small firm to 
build new routines; for example, to read tender questions and answer them,  
and to adapt existing routines such as adopting a distributed approach to 
tender opportunity selection and fulfilment. An entrepreneurial orientation 
dynamic capability has shown how it has enabled a case firm to take calculated 
risks, develop self-efficacy to manipulate market practices and to set a 
tendering strategy that inhibited competitor growth in targeted spatial areas. 
Small firms can reflect on if they have or should have each of these dynamic 
capabilities. 
 
Second, small firms can use the notion of context to construct competitive 
behaviours. Thesis findings about small firm capability reveal that it holds a 
contingent and temporal relationship with its external environment. This is 
because tendering capability centres around market understanding and 
interpretation. As such, small firms not only need to think about what resources 
and routines are required to know what ‘tendering capability’ looks like inside 
their firm. They also have to consider competitive practice in relation to selling 
their product or service to the public sector in changing, contextual conditions. 
Tendering takes place in a dynamically competitive environment that requires 
constant recalibration to build defences to competition, shape specifications, 
orchestrate firm assets through managerial cognition and reconfigure firm 
routines through reflexive learning. Competitive dynamism varies across 
sector, location and product or service supplied. This is about looking beyond 
ubiquitous contexts of tendering encased in regulatory protocols to recognising 
discrete temporal, sectoral, geographic, market and other conditions that apply 
to the firm for each tendering episode. It is important that small firms place 
themselves in the wider contextual environment. In this way, firms can acquire 
the distinguishing characteristics of expert performers though being a 
collective cognitive actor (Peteraf and Shanley, 1997). This involves adapting 
to unstable contexts that goes beyond displaying cognitive efficiency; self-
reflective and other-reflective behaviour is also necessary (Feldmand and 
Pentland, 2003).  
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Third, tenders are cooperative structures to allow firm participants pursue their 
ends, subject to regulatory and policy rules. Yet the social system cannot be 
neutral in impact, and firms must make their resources appear relevant to the 
public market, and to do this they need to learn continuously. It is not enough 
to consider only their product or service, and create a firm culture that can build 
and sustain high levels of absorptive capacity capable of instigating 
endogenous change.  
 
Firm level learning is self-regulated, so small firm owners can be made aware 
of their knowledge acquisition and retention culture. It is important to recognise 
mechanisms that exist to acquire and absorb knowledge into the firm and 
between individuals within the firm. Resource investment resides in these 
processes and getting people to adapt routines and use existing ones requires 
the presence of cognitive antecedents and motivational antecedents. 
Cognitive antecedents include using the framework as a process for 
knowledge acquisition using human capital investment. Motivational 
antecedents include leadership to coo-ordinate and mobilise resources. This 
makes environmental learning a critical dynamic capability in small firms to 
achieve sustainable tendering success; mechanisms to perpetuate knowledge 
acquisition over time may vary from firm to firm but are necessary to construct 
and critique tendering performance attempts.   
Finally, and despite firm heterogeneity and societal positioning, it is good 
practice for all small firms to consider developing a set of sensitising concepts 
that consolidate the utility of routines, an appreciation of context and firm-level 
learning. This thesis shows that it can include having: an effective tendering 
production unit, specialist knowledge of tendering systems and procurement 
language to interpret a tender specification and complete a compliant and 
competitive response; the ability to continuously draw in learning and integrate 
it into the firm to build  longer term market access; market compliance, 
relevance and market legitimacy credentials; formalised artefacts for 
legitimacy, e.g. policies, financial indemnity cover; co-ordinating mechanisms 
for tender finding, selection and completion; knowledge acquisition and 
retention procedures; effective deliberation and decision making; resource 
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mobilisation and co-ordination and ensuring designated responsibility for 
keeping knowledge current.  
8.9.2 Implications of research for theory 
 
This thesis makes a valuable contribution to literature. First, it applies a critical 
realist ontology and epistemology to explore small firm tendering capability. 
Critical realism has offered a useful set of social theory concepts to explore 
the nature of small firm capability (structure and agency, the notion of 
generative mechanisms with tendencies, a stratified view of reality to define 
public sector tendering and firm capability within a wider morphogenetic cycle) 
to examine the interaction of practice with context.  
The concept of laminated structure is useful to show how power is held by, and 
exists between entities, where small firms are one entity within a much wider 
social system. The powers are hidden mechanisms with tendencies, and both 
the literature review and empirical data collected for this thesis has clearly 
identified generative mechanisms with tendencies that affect small firm 
capability. For example, policy makers cause procurement teams to increase 
the breadth and depth of questions built into tenders, and in one case 
observed, significantly change scoring criteria. In turn, firms need to acquire 
knowledge to interpret and respond to raised resource requirements that 
increases tendering costs. Small firm agency is also shown as a generative 
mechanism, explained through two dynamic capabilities, entrepreneurial 
orientation and environmental learning, because they create different 
performance levels between firms. Research findings then make bold claims 
in relation to existing literature by providing a theoretical model that can explain 
the role of agency in developing capability to craft whilst acknowledging the 
complexity of the tendering environment with its set of structural conditions. 
Generative mechanisms in this thesis are found to be firm agency at firm level, 
and embodied within the structural powers of entities in a laminated tendering 
institution. The documentation of mechanisms and their effects is important for 
improving the ongoing design and modification of public sector tendering. 
Additionally, as findings indicate that separate cases can share a common 
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mechanism it increases the generalisability and external validity of findings. 
Knowledge of generative mechanisms and conditions that stimulate or 
constrain competitive effects can also help to ensure (or avoid) their 
reproduction.  
The thesis shows how firms access an interpretation of reality through their 
individual exploration of social mechanisms and their effects. Case data shows 
that not all firms will experience the same effects as they invariably hold 
different positions within social structures. It therefore alerts researchers to the 
primary importance of exploring structural conditions that shape the 
capabilities small firms can accrue. Findings allows the researcher to claim 
that context cannot be treated as a static concept, and a firm’s tendering 
capability cannot be fully observed in isolation from its temporal environment. 
Tendering then is a context-specific performance, and the application of a 
stratified ontology enables tendering to be presented as a laminated structure. 
This emphasises the stratified nature of reality and the two-way nature of 
interaction, whereby entities shape and become modified themselves by other 
forms of agential power. This thesis has attempted to highlight both the 
structural and agential relationships that exist within one particular social 
system for small firms, public tendering. 
The concept of emergence is a powerful critical realist tool for explaining how 
change takes place in small firm capability through a continuous cycle of 
interaction between firms and their social environment (Elder-Vass, 2007). 
Exploring small firm tendering capability to tender from a social theory 
perspective and adoption of the morphogenetic approach (Archer, 1995) as an 
analytical tool has elaborated understanding of the social context within which 
tendering firms find themselves. This thesis applies a morphogenetic approach 
at the level of society Archer (2013) and in a tendering environment affords an 
examination the roles of the different entities within the overall public 
procurement system.  
Second, this study presents an empirical evaluation of the role of absorptive 
capacity in small firm tendering. Researchers are given data about firm 
learning which suggests that tendering cannot be explained by experience 
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accumulation alone. Existing literature makes claims to learning through 
experience (Erridge et al, 1999; Blackburn and Smallbone, 2008) and it also 
states that unsuccessful performance attempts reduce learning capacity 
(Smallbone, 2009), yet it is not able to articulate what is encased within the 
black box of internal firm tendering performance attempts. Existing empirical 
studies show that prior experience is valuable as an initial form of human 
capital (Blackburn and Smalbone, 2008) Similarly, social capital through 
network belonging is alluded to but not explored. This thesis contributes a 
novel application of absorptive capacity (AC) to explore small firm tendering 
capability. Specific components of a firm’s stocks of AC have been identified, 
explained and shown how they are deliberately acquired and amenable to 
change.  
 
The conditions under which AC can provide value can also be explained. 
Previously, the utility of AC has been described as a capacity to learn and 
solve problems (Kim, 1998). This study has located routines within which 
stocks of AC can reside. AC has been found to increase through the presence 
of environmental learning as a dynamic capability. Environmental and internal 
structural conditions place AC into a potential or realised state, and thesis 
findings show that a firm’s capacity to use learning is contingent upon a 
combination of routines to mobilise knowledge.  
 
To date, no studies can be found that explain a process for assimilating and 
modifying imported knowledge into firm tendering routines. It supports the 
argument that small firm tendering capability can be agentially controlled 
through firm level ability to value, assimilate and apply new knowledge (Cohen 
and Levinthal, 1990). This study has highlighted how it is possible to 
empirically evaluate the role absorptive capacity plays in small firm tendering 
capability, even if case firms do not recognise tendering episodes as a learning 
environment. It is shown that the same routines in different firms have different 
dimensions of capability, whether it is just to get the job done or to do so more 
competitively than others.  
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The theoretical framework developed through this thesis is a whole new way 
of thinking about small firm capability to procure for public sector tenders. From 
a novel critical realist perspective, it demonstrates that small firm procurement 
capability is more complex than stated in existing literature as it is contingent 
upon pre-existing structural conditions that precede firm action. The thesis 
approaches the subject from an entirely new perspective; the perspective of 
successful small firms’ patterns of behaviour, encased in combinations of their 
routines and associated resources. To date, routines literature has adopted a 
more static and closed position to their utility. By adding a contextual 
dimension to their identification and role, it is possible to realise why some 
contexts make some capabilities and routines more important than others.  
The new conceptualisation of how to consider how small firms can become 
successful tenderers sites capability as a core component, but only one of 
three components; capability, learning and institutional context, that can be 
theoretically explored. By explaining tendering as a specific regulatory 
capability in a wider social context, performance attempts are framed within 
specific institutional environmental episodes. The combined theoretical model 
can be tested by other researchers of small firms. 
 
8.9.3 Implications of research for policy makers  
 
Small firms’ policy remains a central plank of the UK government’s Industrial 
Strategy (UK Government Green Paper, 2017), with procurement access for 
small firms awarded an entire chapter in the 2017 Government Green Paper. 
Research findings from this thesis can shape inclusive policy development at 
national and regional levels. The theoretical chapter discussed the notion of 
agent sensitivity and insensitivity (Hodgson, 2006). Research findings offer 
examples of agent insensitivity, the most significant being the pace of 
change. Other examples given in chapters six and seven include use of 
unclear and compound question, poor quality feedback given by a procurers 
on tender performance attempts to case firms and insufficient deployment of 
expertise to deal with small firm information requests, including one example 
relating to erroneous TUPE data that caused a case firm to involve legal 
experts. The thesis then offers clues about how policy makers can encourage 
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agent sensitivity in procurers. The British government should reflect on the 
current institutional framework to which small firms must respond to compete. 
This means analysing not only the demands made through procurement but 
also the rate of change in this process and the demands this place on learning 
and innovation. Policy makers may also wish to reflect on the likelihood that 
– in responding to this context – small firms will have limited resources to 
development other modes of business development. Asking small firms and 
social enterprises to both become more commercial and to succeed in 
tendering may well be naïve.  
 
At the level of tender procurement, policy professionals can set standards 
that they encourage procurement teams to follow. Examples include better 
explanations to how to use regulatory language and terms, by asking 
straightforward questions that require less interpretive effort, signalling  clues 
where information requires repetition between questions and using examples 
that are relatable to small firm practices. Procurers could also be asked to 
offer transparent guidance with their tender specification. Public bodies could 
use the findings of this thesis to develop better guidelines for tender feedback 
to help small firms reflect on their context and their capabilities and to 
improve. There is no reason why a policy cannot be put in place that provides 
more in-depth summative feedback to firms under a certain threshold size or 
turnover, or to provide formative guidance about how to build routines. There 
is significant value in any form of policy instrument that  helps small firms to 
think about the detailed capabilities and routines in this thesis that have 
worked for other successful small firms. At a time of Brexit, the theoretical 
framework can assist with modelling future challenges, risks and 
opportunities as European regulation  applied to tendering is scutinised for 
its ongoing utility in a post Brexit UK. 
 
8.10 Implications for the direction of future study 
 
Reflecting on this study suggests a number of implications with regard to 
further research. Firstly, future research could explore the question of how 
tendering regulation shapes firm behaviour as a longitudinal study.  The 
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comparative case study is based on two successful firms and data from 
three other firms that were selected on the basis of tendering participation, 
not success. In this sense, the re-use of pilot data sets offered limited 
inference. A natural further question to be posed is whether there is 
variation across different kinds of companies and representing different 
stages of company life cycle. These issues, together with the project life 
cycle dynamics for the capability domains, should be studied further.  
Secondly, the proposed fifteen routines, organised into capability domains, 
could be evaluated through a wider survey for empirical corroboration. A 
different method, or the same method with a different sample of firms, may 
have shown different results. It is possible to identity further generative 
mechanisms from the data at micro-level and so no claim is made to a full 
discovery of generative mechanisms as sensitising concepts. 
Nevertheless, the methodology was rigorously followed, albeit that a longer 
time-frame may have identified new patterns or themes.  
 
Thirdly, further research could increase the utility of the explorative model 
of routines and capability to increase small firm productivity in areas other 
than tendering, such as navigating tax regulations. In this sense, it could 
act as a framework to develop practitioner capabilities in different areas of 
small firm management.  
 
Fourthly, the thesis opened with mention of the UK 2016 Brexit decision, 
which has significant implications for how EU law may be repealed in 
relation to public sector tendering. The effects of Brexit upon this research 
topic open up an invitation for further research to explore if it can enable, 
not frustrate, small firm productivity building in delivering more products and 
services into the public sector. Therefore, a study of Brexit or a different 
institutional environment such as the Unites States would add to contextual 
knowledge of tendering practice in small firms literature. 
 
8.11 Study limitations  
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This study has some limitations that suggest a number of directions for future 
research. The first limitation is caused by a lack of existing empirical data in 
the research field about small firm tendering capability from the firm’s 
perspective. The in-depth focus to develop a typology of routines and a 
capability framework lacks broader comparison beyond four other cases. 
Applying the capability framework identified in chapter six to other firms would 
widen the generalisations of findings across wider contexts.  A stronger 
evidence base is required before bold claims can be made. A more 
comprehensive analysis of the context might also highlight other routines and 
structural conditions that enable or constrain capability emergence.  
 
A second limitation relates to limitations of time to observe how routines 
emerge and how the same routine in a firm can differ over time between 
tendering episodes. How and why routines change would contribute to 
understanding micro-foundations of firm behaviour across successful and 
unsuccessful events.  These limitations suggest possible directions for further 
research.   
 
8.12 Concluding remarks   
 
This thesis demonstrates the limits of an agency perspective on small firm 
tendering capability in existing literature, and it offers a micro-foundational 
approach of the agency perspective through a small, exploratory study. It 
has suggested how capability can be conceptualised into a framework that 
is contingent on combinations of resources into routines, and yet it also 
points out that routines do not in themselves constitute capability.  
Firm action has been expressed through a comparative case discussion of 
resource command in fifteen routines, upon which capability is built. In 
doing so it has emphasised the multi-dimensional resource and capability 
requirements demanded from public sector tendering character. 
The thesis illustrates the complexity of understanding small firm tendering 
capability. Tendering is a carousel of opportunities and decision-making, 
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where the enactment of identified routines can be strategic, reactive, 
deliberate or the result of unintended consequences, shaped by exercise 
of firm-level agency. It has asked novel research questions and presented 
core ideas that add cogency to understanding tendering capability beyond 
case firms studied in this thesis. 
Firstly, capability is a continuous generative mechanism, exercised 
through agency. Agency exists at firm level, and this may itself be an 
institution. Capability is socially conditioned, and it can take hidden forms. 
Tendering capability has historically been treated as a structural process 
that largely ignores the influence of human agency. This study has 
reconceptualised tendering as an agential exercise.  
Existing literature implicates resource poverty as a primary causal factor in 
SME under-representation in public sector contract awards. Resource 
poverty can contingently impact on small firm tendering capability but it 
does not need to exist for active agency to occur. Firms can occupy a 
strong capability to deliver a particular service, but they also need a set of 
specialist capabilities to sell this to public procurers. 
Secondly,  tendering is defined in the thesis as a social institution that has 
a laminated structure, giving firms different access to resources through 
their social positioning. Findings in chapters six and seven show that small 
firms do not experience social structures uniformly; they inhabit the 
tendering institution in different ways. The social practice of tendering is 
dependent upon a firm having resources, but cannot be reduced to just the 
existence of resources. Tendering capability is amenable to causal 
analysis. Consideration of the structural conditions as well as firm agency 
matters to explaining small form tendering performance. 
Thirdly, this thesis has shown that tendering is amenable to routinisation, 
where combinations of resources and routines exist that support firm 
tendering capabilities. These core ideas are useful for firms to consider, 
whilst not a prescription for success, as markets and market competition 
remains volatile. 
296 
 
The study began by asking three research questions, using a depth 
ontology to explain the relationship between firm tendering capability and 
contexts for capability execution.  
The first research question asked, ’What are the practices, expressed as 
routines that generate capability to successfully tender in the case firm?’  
A set of fifteen inter-linked tendering routines, built from resources that 
possess operational and dynamic properties, has been identified. Dynamic 
capabilities and agency create operational capabilities. Their existence 
leverages capacity to mount innovative responses to tender situations in 
the face of contextual constraints. By doing so, the study extends 
knowledge of the nature and composition of tendering routines. It shows 
tendering activity is amenable to routinisation that can be situated in regular 
patterns of knowledge, skills and action. This discovery fulfils an omission 
in existing literature about how tendering routines are subject to active 
modification, both incremental and transformational, through deliberate 
exercise of agency in small firms. It offers a better understanding of the 
structural antecedents of routine emergence and adaptation, whether that 
is incremental or transformational in nature. This is a missing micro-
foundation in extant work on routines and capabilities, which in turn has led 
to a lack of work on the origins of organisational routines and capabilities 
that underpin small firm tendering capability. 
 
The second question asked, ‘What causal powers exist within the 
tendering environment to constrain and enable small firm tendering 
performance?’ Tendering as a social system is mutually reliant upon the 
choice of individuals within firms to participate in tendering exercises and 
their creation by public procurers. Tendering remains an experimental 
process, and adverse market conditions can reverse capability in small 
firms because they are more vulnerable to market turbulence.  
However, the thesis has shown how firm agency can co-determine the 
outcome of a tendering performance, enacted through its routines. This 
makes the emergence of social uniformity highly conditional upon its 
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causal mechanisms. Therefore, the comparative nature of this study has 
been to identify and explain forms of capability as  generative mechanisms 
and their display through routines to show a novel presence or an absence 
of regularity. By doing so, routines can explain tendering as operational 
and dynamic modes of capability action. Prior to this study, a relationship 
did not exist in the literature between capability enactment and the 
structural conditions of a firm’s operating environment. It now does, and 
the thesis adds to contemporary debates about small firm capability 
construction. 
 
The third research question, ‘To what extent, and how, do small firms learn 
to improve their tendering capability through repeated tendering 
experiences?’ is answered by case findings. Data reveal that service skills 
cannot create contract growth without knowing about tendering capability. 
It tells us that managerial skills are required to organise resources around 
an opportunity to complete a successful tender and to draw learning from 
it. Also, that as firm behaviour is strongly influenced by the purchasing 
environment, then absorptive capacity is a relevant theory to explain ‘how 
to know.’ The research question enquires into how small firms acquire, 
assimilate and apply knowledge to tendering performances. Comparative 
case findings show that tendering performance is more than just doing it 
repeatedly. Firm learning is itself a generative mechanism for marketplace 
sustainability. Case firms such as The Local Carer and Domiciliary Ltd 
clearly stay in a state of arrested development. As such, DCs ameliorate 
the chances of routines becoming redundant.  
 
This thesis has delivered three forms of knowledge to extant literature: i) a 
theoretical methodological contribution; ii) an empirical contribution, and; iii) 
implications for policy and practice. There are no other empirical examples 
that explicitly attempt to trace the formation and development of small firm 
routines to enact a tendering episode, and none other known about that 
studies successful routines or uses a critical realist interpretation of firm 
action. The distinctive nature of the contribution from this thesis is its micro-
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foundational process perspective on firm level actions and behaviours 
through use of a qualitative case study approach. The study proposes a 
novel theoretical framework to explain small firm tendering and a set of 
thinking tools for small firms to use; a good practice arising from critical 
realist ontology. Critical realists cannot give a prescription for capability, but 
the suggestion of sensitising concepts in a capability framework is a useful 
place to start the conversation. 
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